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Abstract 
This project deals with the ongoing importance of nations, cultures, and politics in the 
modern world, and with the complex and layered relationships between them. Despite the 
expanding phenomenon of globalization, which promises to open up borders and tear down 
the boundaries between peoples, nations remain the most important actors in international 
politics and nationalism continues to be a potent force throughout the world. This project 
explores the significance of nations and cultures for politics, with special emphasis on the 
importance of nationalism and nationalist theory in the twenty-first century. I argue that there 
are significant gaps in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism, and I 
address these gaps by turning to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau’s 
philosophy uniquely combines nationalism with republican citizenship and participatory 
democracy, and his perspective shares many commonalities with David Miller, a 
contemporary nationalist thinker who combines the principle of nationality with republican 
citizenship. I argue that the theories of Rousseau and Miller form the foundations of 
republican nationalism; a unique strand of nationalist theory that is distinct from other 
perspectives―and from liberal nationalism in particular―and should be treated as separate 
in the literature. I seek to develop republican nationalism as a theoretical framework that 
looks at the major questions in the literature from a novel perspective and provides new 
solutions to some of the discipline’s most persistent problems. By identifying republican 
nationalism as an approach that is firmly rooted in the wider traditions of republicanism and 
nationalism, and by demonstrating that this approach is distinct from liberal nationalism and 
other alternative perspectives, I hope to make valuable contributions to the literature and help 
move the debate within nationalist theory forward. I conclude by emphasizing the continuing 
relevance of nations, cultures, and politics in the modern world, and by stressing that 
nationalism is likely to remain a potent force in world affairs. For this reason, it is still as 
crucial as ever to treat nations and nationalism as serious subjects of academic study, and to 
keep the debates currently taking place within nationalist theory moving forward. 
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Preface 
This project deals with the continuing importance of nations, cultures, and politics in 
the modern world, and with the complex and layered relationships between them. Despite the 
expanding phenomenon of globalization, which promises to open up borders and tear down 
the boundaries between peoples, nations remain the most important actors in international 
politics and nationalism continues to be a potent force throughout the world. Between 
separatist movements in places like Quebec and Catalonia, the Kurdish struggle for a national 
homeland and its implications for the already complex situation in the Middle East, and the 
international tensions between powerful nations such as China and Japan, the concept of “the 
nation” and the ideas and beliefs that accompany it still exercise immense influence over 
real-world actions and decisions. This project explores the continuing relevance of nations 
and cultures for politics, with special emphasis on the importance of nationalism and 
nationalist theory in the twenty-first century.  
 Much has been written about nations and nationalism, and about the meaning of these 
ideas for citizenship and democracy. Major questions on the subject include: Is nationalism 
compatible with democracy, or do nationalist movements naturally gravitate towards 
authoritarianism? Is nationalism inherently chauvinistic, or is it possible for nationalists to 
reject militarism and endorse equal respect for other nations (and for minorities within their 
own nations)? Can we keep matters of culture and nationality from biasing the political 
process, or does politics always involve cultural and national elements? Does national 
belonging still hold any value in the modern world, and is the value of political participation 
intrinsic or instrumental? Moreover, could it be that the nation-state is already an outdated 
concept, soon to be replaced by larger supranational bodies such as the European Union 
(EU)? I tackle these familiar and much debated questions from a fresh perspective by 
introducing a new theoretical approach which I call republican nationalism.  
 Republican nationalism is rooted in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is a 
central figure for this project because of his status as an influential thinker of the republican 
political tradition and the father of modern nationalism. I argue that Rousseau’s philosophy 
has been largely neglected in much of the contemporary literature on republicanism and 
nationalism, and this has left both traditions with significant theoretical gaps. Rousseau’s 
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approach uniquely combines nationalism with republican citizenship and participatory 
democracy, and a closer study of his work provides valuable insight into these important 
concepts. The second central figure for this project is David Miller, a contemporary 
nationalist thinker who attempts to combine the principle of nationality with republican 
citizenship in a way that shares many parallels with Rousseau. I argue that the works of 
Rousseau and Miller form the foundations of republican nationalism, a unique strand of 
nationalist theory that is distinct enough from other perspectives―and from liberal 
nationalism in particular―to be treated as separate in the literature. 
 My goal is to develop republican nationalism as a theoretical framework that looks at 
the major questions in the literature from a novel perspective and provides unique solutions 
to many of the problems posed. I hope that by identifying republican nationalism as an 
approach that is firmly rooted in the theoretical traditions of republicanism and nationalism, 
and by demonstrating that this approach is distinct from liberal nationalism and other 
alternative perspectives, I will be able to make valuable contributions to the literature and 
help move the debate within nationalist theory forward. More research will be needed to 
develop republican nationalism into the kind of serious approach to political decision-making 
that liberal nationalism has become thanks to the groundbreaking work of liberal thinkers 
like Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka. Nevertheless, I hope that this project will serve as an 
important first step in that direction by establishing republican nationalism as a distinct and 
defensible theoretical framework. 
 Chapter 1 deals with nations and nationalisms; it provides working definitions for 
“nation,” “nationalism,” and “nationalist theory” and gives an overview of the main debates 
that have been taking place within nationalist theory over the past several decades. The 
chapter identifies three distinct approaches to nationalism: ethnic nationalism, civic 
nationalism, and cultural nationalism. The debate between civic and ethnic nationalism had 
been the focus of nationalist scholarship for many years, but more recently many nationalist 
thinkers have argued that the civic vs. ethnic divide is misleading because all nationalisms 
have a fundamental cultural component. Cultural nationalism appears to be the framework 
within which the debate in nationalist theory is currently taking place, but there is still a great 
deal of diversity between theorists who identify as cultural nationalists. Liberal nationalism is 
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the most prominent strand of cultural nationalism, but I argue that the writings of Rousseau 
and Miller point towards a distinct republican alternative. 
 Because of the crucial role that republican political theory plays in developing the 
concept of republican nationalism, Chapter 2 looks at the historical development of 
republicanism. By identifying the major thinkers in the tradition and the distinct strands of 
republicanism that have emerged over time, I hope to demonstrate that there is a significant 
gap in the literature on republicanism concerning the role that culture and nationality play in 
politics. While the contemporary debate in republican political theory has largely been taking 
place between instrumental republicans on the one hand and civic humanists on the other, I 
argue that there is a third strand of republican theory rooted in the works of Rousseau, who 
makes an intrinsic connection between the national culture and participatory democracy. 
Rousseau’s cultural approach to republicanism has been largely neglected by contemporary 
republican thinkers, but it offers valuable insights into the important connection between 
culture and politics, and between nationalism and democracy. 
 Due to Rousseau’s central importance for both republican and nationalist theory, 
Chapters 3 & 4 take an in-depth look at his philosophy. Chapter 3 considers the significant 
contributions that Rousseau has made to republicanism, while Chapter 4 argues that 
Rousseau’s philosophy is fundamentally distinct from liberalism and cannot be subsumed 
under the wider liberal umbrella (as thinkers like Joshua Cohen have attempted to do). I 
contend that Rousseau is both a distinctly republican thinker and the founder of modern 
nationalism; the fundamental connection that he makes between republicanism and 
nationalism points towards a distinct strand of nationalist theory that I call republican 
nationalism. 
 Chapter 5 defines the concept of republican nationalism through a comparison of 
Rousseau’s writings and the works of David Miller. While there are notable differences 
between the two, Rousseau and Miller embark on very similar projects; in fact, I argue that 
Miller accepts the fundamentals of Rousseau’s republicanism, and that his theory amounts to 
a sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s philosophy. Chapter 6 contrasts the liberal 
nationalism of Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka with republican nationalism. I aim to show 
that the two approaches are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate classifications within 
 xi 
 
nationalist theory, and I identify six major differences between liberal and republican 
nationalism in order to illustrate this point. 
 The final chapter (Chapter 7) restates my main claims and arguments, considers the 
contributions that this project has made to the literature on republicanism and nationalism, 
and addresses some important questions that proponents of republican nationalism will have 
to grapple with in the future. I conclude by emphasizing the continuing relevance of nations, 
cultures, and politics in the modern world, and by stressing that nationalism is likely to 
remain a potent force in world affairs for the foreseeable future. For this reason, it is still as 
crucial as ever to treat nations and nationalism as serious subjects of academic study, and to 
keep the debates currently taking place within nationalist theory moving forward. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Nations and Nationalism 
Our contemporary understanding of the “nation” and consequently of 
“nationalism” developed as part of a complex and often turbulent process that took place 
over many centuries.  Historically nationalism has taken on a variety of diverse forms, 
from left-wing emancipatory and anti-colonial nationalism to imperialist chauvinism and 
fascism. While some aspects of nationalist theory can be said to date back to antiquity, 
other aspects appear to be quintessentially modern. These and others circumstances have 
made it difficult and often controversial to theorize about nationalism and its 
implications, and the word itself continues to have different meanings to different people. 
In this chapter, I consider the continuing relevance of nationalism in the modern world, 
and I identify three primary theoretical frameworks within nationalist theory: 1) ethnic 
nationalism, 2) civic nationalism, and 3) cultural nationalism. Ethnic nationalism 
presupposes a common national identity based on ethnic ties, while civic nationalism 
postulates a civic commitment to common political principles, practices, and institutions. 
Neither purely civic nor strictly ethnic, cultural nationalism presupposes a common 
public culture that is not defined by ethnic ties and yet requires more than a civic 
commitment to common principles and practices. Cultural nationalism emphasizes the 
importance of a common public culture for nations and their citizens; these citizens need 
not belong to any particular ethnic, religious, or tribal group, but they do need to accept a 
set of shared traditions, moral commitments, and responsibilities within the political 
community. Ultimately, this chapter argues that cultural nationalism is the framework 
within which the current debate about nationalist theory is taking place. I aim to clarify 
the terms of this debate, and I argue that nationalism remains a potent force in the twenty-
first century.  
1.1 What Is a Nation? 
In On Nationality, David Miller identifiers five elements that distinguish 
nationality from other collective sources of identity. These are: 1) national communities 
are constituted by belief; their existence depends on a shared belief that its members 
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belong together and on the common desire of those members to continue living together 
in the future. 2) A nation is an identity that embodies historical continuity; the nation is a 
unique form of association because it stretches backwards in the past and forwards in the 
future, forming a distinct community of obligation between us, our ancestors, and our 
descendants. 3) National identity is an active identity; national communities actively 
work together to make decisions, achieve goals, and so on. 4) National identity connects 
a group of people to a specific geographical location; every nation has a homeland and 
either is or aspires to become a political community. 5) National identity demands that 
the individuals who share it have something in common. Miller defines this commonality 
as a set of characteristics that constitute a common public culture; this public culture goes 
beyond mere political principles and represents a shared understanding about how a 
group of people should conduct their life together. A common public culture should not 
be so all-embracing that it destroys private subcultures, but it should have substantial 
content and meaning for members of the national community.1 These five elements are 
helpful to keep in mind when considering what constitutes a nation, and how the nation 
differs from other forms of group association.  
 As human beings we are social creatures who live almost exclusively in 
communities of some type, and the bonds that are created within these communities often 
translate into a powerful sense of allegiance and belonging. It is nearly impossible to 
imagine the individual as being completely independent of his communal context, and it 
would be impossible to reduce human beings to atomistic individuals who exist prior to 
society. As Neil MacCormick observes, “the truth about human beings is that they can 
only become individuals―acquire a sense of their own individuality―as a result of their 
social experiences within human communities. Thus ‘the individual’ is as much a product 
of ‘society’ as vice versa. Even political individualism is a program for social 
organization.”2 With this in mind, it is clear that studying the nation as one of the most 
                                                 
 
1
 David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 22-27.  
 
2
 Neil MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. Ronald Beiner 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 189. 
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powerful forms of social organization in the modern world is an essential component of 
studying human beings in general. 
 It is important not to confuse the nation with the state. According to Miller, the 
“nation” is a community of people with an aspiration for political self-determination, 
whereas the “state” refers to the set of political institutions that the nation seeks to 
establish for itself.3 On the one hand, states are seen as legalistic and largely procedural 
entities which, to paraphrase Max Weber, have a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force within their sovereign territory and seek to uphold laws and protect their citizens 
from harm. On the other hand, to paraphrase Ernest Renan, nations refer to cultural 
communities constituted by a form of popular consciousness rather than legal procedures, 
including a shared sense of a common past and a present will to live together. It is also 
important to differentiate between nationality and ethnicity: there are nations which have 
been formed by a single and largely homogeneous ethnic group (e.g. Japan), and there are 
also nations which were formed out of many different ethnic groups (e.g. United States, 
Canada, and even France).4 As Neil MacCormick points out,  
A nation is constituted by a relatively large grouping of people who conceive 
themselves to have a communal past, including shared sufferings and shared 
achievements, from which past is derived a common culture that represents a 
form of cultural continuity uniting past and present and capable of  being 
projected into the future. This continuity is not a static one, but is in a sense 
“organic.” The common culture, the common way of doing and living, the 
common language (though nations need not be identified with a single language, 
e.g., Switzerland), have changed over time, but the changes occur within and 
make sense within an uninterrupted tradition, and stem from each generation’s 
own choices, as distinct from having been imposed ab extra.5 
Benedict Anderson famously argued that nations are “imagined communities” constituted 
by a group of people who see themselves as members of a particular national community 
                                                 
 
3
 Miller, On Nationality, 19.  
 
4
 Ibid., 21. 
 
5
 MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” 191.   
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sharing a common history.6 Their understanding of this common history may include 
unsubstantiated myths and fictitious accounts of historical events, but this does not take 
away from the fact that the people in question hold these myths as important aspects of a 
common history and tradition. Out of this tradition emerge a shared consciousness and a 
sense of common identity that play a real and important part in the lives of the members 
of a national community.7 Although nations may be imagined communities and although 
they may often be grounded in less than accurate historical accounts, they are real 
because they exist in the shared consciousness of their members and play a significant 
role in the lives of those members. Every single day crucially important decisions with 
major practical consequences are made based on our understanding of nations, both our 
own nation and other nations which coexist alongside our own on the world stage. 
Though nations may exist only in our consciousness, this consciousness still shapes our 
actions and behaviours in meaningful ways. This means that nations and the complex 
issues that surround them are and continue to be a part of our common reality. 
1.2 What Is Nationalism? 
In Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Liah Greenfeld defines nationalism as a 
source of individual identity that is located within a “people,” seen as the bearer of 
sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.8 Greenfeld 
believes that nationalism forms the basis of the modern world, and she uses the word as 
an umbrella term which includes the related phenomena of national identity (or 
nationality) and consciousness, and collectivities based on these phenomena; i.e. nations. 
Occasionally nationalism refers to the articulate ideology on which national identity and 
consciousness rest, but nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism. 
Nationalism “is a political ideology (or a class of political ideologies deriving from the 
                                                 
 
6
 See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Revised Edition), (London & New York: Verso, 2006). 
 
7
 MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” 192.  
 
8
 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 3.  
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same basic principle), and as such it does not have to be identified with any particular 
community. A nation coextensive with humanity is in no way a contradiction in terms.”9 
The concept of a nation coextensive with humanity is certainly controversial within 
nationalist circles, but it speaks to the diversity of views that proponents of nationalism 
hold. On the one hand, the nation might refer to a sovereign people, which presupposes a 
political ideology that is not necessarily particularistic and is in fact inherently linked to 
democracy. On the other, the nation might also refer to a unique people, which is a 
particularistic conception and has the potential to become authoritarian. Nevertheless, 
Greenfeld emphasizes that nationalism was the form in which democracy first appeared 
in the world (embodied in the idea of the people as bearers of sovereignty); as such, 
nationalism originally developed as democracy. In fact, democracy and nationalism are 
“inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection.”10 
Greenfeld’s major point is that nationalism defines modernity, and that the idea of the 
“nation” forms the constitutive element of modernity. As such, modernity is defined by 
nationalism, and not the other way around.11 National identity preceded the formation of 
nations (the nation is a pre-political community), and it is nationalism which has made 
the modern world, politically, what it is today.12 These are important points, and we will 
return to them often in the coming chapters. In the following section, I consider the 
importance of nationalist theory, its development and contemporary relevance.    
1.3 What Is Nationalist Theory? 
Nationalism can be understood as a system of ideas and beliefs that places a high 
value on one’s attachments to the nation and national community. Some thinkers argue 
that nationalism does not qualify as a distinct ideology, and critics are skeptical about any 
form of nationalism being compatible with democratic values. According to Charles 
                                                 
 
9
 Ibid, 7.  
 
10
 Ibid, 10.  
 
11
 Ibid, 18.  
 
12
 Ibid, 21.  
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Taylor, however, critics of nationalism fail to adequately explain where nationalism gets 
its moral thrust.13 Nationalism can foster a strong sense of solidarity between elites and 
non-elites, rich and poor, peasants and intelligentsia; this is a real and politically 
significant solidarity based in common nationality. Before the 18th century, society was 
largely hierarchical and being a part of society meant belonging to a very specific 
segment of it, such as being part of a guild or being subject to a Lord. And yet today, “I 
stand, alongside all my fellow citizens, in direct relationship to the state that is the object 
of our common allegiance.”14 This is an important point, and it speaks to the continuing 
relevance of nationalism in the modern world. Having survived both communism and 
imperialism, and in spite of globalization and the recent push towards supranational 
organizations such as the EU, the nation-state remains the primary mode of political 
organization in the modern world, and common nationality is perhaps the strongest 
unifying force among human beings. 
 Benedict Anderson states that “unlike most other isms, nationalism has never 
produced its own grand thinkers: No Hobbes, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers.”15 
Ronald Beiner believes that this is in part because unlike other theories, nationalism is 
concerned with the particular: with distinct national contexts which shape each nation’s 
unique worldview. The particular circumstances of any given nation are often (though not 
always) so unique that they cannot be generalized into universal principles. The question 
is whether we can construct a general account of obligations, rights, and prohibitions that 
apply to all cases of nationalism, or whether different nationalisms are so diverse and 
embedded within their own particular contexts that all attempts to generalize them are 
futile.16 Furthermore, nationalism is an extremely diverse theoretical framework with 
many different strands. Historically, nationalist movements pushing for independence 
                                                 
 
13
  Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity,” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. Ronald Beiner 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 223. 
 
14
 Ibid., 224.   
 
15
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5. 
 
16
 Yael Tamir, “Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism,” in Theorizing Nationalism, 
ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 68.  
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from imperial and colonial powers have often been decisively left-wing, but the extreme 
right-wing and fascist movements of the interwar period have also claimed a nationalist 
legacy. As a result, nationalist claims are often viewed with suspicion, and theorists of 
nationalism are forced to be on the defensive. Moderate forms of nationalism are 
dismissed by critics as not constituting “real” nationalism, whereas “real” nationalism is 
immediately labeled as harmful and dangerous.17 In fact, the excesses of some self-
proclaimed nationalist movements have prompted critics to dismiss the very idea of 
nationalism as a return to a primitive and pre-modern tribalism which has no place in the 
modern world. Consequently, the question of whether nationalism is a modern or pre-
modern idea has been the subject of intense debate over the last several decades. I already 
mentioned Greenfeld’s take on the issue, but another compelling answer is provided by 
Miller, who states that our sense of nationality is both modern and pre-modern; while the 
sense of kinship and belonging to a community is not a modern idea, what is modern and 
distinctive about nationalism is the idea of a body of people capable of acting collectively 
and of conferring authority on political institutions. According to Miller, 
Ideas of national characters and so forth were of long-standing. What is new is the 
belief that nations can be regarded as active political agents, the bearers of the 
ultimate power of sovereignty. This in turn was connected to a new way of 
thinking about politics, the idea that institutions and policies could be seen as 
somehow expressing a popular national will.18 
Nevertheless, nationalism continues to be portrayed by critics as too sentimental, chaotic, 
and irrational to form a cohesive theoretical framework. For some, nationalism represents 
an emotional force that subverts reason and rational thinking, which makes it 
incompatible with Enlightenment values and therefore dangerous.19 Proponents of 
nationalism, including those attempting to construct a defensible academic theory of 
nationalism, must answer this criticism.  
                                                 
 
17
 Ibid., 71.  
 
18
 Miller, On Nationality, 30-31.  
 
19
 Tamir, “Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism,” 69.  
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 Yael Tamir argues that defensible theories of nationalism can in fact be 
constructed, and urges more scholars to contribute to the project.20 She states that: 
A theory of nationalism must structure itself independently of all contingencies. 
Its basis must be a systematic view of human nature and of the world order, as 
well as a coherent set of universally applicable values.… [A] theory of 
nationalism, like all other political theories, must be constructed in the abstract 
but cannot be implemented outside of a particular context.21  
According to Tamir, a theory of nationalism will include a particular set of descriptive 
statements followed by normative claims focusing on the moral, social, and 
psychological importance of national and cultural membership, which will in turn be 
followed by an inventory of the means necessary to preserve it. The major points on 
which nationalist theorists will disagree are: the nature of the relationship between the 
nation and its individual members, the normative justifications for the existence of the 
nation, and the political goals and aspirations that nationalism supports.22 Wayne Norman 
agrees that there is a need to theorize nationalism, arguing that philosophers have an 
important role to play in shaping nationalist studies in general. According to Norman, “a 
normative theory of nationalism should be concerned with the nature of national 
identities, the political attempts to forge them, the rhetoric and ideologies that are used in 
such attempts, and the principles nationalists use to justify these kinds of politics; among 
other things.”23 It is worth repeating that although nationalism is often referred to as “by 
far the most potent ideology in the world,” it is also considered the only major political 
ideology without a great theorist of its own. Anderson points out that the theorists of 
nationalism are often puzzled by the discrepancy between the political power and vitality 
of nationalism and its relative philosophical poverty and even incoherence.24 As 
                                                 
 
20
 Ibid., 68. 
 
21
 Ibid., 82. 
 
22
 Ibid., 84.  
 
23
 Wayne Norman, “Theorizing Nationalism (Normatively),” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. 
Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 57. 
 
24
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5.  
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previously mentioned, Anderson claims that nationalism never produced its own grand 
thinker such as Hobbes, Tocqueville, Marx, or Weber. Norman expands this list, adding 
Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls to the list of theorists whose equivalent nationalist theory 
lacks. While I support the call to develop nationalist theory into a more cohesive 
theoretical framework, I disagree with the claim that nationalism lacks its own great 
theorist. In the coming chapters I will argue that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is in fact the 
grand thinker of nationalist theory and the father of modern nationalism. I also suggest 
that Rousseau’s political philosophy forms the basis of a distinct republican strand of 
nationalist theory which merits closer academic consideration in the future. 
1.4 Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism 
For many years the central conflict within nationalist theory had been the debate 
between civic and ethnic nationalism. Michael Ignatieff defines civic nationalism as the 
belief “that the nation should be composed of all those―regardless of race, color, creed, 
gender, language, or ethnicity―who subscribe to the nation’s political creed,” and he 
understands the civic nation to be “a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united 
in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.”25 According to 
Ignatieff, the civic nation is a community created by the free choice of individuals to 
come together in order to uphold particular political values and practices. Civic 
nationalism is based on the freely given consent of each member of the nation and it 
looks at national belonging as a form of rational attachment. Civic nationalism is distinct 
from ethnic nationalism, which holds that our deepest attachments are inherited rather 
than chosen, and that the national community defines the individual rather than the other 
way around.26 In this context, civic nationalism was portrayed as the “good” and 
“rational” type of nationalism found in Western liberal democracies, whereas ethnic 
nationalism was dismissed as the “bad” and “dangerous” type of nationalism prevalent in 
non-Western states. The implication was that civic nationalism as defined by such 
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thinkers as Ignatieff and John Plamenatz constitutes the only defensible form of 
nationalism, whereas all other forms of nationalism were automatically seen as irrational 
and undesirable (ethnic, Eastern, dangerous).27  
 David Miller, Bernard Yack, Yael Tamir, and Will Kymlicka, among others, 
challenge the rather simplistic claim that Western nations embrace civic nationalism 
(which is good) while Eastern nations embrace ethnic nationalism (which is bad). Yack 
states: “the characterization of political community in the so-called civic nations as a 
rational and freely chosen allegiance to a set of political principles seems untenable to 
me, a mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking.”28 This is because all 
collective identities are in a constant process of development and interpretation, and even 
if collective identities such as American, Canadian, or French are merely sites for 
controversy and construction (as opposed to pre-determined and static identities), these 
sites themselves are cultural artifacts that are inherited from previous generations. The 
purely civic nation is a myth, because every nation consists of a contingent inheritance of 
distinctive experiences and cultural memories that represent an inseparable part of its 
national identity. Western nations such as the United States, Canada, and France are not 
merely voluntary associations made up of individuals who are interested in upholding 
certain political principles. Political loyalty cannot be reduced to a random association of 
individuals held together exclusively by particular political values and practices because 
every nation constitutes a pre-political community with a cultural “horizon” of shared 
historical experiences and cultural memories.29 Furthermore, the purely ethnic nation is 
also a myth, because it implies that national identity is constant and unchanging and that 
members of the nation have no choice or input in the shaping of their national identity. 
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Commenting on Ernest Renan’s famous statement that the nation is a “daily plebiscite,” 
Yack states: 
The nation may be a daily plebiscite for Renan, but the subject of that plebiscite is 
what we will do with the mix of competing symbols and stories that make up our 
cultural inheritance. Without a “rich legacy of memories” there are no communal 
loyalties to be tested by consent. The myth of the ethnic nation suggests that you 
have no choice at all in the making of your national identity: you are your cultural 
inheritance and nothing else. The myth of the civic nation, in contrast, suggests 
that your national identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political 
principles you share with other like-minded individuals.30 
Although many of its critics portray nationalism as a romantic and irrationalist theory that 
emphasizes inheritance instead of choice and wants to bring the pre-political community 
into politics, through the doctrine of popular sovereignty even classical liberalism implies 
that citizens should think of themselves as forming a community that is prior to political 
institutions. Locke’s famous distinction between the commonwealth and the community 
implies that there is a people that are prior to the state, and that these people have the 
right to limit the political powers of the state and even dissolve the government in 
extreme circumstances. The fundamental idea behind this distinction is that political 
institutions and the state may dissolve but the people and the community remain intact; 
the very concept of a sovereign people forming a national community rests on an 
understanding of the community as distinct from the state (which is merely a tool of self-
government). According to Yack, because they emerged within a specific historical 
context even the quintessential liberal ideals of “individual rights and political freedoms 
depend to a certain extent on contingencies and vagaries of shared memory and 
identity.”31  
 Thus, while it would be inaccurate to conceive of the nation as a reflection of an 
inherited and unchanging ethnic identity (all identities are dynamic and change over 
time), it is also inaccurate to portray the nation as nothing more than a voluntary 
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association of individuals brought together by a shared commitment to common political 
principles, practices, and institutions (a purely civic nation). For one thing, liberal 
principles have themselves developed within political communities with their own 
inherited cultural identity. For another, even if a nation could be purely civic and based 
solely on shared political principles, it is not necessarily true that this type of state would 
be more desirable or tolerant. As the example of McCarthyism in the United States 
illustrates, individuals can be excluded and discriminated against based simply on the fact 
that they hold different political principles from the majority. In the end, it is important to 
understand that every nation has its own unique cultural inheritance, and as Renan 
suggested, the nation grows out of the choices we make within that inheritance. As such, 
the state is always to some extent a product of pre-political culture and it cannot be 
culturally and linguistically neutral.32 It is impossible to answer the myth of an 
unchanging ethnic identity with a countermyth of a purely civic state.33 There is no such 
thing as a purely political culture, and it is impossible to completely exclude each 
nation’s distinct pre-political cultural inheritance from politics. This does not mean that 
we do not have the ability to collectively shape and reshape our national identity over 
time through an active political culture and vibrant civil society, but this is always done 
within the particular cultural context we have inherited. As Yack concludes, 
In the end, I believe Renan got it right. Two things make a nation: present-day 
consent and a rich cultural inheritance of shared memories and practices. Without 
consent our cultural legacy would be our destiny, rather than a set of background 
constraints on our activities. But without such a legacy there would be no consent 
at all, since there would be no reason for people to seek agreement with any one 
group of individuals rather than another.34 
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We need to move beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide because both options are inadequate; 
both perpetuate myths of their own while neglecting the essential cultural aspect of 
nationalism. In the next section, I take a closer look at the idea of cultural nationalism and 
how it contributes to the debate surrounding nationalist theory and practice.  
1.5   Cultural Nationalism 
 Both civic and ethnic nationalism fail to account for the cultural dimension that 
plays a crucial role in the life of every nation. For this reason, the debate surrounding 
nationalism has shifted focus towards cultural nationalism, examined in different ways by 
such authors as David Miller, Yael Tamir, Will Kymlicka, Kai Nielsen, Bernard Yack, 
and others. Nielsen asserts that nationality always involves a richer cultural component; 
although they fail to recognize it, both civic and ethnic accounts of nationalism are forms 
of cultural nationalism, but cultural nationalism itself need not be strictly civic or 
ethnic.35 As Nielsen explains, “cultural nationalism defines the nation in terms of a 
common encompassing culture,” but, according to Nielsen, the nature of that culture can 
take many forms from nation to nation, including that of a liberal democratic culture.36 
Therefore, the primary aim of nationalist movements is seen as the preservation and 
promotion of the particular national culture they represent; their aim is not necessarily the 
oppression of other cultures. According to John Dunn,  
Cultural nationalism is in the first instance little more than valuing the existing 
human social identity at a point in time when this has come to feel itself under 
pressure. It is not necessarily culturally bigoted―committed to the infliction of its 
own local cultural proclivities in a hegemonic fashion on the rest of the world. 
Indeed, as Isaiah Berlin has eloquently insisted, the first great protagonist of 
cultural nationalism, the German social philosopher Herder, took the view that it 
was necessarily opposed to any such venture. Valuing the plurality of cultures and 
languages, the subtle ecological variety and nuance of human practices, distinctly 
for themselves, for their existent idiosyncrasy, rather than assessing their merits in 
terms of their conformity with or deviation from some supposedly humanly 
universal aesthetic or ethic, he refused to see hierarchy within the realm of 
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cultures and insisted that, as structures of lived sentiment, they must instead be 
accorded intrinsic value rather than appraised sternly from the bastion of a single 
culture.37 
Proponents of a purely civic nationalism such as Ignatieff ignore the significance of 
national identity because they refuse to consider people’s attachment to culture. 
According to Ignatieff, what matters is either political principles and practices (civic 
nationalism) or ethnic descent (ethnic nationalism).38 Kymlicka believes that Ignatieff 
commits an error when he labels Flemish and Quebecois nationalisms as ethnic in nature. 
According to Kymlicka, “the Quebecois and the Flemish accept immigrants as full 
members of the nation, so long as they learn the language and history of the society. They 
define membership in terms of participation in a common culture, open to all, rather than 
on ethnic grounds.”39 Even Western democracies such as the United States, Canada, and 
France, which have been described as civic nations in the past, compel immigrants to 
learn the language and history of the nation in order to integrate them into the common 
culture. In fact, immigration laws illustrate quite clearly the role of culture in the politics 
of nations. If a nation was constituted on purely civic grounds, it would be compelled to 
accommodate every person who demonstrates a commitment to the specific political 
principles and practices upon which that particular nation is founded, and it could not 
impose any additional cultural requirements on those individuals. There is no modern 
nation, Western liberal democracies included, that actively embraces every potential 
immigrant who happens to accept a particular set of political principles.  
 What’s more, proponents of the myth of a purely civic nation tend to portray civic 
nationalism as inherently good, peaceful, and democratic and contrast this with ethnic 
nationalism, which must therefore be inherently bad, violent, and dangerous. However, 
ethnic nationalism is not behind all nationalist conflicts in the world. Often it is civic 
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nationalists who create conflict by forcibly trying to assimilate national minorities into a 
single civic culture (e.g. the Kurdish minority in Turkey). In so doing, civic nationalists 
are prepared to grant members of minority cultures equal citizenship and legal rights 
under state law but they deny them a separate national identity. On the grounds that the 
majority nation is non-ethnic and therefore inclusive, civic nationalist often attempt to 
assimilate ethnic minorities against their will, as was the case with Native Americans, 
Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans in the United States. Furthermore, civic nationalism is not 
necessarily democratic. Not all civic nations have been liberal democracies, and for much 
of the 20th century ethnically diverse countries like Brazil and Argentina embraced a form 
of civic nationalism by promoting a common national identity and citizenship status for 
all citizens regardless of their diverse ethnic backgrounds while being governed by 
military dictatorships.40 
 Cultural nationalists want to move beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide and they 
offer a more nuanced understanding of national identity and nationalism, an 
understanding which accounts for the importance of culture. Miller argues that a common 
national culture “not only gives its bearers a sense of where they belong and provides an 
historical identity, but also provides them with a background against which more 
individual choices about how to live can be made.”41 Miller concedes that a person is 
likely to be a participant in a number of other cultures alongside the national culture, 
including family, class, ethnic group, and so on, which means that nationality is certainly 
not the only cultural resource available to a person at any given time. Nevertheless, 
national culture is an important resource that ought to be preserved by the state. As 
Kymlicka explains, paraphrasing Yael Tamir’s views,  
Being able to express one’s cultural identity is important for many reasons. 
Cultural membership is a precondition of autonomous moral choices. Actions 
performed in a cultural context are “endowed with additional meaning” because 
they can be seen both as acts of individual achievement and as contributions to the 
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development of one’s culture; and shared membership in a culture promotes a 
sense of belonging and relationships of mutual recognition.42 
Thus, a well functioning state rests upon a pre-political, or, more accurately, an extra-
political sense of cultural belonging. As Miller indicates, common nationality is 
significant because:  
It provides the wherewithal for a common culture against whose background 
people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives; it 
provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued, particularly 
ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a ‘common 
asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding and 
trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.43 
Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of cultural belonging to individual well-being, and 
conceives of the nation as a “societal culture.” According to Kymlicka, a societal culture 
“provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human 
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially 
concentrated, and based on a shared language.”44 However, even though extra-political 
culture is an inevitable component of common nationality, this does not mean that the 
content of said nationality should be set in stone. National identities and the culture that 
surrounds them can and do change significantly over time, and this change should not be 
seen as constituting the dissolution of those identities. Change is inevitable, and for 
democratically-inclined nationalist thinkers in particular, it is important to ensure that 
changes occur through a process of free and open deliberation between fellow citizens, 
including immigrants and minorities.  
 In short, cultural nationalism moves beyond the overly simplistic civic vs. ethnic 
divide, it emphasizes the inevitable connection between state and culture, and it asserts 
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that there can be no purely political conception of the nation. Cultural nationalists argue 
that there is nothing inherently fanatical or antidemocratic about nationalism, and many 
suggest that nationalism is compatible with liberalism (Tamir, Neilsen, Kymlicka, and 
others). The main point that these theorists make is that “all nationalisms are cultural 
nationalisms of one kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation, 
liberal or otherwise.”45  
1.6 Current Debates within Cultural Nationalism 
Despite accepting a common theoretical framework that stresses the connection 
between politics and culture, cultural nationalists differ in their views. In the literature, 
cultural nationalists have traditionally been divided into two camps: liberal nationalists 
on the one side, and non-liberal (sometimes called communitarian or conservative) 
nationalists on the other. Liberal nationalists such as Tamir and Kymlicka acknowledge 
the importance of cultural belonging to individual well-being, and they endorse a “right 
to culture” for all nations, including national minorities. They believe that the importance 
of cultural belonging can be justified on purely individualist grounds; in line with liberal 
principles, cultural belonging is seen as valuable because it improves the lives of the 
individual members of a cultural group, provides them with a meaningful context for 
making decisions, and so on. Moreover, liberal nationalists reject all collectivist versions 
of nationalism which value the well-being of the nation as a whole over the well-being of 
individuals.46 On the other hand, Bhikhu Parekh says that those cultural nationalists such 
as Roger Scruton, generally described as non-liberal or conservative nationalists, believe 
that nationality precedes the individual and that nations form spiritual and moral 
communities.47 Unlike their liberal counterparts, conservative nationalists believe that the 
source of political legitimacy lies not in individual consent but in the national will of the 
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people as a whole. Furthermore, Parekh tells us that conservative nationalists see the 
nation as the highest moral and political principle and believe that the integrity of the 
nation must be preserved at all costs, even at the expense of such fundamental liberal 
principles as freedom of speech and individual rights.48 Non-liberal nationalists tend to 
believe that a shared national identity must be grounded in a common communal 
conception of the good life, while liberal nationalists hold that the basis for a common 
national identity must be a thinner and more diffuse sense of belonging, typically 
consisting of a shared history, territory, language, and common public institutions.49 
Kymlicka says that this constitutes a clear difference between liberal nationalism and 
most conservative and communitarian theories, which advocate for a ‘politics of the 
common good’ and reject the liberal nationalist conception of the good as too thin.50 
Non-liberal nationalists do not believe that social unity can be sustained by such weak 
bonds as shared principles of justice, or a thinned-out liberal nationalist conception of 
national identity.51 As such, cultural nationalists remain largely divided into liberal 
nationalists and non-liberal nationalists.   
 David Miller is a cultural nationalist who attempts to combine the principle of 
nationality with republican citizenship. Miller’s goal is to “reassert the underlying values 
of republican citizenship as a form of politics and nationhood as a form of political 
identity, while simultaneously thinking about how to best implement these values in the 
contemporary world.”52 Miller places himself inside the liberal nationalist camp, but as 
Parekh points out, “although Miller is a liberal and wants the nation to be constituted 
along liberal lines, he realizes that [liberalism and nationalism] might conflict, and then 
he tends to privilege nationalism. Since the national culture gives a society its distinct 
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identity, he insists that the state cannot and ought not to be neutral with respect to it.”53 I 
believe that Miller’s work makes an important contribution to the current debate within 
cultural nationalism, and this project seeks to build on many of his arguments. In 
Chapters 5 in particular, I argue that Miller’s work is firmly rooted in the philosophy of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the theoretical father of modern nationalism, and I suggest that 
although Miller identifies as a liberal nationalist, his work points towards a distinct 
republican strand of cultural nationalism. Chapter 6 focuses on drawing out the rather 
stark differences between the liberal nationalism of Tamir and Kymlicka on the one hand, 
and Rousseau’s and Miller’s republican nationalism on the other. My aim is to show that 
republican nationalism forms a distinct theoretical strand of cultural nationalism and 
constitutes a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. In the next chapter, I consider 
republican political theory and the origins of republican citizenship (a central aspect of 
Miller’s philosophy), before taking an in-depth look at the works of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, the first modern thinker to combine republicanism with nationalism. 
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Chapter 2  
2  Republican Political Theory 
In this chapter I define republican political theory, trace its historical 
development, and identify the various distinct strands of thought that exist within the 
republican theoretical tradition. I then go on to juxtapose republicanism with liberalism, 
and I attempt to show that republican political theory offers a unique perspective on some 
of the most important concepts in political theory, including freedom and political 
participation. Finally, I discuss a specific strand of republicanism, which I refer to as 
cultural republicanism, that is rooted in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and that has 
been largely neglected in contemporary republican literature. Contrary to many modern 
republicans, including Hannah Arendt, Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and Iseult 
Honohan, I suggest that “extra-political” cultural values and national identity constitute 
an important component of every political community, including a republican one. As 
noted in the previous chapter, Honohan and others use the term “pre-political” to refer to 
everything that lies outside of the formal domain of politics (including culture, tradition, 
customs, national identity, and so on). Although these concepts have pre-political origins, 
they also change over time, and they continue to change after political institutions are 
established. Because these concepts still play an important role in the lives of citizens, a 
more accurate way to describe them is “extra-political,” a term which encompasses both 
the pre-political roots and contemporary relevance of culture and national identity.54 I 
argue that it is impossible to separate certain aspects of extra-political culture from 
politics, and I believe that a properly functioning republic rests at least to some extent on 
an extra-political sense of common culture and nationality. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, there is no modern community with a public culture that is exclusively political 
and based on a purely civic commitment to common political principles, practices, and 
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institutions. Political communities cannot be reduced to a random association of 
individuals held together solely by common principles, practices, and institutions; 
instead, every modern nation constitutes an extra-political community with a cultural 
“horizon” of shared historical experiences and cultural memories.55 I argue that within 
the admittedly diverse republican tradition there exists a body of work that takes this 
connection between extra-political culture and politics seriously. This strand of thought, 
henceforth referred to as cultural republicanism, is best expressed in the philosophy of 
Rousseau, but it is also clearly present in the works of contemporary republican thinker 
David Miller. In the sections that follow, I take a closer look at this largely neglected 
strand of republican theory.  
2.1   What Is Republicanism? 
In the book Civic Republicanism, Iseult Honohan provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive overview of the republican political tradition as a whole, tracing its 
historical development and identifying the most important debates within the tradition. 
She defines republicanism as a middle ground between the extremes in the liberalism vs. 
communitarianism debate. According to Honohan, republicanism has a richer 
understanding of political community than mainstream liberalism, but is less 
homogenising and exclusive than nationalism and other forms of communitarianism.56 
Honohan explains: 
Republican politics is concerned with enabling interdependent citizens to 
deliberate on, and realise, the  common goods of an historically evolving political 
community, at least as much as promoting individual interests or protecting 
individual rights. Emphasising responsibility for common goods sets 
republicanism  apart from libertarian theories centered on individual rights. 
Emphasising that these common goods are politically realised sets republicanism 
apart from neutralist liberal theories which exclude substantive questions of 
values and the good life from politics. Finally, emphasising the political 
construction of the political community distinguishes republicans from those 
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communitarians who see politics as expressing the pre-political shared values of a 
community.57 
Honohan defines republicanism as a very specific variant of communitarianism, one 
which values citizenship, or membership in a political community, as “distinct from other 
kinds of community based on pre-political commonality, of, for example, race, religion or 
culture.”58 I take issue with Honohan’s claim that any political community can be 
understood in strictly political terms, and I argue that every political community, 
including a republican community, has an undeniable cultural component that cannot be 
separated from politics. I will return to this point later, but first it is important to 
understand the historical development of republicanism, the key thinkers that shaped the 
tradition, and the distinct theoretical strands of republicanism that have emerged over 
time. Civic Republicanism offers valuable insight into these questions. 
 Honohan notes that there is a great amount of diversity within the republican 
political tradition, but she identifies four key themes that she believes run throughout the 
tradition as a whole: a) civic virtue and the common good, b) duty of participation, c) 
freedom, and d) recognition. These themes are defined and prioritized differently by the 
various republican thinkers, which has led to the development of distinct strands of 
thought within the republican tradition. Honohan believes that there are two dominant 
approaches within republican theory: 1) instrumental republicanism, which sees 
citizenship as a means to the end of preserving individual freedom rather than a 
relationship or activity with significant intrinsic value, and 2) strong republicanism, 
which emphasizes the intrinsic value of participating in self-government and realizing 
common goods as citizens.59 The differences between these two approaches represent the 
main division within the contemporary republican tradition and form the foundations for 
the central debate between contemporary republican thinkers.  
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 Republicanism traces its roots to Aristotle, who believed that human beings are by 
nature political and that they could fully realize this nature only through political 
participation and taking an active role in shaping the laws that govern them. Aristotle 
sees political participation as intrinsically valuable for realizing man’s nature and 
potential. Freedom is instrumentally valuable in that it makes meaningful political 
participation possible, but the primary goal is virtue and the realization of one’s nature. 
Aristotle’s philosophy influenced the strong republican strand within republican political 
theory; strong republicans see political participation as an essential component of “the 
good life,” and some go even further, arguing that participation in civic activity 
constitutes the highest realization of human nature.60 
 From Aristotle, the roots of republican political theory can be traced to Roman 
statesman Cicero, who was himself influenced by Aristotle. Cicero emphasized the 
importance of the mixed regime, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. His work 
formed the basis for the instrumental republican strand within republican political theory, 
which holds that republican freedom is not achieved through active political participation 
but through living under just laws and fair institutions instead of the arbitrary will of 
others. Citizenship for Cicero was not synonymous with active participation; rather, 
citizenship refers to the equal legal status that every citizen is entitled to by law. 
Although Aristotle and Cicero are described as antecedents of republicanism rather than 
full-fledged republicans themselves, Aristotle’s emphasis on political participation and 
Cicero’s emphasis on the rule of law played a major role in shaping republicanism and 
the main division within the tradition. Ultimately, both thinkers stress the importance of 
virtue and the public good over material and individual interests, and both hold that 
freedom is not a natural human condition that limits the power of government; rather, 
meaningful freedom is only made possible by the laws of a political community. 
Moreover, freedom is not the ultimate goal but merely a means to attaining virtue and 
pursuing the common good.61 
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 The political ideas of Aristotle and Cicero were rediscovered during the 
Renaissance by a number of prominent Florentine republican thinkers, including Niccolò 
Machiavelli. Machiavelli was among the leaders of a republican revival that was seen as 
a reaction against the Christian theological approach to politics that dominated Western 
Europe following the fall of Rome. J.G.A. Pocock calls this “the Machiavellian moment,” 
a point in time when the republicans of Florence rejected the Christian emphasis on 
happiness in the afterlife and looked to restore the Roman ideals of citizenship and civic 
virtue to politics.62 Machiavelli famously rejects conventional Christian morality and 
advances a new kind of morality, one that subordinates religion to politics and stresses 
the importance of preserving the republic and the liberty it offers in this life. Machiavelli 
emphasizes the need for military dynamism in preserving the republic, and he prioritizes 
military and civic service over active participation in politics. While there ought to be 
equal opportunity for all virtuous citizens to govern, the rulers will always be made up of 
the virtuous elite rather than all the citizens collectively. It is important to note that at the 
same time as Machiavelli is writing in Florence, the Venetian republic was developing a 
separate commercial model of republicanism that focused less on military might and 
expansion and more on the importance of commerce. Ultimately, Machiavelli’s revival of 
republican ideals, including the rule of law, the mixed regime, and civic virtue, coupled 
with the development of the Venetian commercial model of republicanism, had a 
profound impact on the republican ideas of James Harrington and the wider Atlantic 
tradition. 
 By the 18th century we see two distinct strands of republicanism take shape: 
participatory republicanism and representative/institutional republicanism. The 
participatory model of republican political theory is expressed in the works of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who proclaims that meaningful freedom consists in democratic self-
rule; in living according to laws we make for ourselves through direct political 
participation. In order to be free, man must substitute natural freedom (pre-political 
freedom or license) for civil and moral freedom, and he must substitute his corrupting 
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dependence on individuals for the reciprocal dependence on the community as a whole. 
According to Rousseau, moral freedom entails learning to overcome one’s narrow self-
interest in order to see beyond it and understand the common good. In order to be free in 
the most meaningful sense, man must attain a level of “self-mastery” and take an active 
part in collective will formation. As Honohan points out, for Rousseau “real freedom is 
won only in political society, and exercised by collectively self-governing citizens.”63 
 Rousseau sees the ideal republic as a small moral community of responsibility 
modeled on the family, and it is necessarily limited in size and scope.  As Honohan 
explains, “in the republic citizens are bound by a strong sentiment of patriotism, love of 
their country, which is grounded in their dependence on the social whole. This 
identification lies between selfishness and altruism. It is modelled on the close face-to-
face relations of the family: love for the motherland, and fraternity between citizens.”64 
The ideal republic ought to be small because freedom diminishes with increased size; a 
larger community cannot be as participatory, which opens the door for corruption through 
representation and institutionalism. According to Rousseau, in order to overcome their 
narrow self-interests in the name of the common good, the citizens of a republic must 
possess a sense of shared destiny, a common history and culture, and close emotional 
attachments to each other.65 This is what makes willing generally possible, and what 
allows the general will to take shape. The larger a republic becomes, the harder it is for 
citizens to relate to each other and pursue the common good at the expense of individual 
self-interest and factional group interests. Thus, Rousseau’s ideal republic is small, 
independent, and defensive in character, though he readily acknowledges that this ideal is 
difficult to achieve in practice. This is in sharp contrast to both Machiavelli’s militaristic 
expansionist republic and Harrington’s large commercial republic. According to 
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Rousseau’s participatory model of republicanism, citizens are only free when they are 
active participants in their own self-government.66 In addition, Rousseau’s republicanism 
has a strong cultural component that emphasizes the importance of patriotism, fraternity, 
solidarity, and the love of nation. This cultural aspect to Rousseau’s republicanism is 
crucial for locating his specific brand of republicanism within the wider republican 
tradition, and in the following section I discuss in greater detail the various strands of 
republican political theory before examining the nature of Rousseau’s cultural 
republicanism. 
 The second major model of republicanism is the representative/institutional 
model, which was greatly influenced by Harrington and Venetian commercial 
republicanism. Some of the American founding fathers, including James Madison, pick 
up on this line of thought and argue that republican freedom should be defined in terms of 
the security of life, liberty, and property, to be protected by a representative form of 
government and the constitutional separation of powers. This particular understanding of 
republican freedom allows republics to expand far beyond Rousseau’s small moral 
community of responsibility, and the participatory vs. representative divide was a central 
issue in the eighteenth century debate between the federalists and anti-federalists in the 
newly independent American state, with the anti-federalists defending a small 
participatory republic and the federalists favoring a large representative state.67 This same 
divide is still at the heart of the debate between republican thinkers today, and keeping 
these issues in mind will help us to identify and delineate the various distinct strands 
within contemporary republican thought. 
2.2   Republicanisms 
Following the French Revolution, some argued that the republican ideas of 
thinkers like Rousseau contributed to the revolution’s excesses, and many abandoned 
republican political theory in favor of liberalism, a theoretical framework inspired by the 
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writings of John Locke. During the twentieth century another republican revival takes 
place in response to the perceived dominance of liberalism. The two strands of 
republicanism most represented in contemporary republican literature are instrumental 
republicanism and strong republicanism. For instrumental republicans, citizenship is seen 
as a means of preserving individual freedom and not a relationship or activity with 
intrinsic value. Strong republicans stress the intrinsic value of participating in self-
government and realizing common goods as citizens. Honohan identifies Hannah Arendt 
and Charles Taylor as the most prominent contemporary proponents of strong 
republicanism. As Honohan explains: 
Reacting to totalitarianism and neutralist liberalism, [Arendt and Taylor] stress 
the expressive dimension of politics, in which people seek not only to be treated 
as legal and political equals, but to have the value of their projects and identities 
confirmed in public. Arendt and Taylor justify the revaluation of political action 
in three dimensions. They draw attention to the ways in which self-realisation 
requires public recognition, they see freedom in positive terms as realised in 
political action, and they reaffirm the role of politics in realising shared goods.68 
Arendt argues that individual freedom and recognition can only be achieved through 
political participation because political activity constitutes the highest expression of 
human liberty. She stresses the importance of political action within a vibrant public 
space, and she advocates for preserving the less structured area of action and debate that 
forms the context within which the state acts and which has been eroded in contemporary 
society. Unlike Rousseau, she rejects consensus-based politics and believes that the 
political community should not be based on the moral sentiments. According to Arendt, 
citizens should not be seen as an extended family but as independent individuals who 
work together as colleagues. Citizens who share a common public space become a 
political community; this community is not bound by a common identity or shared 
cultural values, but rather by the strictly political concerns that arise from living in a 
common world and participating in a shared public realm. Arendt disagrees with 
Rousseau’s claims that citizens living together within a political community form a 
common will, and she believes that rather than becoming part of a larger whole each 
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citizen interacts independently with other citizens within the public space. As Honohan 
points out, “those who share a public realm become a political community, in which 
citizens are bound, not by common identity or shared cultural values, but by concerns 
arising from living in a common world and by participation in a common public realm. 
Against Rousseau’s claims, they do not come to form a common will, but face common 
concerns and a common world.”69 I will challenge the assumption that citizens of a 
political community need not be bound by a common identity and shared cultural values 
later on in this chapter. Honohan notes that some problems with Arendt’s conception of 
the political community include the fact that she overvalues political life by portraying it 
as the highest fulfillment of human nature, and the fact that she assumes that since 
political participation is an intrinsic good, it cannot also be considered an instrumental 
good. In addition, she has an individualistic conception of political recognition and she 
neglects the social and cultural dimensions of recognition.70 
 Charles Taylor considers himself to be a liberal perfectionist who wants to 
promote the goods of freedom and self-rule in conformity with rights founded on 
equality. Taylor sees modern civic republicanism as a specific strand of liberalism that 
values participation in collective self-government as well as the realization of common 
goods and individual freedom. Honohan notes that for Taylor, “freedom is a matter of 
realising ourselves according to our most central purposes, not the absence of 
interference. Thus politics is an arena for self-expression and public recognition of 
identity and values, and not just a framework for maintaining order and just 
distribution.”71 Taylor believes that social practices and the community that sustains them 
are not merely instrumental to but also constitutive of individual identity. Taylor 
addresses the problems in some of Arendt’s work by arguing that political participation 
has both intrinsic and instrumental value; participation plays a role in the formation of an 
individual’s identity, and it also provides an opportunity to achieve other important ends, 
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such as preserving liberty within the political community. Due to the fact that culture 
sustains identity and meanings for individuals, Taylor unlike Arendt believes that culture 
should be given expression in politics. But unlike Rousseau, Taylor is not interested in 
promoting a common national culture; instead, he advocates multiculturalism, stressing 
that equal rights for individuals are not in themselves enough to satisfy the need for 
cultural recognition. Taylor argues that the political community must at times abandon 
neutrality in order to accommodate the claims of culture, and he believes that liberals 
themselves have a particular vision of the good life which puts special value on freedom 
and autonomy. Taylor argues that special value should also be given to recognition, 
including the recognition of culture, because culture and other categories such as race and 
gender play an important part in the formation of each individual’s identity. Taylor 
criticizes what has been alternatively referred to as “negative freedom” or “freedom as 
non-interference” by claiming that doing whatever one wants as long as that action does 
not conflict with the law does not necessarily equate to freedom in the proper sense. For 
instance, an alcoholic may be at liberty to legally buy alcohol and feed his addiction in 
this way, but that does not mean that he is properly free. In fact, one could say that the 
alcoholic is a slave to his addiction and the opposite of free. For Taylor and most strong 
republicans, freedom presupposes the ability to act according to what one understands to 
be their most important purposes, and this is best achieved through active participation in 
the political community.72 
 Strong republicanism can be broadly defined as a political philosophy focused on 
the idea of promoting a specific conception of the good life consisting in political 
participation and civic virtue, as well as on fighting any sort of corruption that would 
undermine these values. For strong republicans, civic virtue and active political 
participation should be considered public goods which are intrinsically valuable for 
human flourishing. Strong republicans claim that their understanding of civic virtue and 
political participation is shared by the classical republican tradition; political freedom 
requires citizens to share in the good life by embracing the public goods of civic virtue 
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and active political participation. This conception defines freedom in terms of realization 
rather than opportunity. Stemming from Rousseau’s belief that freedom lies in obeying 
laws one makes for oneself, political participation is understood as the highest expression 
of human freedom. Political freedom means realizing our highest purposes and attaining 
recognition through politics, as well as realizing common projects and shared common 
goods among citizens.73 
 The other major strand of contemporary republicanism is instrumental 
republicanism, expressed in the works of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, and Frank 
Lovett, among others. Instrumental republicans argue that achieving republican freedom 
does not require citizens to become anything in particular (self-realization) or take an 
active part in creating the laws that govern them. While civic virtue and political 
participation are instrumentally valuable for preserving liberty (the price of freedom is 
eternal vigilance), Pettit argues that republican freedom is not properly defined as self-
mastery but as “freedom from domination.” In an article entitled Neo-republicanism, co-
authored with Frank Lovett, Pettit defines his neo-republicanism as a contemporary 
public philosophy rooted in the classical republican tradition.74 According to Pettit and 
Lovett, the three key concepts of neo-republicanism are: 
First and most important is the conception of a free person as one who does not 
live under the arbitrary will or domination of others. Second is the associated 
conception of a free state as one that attempts to promote the freedom of its 
citizens without itself coming to dominate them. And third is the conception of 
good citizenship as consisting in a vigilant commitment to preserving the state in 
its distinctive role as an undominating protector against domination. The aim of 
the neorepublican research program is to rethink issues of legitimacy and 
democracy, welfare and justice, public policy and institutional design, from 
within the framework that these basic ideas provide.75 
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Instrumental republicans argue that citizenship does not require direct participation or 
expressed consent by the citizen body, but rather options for contestation (voicing 
disagreement and criticism of the government). Instrumental republicans advocate a 
constitution that establishes the separation of powers and the rule of law, and defines 
good citizenship as a commitment to preserving the state in its role as an undominating 
protector against domination. While the separation of powers and the rule of law have 
been appropriated by the liberal theoretical framework, Pettit and other instrumental 
republicans claim that their conception of citizenship is what makes their approach 
distinctly republican. 
 Instrumental republicans claim to espouse a unique understanding of freedom that 
sets them apart from both liberals and strong republicans. According to Pettit and Lovett, 
strong republicans define freedom in terms of self-mastery and realization (freedom as 
self-mastery, FSM), while liberals define freedom as the absence of direct interference by 
outside forces on their ability to make free choices (freedom as non-interference, FNI).76 
By contrast, or so it is claimed, instrumental republicans define freedom as the absence of 
arbitrary power, whether it is actually exercised or not (freedom as non-domination, 
FND).77 Thus, even when one’s choices are not interfered with directly, to be dependent 
on the arbitrary power of another at any time is to lack freedom in the proper sense. For 
instance, a slave with a benevolent master who does not interfere with the slave’s actions 
directly may be considered free according to FNI, but the very fact that the arbitrary 
power of master over slave exists in the first place would mean that the slave is not free 
according to the standards of FND. While proponents of FNI see all laws as a form 
restraint on freedom, proponents of FND hold that laws that are not arbitrary but reflect 
the will of the people and are made in their interest do not restrain freedom but enlarge it. 
This chapter will engage with four different conceptions of freedom, including the 
aforementioned FSM, FNI, and FND, but also freedom as political autonomy or FPA, 
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which Honohan identifies as the conception of freedom preferred by civic humanists like 
her.78 The following table sums up the differences between these four conceptions: 
Table 1: Four Conceptions of Freedom 
Freedom as 
Non-
interference 
(FNI) 
Freedom as 
Non-
domination 
(FND) 
Freedom as 
Political 
Autonomy 
(FPA) 
Freedom as 
Self-mastery 
(FSM) 
 
Freedom is the 
absence of direct 
interference by 
outside forces 
on one’s ability 
to make free 
choices 
(espoused by 
libertarians and 
some liberals). 
 
 
 
Freedom is the 
absence of 
arbitrary power, 
whether it is 
actually 
exercised or 
not. Even when 
our choices are 
not interfered 
with directly, to 
be dependent 
on the arbitrary 
power of 
another at any 
time is to lack 
freedom in the 
proper sense 
(espoused by 
instrumental 
republicans like 
Pettit). 
 
Freedom 
demands more 
than simply 
obeying laws 
and being free 
from 
domination; 
freedom 
demands that 
citizens have a 
direct say in 
shaping the 
laws that 
govern them 
(espoused by 
civic humanists 
like Honohan). 
 
Freedom requires 
the kind of 
participation 
endorsed by 
FPA, but 
freedom also 
requires self-
mastery: 
overcoming mere 
appetites and 
narrow self-
interests/factional 
interests for the 
common good. 
FSM creates new 
potentialities: it 
allows citizens to 
achieve their full 
potential and 
attain certain 
goods as a 
community that 
they could not 
attain 
individually 
(espoused by 
cultural 
republicans like 
Rousseau). 
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As the table demonstrates, treating FNI, FND, FPA, and FSM as four distinct conceptions 
of freedom can be confusing. The four concepts can be further separated according to 
Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty thesis, with FNI and FND classified as having a 
negative conception of freedom (freedom from), and FPA and FSM classified as 
embracing a positive conception of freedom (freedom to). As far back as 1967 Gerard 
MacCallum tried to simplify such distinctions by arguing that discussions of freedom 
always have a triadic relation and can be represented simply as “agent ˃ obstacle ˃ goal.” 
Put another way, the [agent] is free from [obstacle] to do or be [goal]. As such, freedom is 
always from something and to something, so it does not make sense to think of freedom 
as being either positive or negative. MacCallum argues that both the “positive” and 
“negative” concepts actually share the same concept of freedom, stating that “it would be 
far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is operating throughout, and that the 
differences, rather than being about what freedom is, are for example about what persons 
are, and what can count as an obstacle to or an interference with the freedom of persons 
so conceived.”79 MacCallum believes that the real debate is not about what “freedom” 
means, but about the true identity of the agent whose freedom is being considered (is it 
the individual, or the community, or the nation?), and what counts as an obstacle to our 
freedom (which will depend on our definition of the agent). MacCallum’s formula 
appears to simplify the concept of freedom and remove the confusing distinctions that 
many theorists rely on, and yet “despite the utility of MacCallum's triadic formula and its 
strong influence on analytic philosophers, however, Berlin's distinction continues to 
dominate mainstream discussions about the meaning of political and social freedom.”80 
As such, most of the contemporary theorists considered in this chapter continue to use the 
language of positive and negative liberty, and they intentionally compare their own 
conceptions of freedom to either FNI, FND, FPA, or FSM. For the sake of clarity and in 
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order to engage with their arguments on their own terms, I will stick to the classifications 
that they themselves are using.  
 Instrumental republicans like Pettit reject the view that political participation and 
civic virtue are intrinsically valuable aspects of a particular vision of the good life and 
consider them to be merely instrumentally valuable for securing and preserving political 
liberty, understood as independence from arbitrary rule. FND does not require the 
realization of any particular purpose on the part of the citizen; it requires only the absence 
of something, namely, the absence of dependence on arbitrary power or domination. This 
is different from “positive” conceptions of freedom, which hold that freedom in the 
proper sense can only be achieved through the realization of certain purposes (self-
realization). Honohan separates the positive freedom of a specific type of strong 
republicanism that she refers to as “civic humanism” from freedom as self-mastery; she 
claims that civic humanists like her believe in freedom as political autonomy (FPA), and 
she distinguishes FPA from what she considers to be the “more communitarian” 
understanding of freedom embodied in the works of Rousseau (freedom as self-mastery, 
FSM). I want to point out that there is no inherent connection between communitarianism 
and FSM, and although Honohan uses this comparison in an attempt to differentiate her 
own view from FSM, trying to equate the two leads to more confusion.  Having said that, 
Honohan argues that autonomy cannot be fully realized in politics, but neither can it be 
fully realized outside of politics. For this reason, autonomy needs a political expression, 
and personal autonomy must extend to political autonomy. FPA requires citizens who are 
engaged in politics to follow purposes that they can endorse as their own, in the sense 
that they have a real say in shaping them. Political participation is a necessary aspect of 
freedom; FPA demands more than simply obeying laws and being free from domination, 
it requires citizens to have a direct say in shaping those laws.81 As Michael Sandel points 
out, “I am free insofar as I am a member of a political community that controls its own 
fate and is a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs… the republican sees 
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liberty as internally connected to self-government and the civic virtues that sustain it.”82 
Honohan juxtaposes FPA with Rousseau’s understanding of freedom as self-mastery, 
claiming that while FPA requires citizens to contribute to shaping collective social 
practices, it does not follow Rousseau in his attempt to extend autonomy to the level of 
society by positing a unitary, corporate subject. According to Honohan: 
If participation and freedom are to be connected, it must be in some way that 
maintains personal freedom in individual lives while allowing for collective self-
government. To leave room for personal freedom, a more positive conception of 
freedom cannot be based on a fixed account of human nature, or require citizens 
to act according to a pre-determined ranking of goals and purposes. It cannot 
define political activity as the highest good of a human life, nor assume that there 
is a unitary common good of society. If autonomy is a matter of acting according 
to goals a person can endorse, someone cannot be ‘forced to be autonomous’ by 
being coerced into behaving in a certain way, though he may perhaps be 
prevented from acting in ways that would further reduce his autonomy in the 
future. Political equality is central to the idea of freedom as  participation in 
collective self-government.83 
Rousseau’s vision of freedom, which he calls civil and moral freedom, differs from FPA 
because it requires self-mastery, and because it can only be achieved within a political 
community with a shared national identity and conception of the good life. This 
conception of the good represents a shared moral consensus between citizens, one that is 
shaped by the national culture and held up as the ideal that the society should strive for. 
As such, citizens are guided towards pursuing this good through laws, mores, and a 
comprehensive moral education.   
 The debate between instrumental republicans and strong republicans is an on-
going one, with both sides claiming to represent the legacy of the classical republican 
tradition. In his book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Pettit 
develops his instrumental vision of republicanism and defines instrumental republicanism 
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as the public philosophy that embodies the classical republican tradition.84 In so doing, he 
almost completely ignores the important contributions that thinkers like Aristotle and 
Rousseau have made to republican political theory, and many strong republicans take 
serious issue with his claims. The main debate within contemporary republican theory 
has been taking place between instrumental republicans like Pettit and those strong 
republicans like Honohan who refer to themselves as civic humanists, but who also tend 
to dismiss what they consider to be “more communitarian” versions of strong 
republicanism. Nevertheless, I contend that along with instrumental republicanism and 
civic humanism there exists another strand of republican theory that needs to be 
considered more carefully; I am referring to cultural republicanism, a distinct strand of 
republican theory rooted in the works of Rousseau. Cultural republicanism is the least 
prominently represented in the literature, and it is often dismissed by both instrumental 
republicans and civic humanists for being dependent on the existence of a shared extra-
political culture. In Chapter 3 I draw out this cultural strand of republican political theory, 
but first I take a closer look at the debate between republicanism and liberalism, 
including the liberal critique of republicanism. By considering how the different strands 
of republicanism compare to the liberal theoretical framework we will gain a better 
understanding of what each unique strand has to offer, and how they ultimately compare 
to each other. 
2.3   The Republicanism vs. Liberalism Debate 
As previously mentioned, instrumental republicans such as Skinner, Lovett, and 
Pettit believe that their version of republicanism most closely represents the classical 
republican tradition, and they tend to dismiss thinkers like Aristotle, Rousseau, Arendt, 
and Taylor as proponents of civic humanism, a classification that they believe is distinct 
from republicanism. Pettit says that FNI, which he claims is the dominant liberal 
conception of freedom, was first developed by Thomas Hobbes. Pettit claims that for 
Hobbes freedom is the absence of interference, and this type of freedom can be 
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maximized even in conditions of extreme domination. Thus, though a slave might be 
dependent on the arbitrary power of his master, as long as the master is benevolent and 
does not interfere directly with the actions of the slave, the slave is free. On this view, 
laws are seen as interferences with liberty, but they are interferences which exist to 
prevent more potential interferences by other parties. Laws are a necessary evil; law is 
seen as a restriction on freedom, but a restriction that is preferable to the alternative of 
anarchy. As such, freedom exists only inside the realm where law does not intrude.85 
Pettit believes that this conception of freedom lost prominence in the 18th century as the 
republican conception of freedom as non-domination gained in popularity (Pettit 
classifies Harrington and Locke as proponents of FND), but that FNI was successfully 
revived again by William Paley and Jeremy Bentham. Pettit argues that FNI has 
continued to be the dominant conception of freedom ever since, and it is only now being 
challenged once again by those seeking to revive the republican concept of FND.86 Pettit 
defines non-domination as the condition under which individuals live in the presence of 
others but at the mercy of none, and he claims that FND constitutes the “supreme 
political value” of the republican tradition.87 FND allows citizens to live without 
uncertainty about arbitrary interference in their lives and protects citizens from 
subordination and undue influence by the rich and powerful. Pettit and virtually all 
republican thinkers believe that in order to make meaningful freedom possible there have 
to be limits on material inequality in a republican society; broadly speaking, republicans 
tend to accept Rousseau’s maxim that “no citizen should be so rich as to be capable of 
buying another citizen, and none so poor that he is forced to sell himself.”88 However, 
republican thinkers interpret this maxim in different ways, and more will be said about 
Rousseau’s own views on the limits of material inequality in Chapter 3.  For now it is 
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important to note that Pettit sees FND as an instrumental primary good, or something that 
every individual has an instrumental reason to want regardless of what else they may 
want. According to Pettit, it is not enough to rely on the reciprocity of individuals as this 
may lead to unequal results; FND is a political goal that the state should actively advance 
for all of its citizens. In his defense of FND, Pettit dismisses the concept of freedom as 
self-mastery (FSM). He argues that the participatory ideal of active citizenship is not 
feasible in the modern world, and he claims that the prospect of each citizen being subject 
to the will of all is “scarcely attractive.”89 As such, the state must not seek to actively 
promote FSM because FND is enough. Pettit and other instrumental republicans maintain 
that FND is a superior conception of freedom to both the “liberal” FNI and the various 
conceptions of freedom promoted by strong republicans (civic humanists and cultural 
republicans). Instrumental republicans believe that FND represents the conception of 
freedom of the classical republican tradition, but this claim faces criticism not only from 
other republicans, but also from liberals. 
 Liberal critics of republicanism such as Robert E. Goodin and Alan Patten 
consider instrumental republicans like Skinner and Pettit to be revisionists of 
republicanism, and they argue that it is debatable whether instrumental republicanism is 
the appropriate interpretation of the classical republican tradition. Goodin’s first major 
criticism is that there is no meaningful disagreement between the instrumental 
republicanism of Skinner and Pettit and the liberalism of someone like John Rawls; in 
fact, Rawls believed that instrumental republicanism was perfectly compatible with his 
own form of liberalism. Furthermore, Goodin claims that FND is not a unique conception 
of liberty because this allegedly “liberal” conception of liberty as non-interference taken 
to its logical conclusion of securing FNI for the future would amount to essentially the 
same thing as FND.90 While some liberal theorists may have been negligent in their 
theoretical formulation of FNI, in practice the two conceptions of liberty amount to the 
same thing: the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civic virtue. Goodin’s second 
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criticism is that instrumental republicanism does not offer a different vision of citizenship 
and public service from liberalism. Republicanism is not unique in its call for more 
deliberation, as non-republican arguments for more deliberation have been made by a 
number of thinkers, including Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. In fact, Rawlsian liberalism 
places special emphasis on the importance of deliberation and civic virtue for preserving 
a free liberal society. Although instrumental republicans and liberals may make different 
claims about the origins of rights, or the relationship between liberty and law, according 
to Goodin it all amounts to the same thing in practice. Rawlsian liberalism does not 
appeal to pre-political rights that individuals posses in the state of nature, but rights that 
come out of a democratic community concerned with fairness. As such, laws are 
grounded in fairness and aim to protect rights and liberties, not restrain them in the 
Hobbesian sense.91  
 Goodin ultimately concludes that there is no meaningful difference between 
Enlightenment liberalism and the instrumental (Goodin calls it “liberal”) republicanism 
of someone like Skinner and Pettit (autonomous individuals with natural rights working 
together for common interests), and he sees no advantage in employing the language of 
republicanism instead of the established terminology of liberalism to advocate what 
amounts to the same thing in practice. At the same time, he argues that the “more 
communitarian” strands of republicanism “prioritize the public over the private as part of 
their program of deprioritizing rights and restoring public duty and responsibility to the 
center of the political stage” and maintain that individual agency is a function of 
collective identity, which Goodin believes are ideas that should be dismissed as 
dangerous.92 While both liberals and instrumental republicans believe that political 
decisions are shaped and reshaped by public conversation and are not extra-political, 
cultural republicans like Rousseau believe in the possibility of an extra-political ethical 
consensus. Ultimately, Goodin argues that this “communitarian” approach is not feasible 
in modern heterogeneous and pluralist political communities, arguing that while 
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instrumental republicanism is compatible with and essentially indistinct from liberalism, 
“communitarian” forms of republicanism ought to be rejected outright. Goodin is 
applying the label “communitarian” to refer to strong republicans, including civic 
humanists and cultural republicans. Others like Alan Patten do the same thing, but I do 
not think that the “communitarian” label is particularly useful in this context 
(communitarianism is distinct from republicanism), and I will continue to use 
instrumental republicanism, civic humanism, and cultural republicanism to refer to these 
three distinct strands of republican theory. 
  Alan Patten concurs with Goodin that there are no meaningful differences 
between the instrumental republicanism of someone like Skinner and contemporary 
liberalism. He claims that the liberal critique of republicanism, which holds that 
republicanism ignores the inherent plurality of human ends and values by presuming that 
there is some single good that is good for everyone, has largely succeeded. However, 
today we have revisionist republicans such as Skinner and Pettit who embrace “negative” 
liberty but hold that active citizenship is an instrumental good that contributes to the 
preservation of a free society.93 While he maintains that the instrumental republican 
critique of liberalism fails because it is in fact perfectly compatible with contemporary 
liberalism (FNI and FND amount to the same thing, political participation and civic 
virtue are important for liberals as well as republicans, and so on), Patten believes that 
real differences do exist between liberalism and the “communitarian” republicans such as 
Taylor, but he asserts that liberals are right to reject the arguments of strong republicans. 
Taylor believes that liberals fail to recognize that “patriotism” is a condition for the 
preservation of a free society. Furthermore, as Patten observes, “Taylor's point seems to 
be that the maintenance of liberty requires that individuals view citizenship not merely in 
instrumental terms, but as a good in itself, which is shared with others, and which is 
integral to their identities and self-understandings.”94 Nonetheless, Patten claims that 
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Taylor’s view is still instrumental as he defends the importance of public service and 
civic virtue for society, but does not defend citizenship as an integral part of the good life. 
Patten also claims that while a liberal patriotism (sometimes referred to as constitutional 
patriotism) may play an important role for maintaining a free society, a non-liberal 
patriotism tied to particular historical institutions, traditions, culture, language, and/or 
ethnicity (extra-political factors) may in fact serve causes that threaten liberty.95 As such, 
Patten believes that liberals should resist claims that some type of non-liberal patriotism 
is required for preserving freedom as this would amount to appeasing injustice in the 
name of culture, and deprioritizing the right over the good.96  
 Although instrumental republicans like Pettit may answer such criticisms by 
repeating their claim that FND is a richer conception of freedom than FNI, and by 
arguing that republican citizenship and civic virtue require more contestation than 
currently exists in contemporary liberal democracies, it is questionable whether such 
responses justify the existence of instrumental republicanism as a theoretical framework 
separate from liberalism, or whether instrumental republicanism amounts to a restatement 
of values that fit within the existing liberal framework. And while it can be argued that 
instrumental republicanism appears to be perfectly compatible with liberalism, strong 
republicans like Honohan, Taylor, and David Miller challenge the Rawlsian concept of 
reasonable pluralism, which states that comprehensive doctrines (moral, religious, and so 
on) about constitutional essentials and basic rights should be kept out of public 
deliberation. This is because certain comprehensive doctrines, cultural attachments, and 
religious beliefs are constitutive of an individual’s identity, and excluding such 
fundamental beliefs from deliberation would not reduce conflict in society but rather 
alienate the individuals in question from society as a whole by denying political 
expressions to their most cherished thoughts and beliefs. Taylor would argue that the 
state must at times abandon neutrality in order to address pressing cultural claims; respect 
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for individual rights is not enough if these rights do not take into account cultural 
recognition and other factors that may be constitutive of an individual’s identity. On this 
view, liberty in the proper sense requires more than the absence of restraint; liberty 
requires the realization of one’s highest purposes and the political recognition of one’s 
fundamental thoughts and beliefs. But as I hinted at earlier, among the strong republicans 
there remains a further distinction between civic humanists like Arendt, Taylor, and 
Honohan on the one hand, and cultural republicans like Rousseau on the other. In the 
following section I take a closer look at this distinction. 
2.4   Strong Republicans: Civic Humanism vs. Cultural 
Republicanism 
I have addressed the distinction between instrumental republicanism on the one 
hand and strong republicanism (civic humanism and cultural republicanism) on the other. 
I will now contrast the civic humanism of Iseult Honohan with what she considers to be a 
“more communitarian” version of republicanism, and one which she rejects. This version 
is best expressed in the works of Rousseau and I refer to it as cultural republicanism. In 
explaining her own understanding of republican political autonomy, Honohan claims that 
“the substance of republican politics is based on interdependence (rather than 
commonality), is created in deliberation (not pre-politically), emerges in multiple publics 
to which all can contribute, and is not definitive but open to change.”97 In so doing, she 
tries to distinguish her own conception of republicanism from the republicanism of 
Rousseau, who stresses the importance of establishing a moral community of citizens 
with a shared conception of the public good and a common national identity and culture 
(Honohan refers to this as “pre-political” culture, which she differentiates from civic 
culture formed through the political process alone. I use “extra-political” instead). 
Honohan suggests that on the republican view, cultural claims, much like moral claims, 
must be subject to debate and deliberation; not all identities and cultures receive equal 
political recognition, as not all cultures and identities are equally conducive of personal 
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autonomy. Republican recognition refers to individuals gaining a civic or political 
identity as politically autonomous citizens deliberating on the conditions of their common 
life. As such, political activity constitutes an important part of the individual’s identity. 
However, Honohan argues that:  
[The] contemporary articulation of republican politics does not mean directly 
establishing the shared values of an existing cultural community, since the values 
embodied are subject to the filter of deliberation, are politically constituted and 
contestable. Since the republic does not embody pre-political cultural values, 
republican recognition should be distinguished from a communitarian 
establishment of a package of shared values or conceptions of the good life.”98 
A cultural republican like Rousseau would agree with Honohan that cultural and moral 
claims are subject to debate and deliberation, and that they are contestable. However, 
cultural republicans do believe that every republic embodies extra-political elements 
(national identity and culture, traditions and customs, language, and so on) and that we 
can and should embrace a democratic and moral consensus in the form of a shared 
package of values and conceptions of the public good.  
 Referring back to the previous chapter, cultural republicans like Rousseau join 
with cultural nationalists in arguing that there is no such thing as a purely political 
culture, and that it is impossible to clearly separate each nation’s distinct extra-political 
cultural inheritance from politics. This does not mean that we do not collectively shape 
and reshape that cultural inheritance over time through debate and deliberation, but this 
debate always takes place within the particular cultural context that we have inherited.99  
Honohan believes that citizens can create an independent political culture through civic 
institutions and through the act of participation and deliberation, a political culture that 
does not embody extra-political culture, identity, beliefs, traditions, and customs of the 
society in question. In the previous chapter we established that although all collective 
identities are in a constant process of development and interpretation, a purely civic 
community with an exclusively political culture is impossible. Every political community 
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consists of a contingent inheritance of distinctive experiences and cultural memories that 
represent an inseparable aspect of its collective identity. Nations such as the United 
States, Canada, and France are not merely voluntary associations made up of individuals 
who are interested in upholding certain political principles, or whose only commonality 
lies in their active participation in politics. Political loyalty cannot be reduced to a 
random association of individuals held together exclusively by particular political values, 
institutions, and practices because every nation constitutes an extra-political community 
with a cultural “horizon” of shared historical experiences and cultural memories.100 Every 
community has its own unique cultural inheritance, which means that the political 
community is always to some extent a product of extra-political culture and it cannot be 
culturally and linguistically neutral. Cultural republicans accept David Miller’s assertion 
that a properly functioning political community rests upon an extra-political sense of 
common culture and nationality. According to Miller, common nationality is significant 
because:  
It provides the wherewithal for a common culture against whose background 
people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives; it 
provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued, particularly 
ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a ‘common 
asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding and 
trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.101 
Will Kymlicka also emphasizes the importance of cultural belonging to individual well-
being, and he conceives of the national political community as a “societal culture.” 
According to Kymlicka, a societal culture “provides its members with meaningful ways 
of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These 
cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.”102 The 
type of culture that Miller and Kymlicka are referring to is more than a purely civic 
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culture formed solely through political institutions, active citizenship, and deliberation. 
They recognize that the common culture of each political community has important extra-
political celements, such as a shared language, cultural values, customs, and traditions, 
and that these components play a significant role in shaping the political culture of each 
community. As such, it is impossible to say where extra-political culture ends and where 
political culture begins, as Honohan attempts to do. Furthermore, although cultural 
republicans accept that extra-political cultural values and shared conceptions of the good 
are subject to debate and revision as part of the deliberative process, cultural republicans 
argue that there is still assumed to exist at any given time a substantive consensus on 
what constitutes the cultural values of society and its conception of the public good. For 
cultural republicans, the role of the political community is not to keep these values and 
conceptions of the good out of politics; rather, the community is justified in actively 
promoting them through public institutions and policies. This view will be addressed in 
greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6 as part of my discussion of republican nationalism, a 
concept that combines cultural republicanism and nationalism. For now, it is enough to 
note the difference between Honohan’s attempt to separate extra-political culture and 
nationality from the political process, and the cultural republican view that this cannot be 
done. 
 Honohan also points out that the republican conception of recognition places 
considerable importance on the attitudes, relationships and mutual obligations between 
citizens, as opposed to the liberal tendency to emphasize the contractarian agreement on 
common procedures, institutions, and a pragmatic coexistence.103 Honohan believes that 
while liberals take an association of strangers and communitarians take the family as the 
model for the political community, republicans see their fellow citizens as colleagues; 
separate, diverse, and relatively distant individuals whose involuntary interdependence 
creates common concerns and the possibility of addressing them together (the colleagues 
model of citizenship). As Honohan notes, “on this analogy citizens may be relatively 
distant and different from one another, have no close emotional engagement, but yet 
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recognise the commitments entailed in a valuable relationship, thicker than the civility 
between strangers but of a kind different from friends and family.”104 Honohan considers 
this particular conception of citizenship to be quintessentially republican, as opposed to 
liberal or communitarian. However, we know that some of the thinkers who most 
profoundly influenced republicanism, including Aristotle and Rousseau, conceived of 
citizenship as more than a relationship between colleagues; for Aristotle, the relationship 
between citizens was based on friendship, and for Rousseau it was modeled on the family. 
Thus, it appears that Honohan commits the same error as Pettit; in order to paint 
republicanism as a whole in a particular light, she discounts the views of some of the 
most important theorists in the tradition. Rousseau would accuse Honohan of neglecting 
the importance of sentiments in tying the political community together, sentiments which 
are a prerequisite for establishing a society in which citizens are capable of overcoming 
their narrow self-interest in the name of the common good.  
 Honohan believes in promoting a political patriotism over what she calls ethnic 
and cultural nationalism. She claims that the love of country must be synonymous with 
the love of liberty attained through the republic, because republicans are concerned with 
self-determining and self-governing citizens, not with nations or cultures. She argues that 
culture can be taken into account in politics without making a common national culture 
the basis of a political community, and she sees nationalism as a form of 
communitarianism that is based on a “pre-political” (extra-political) identity. Whereas 
cultural nationality is based on a perceived commonality of extra-political culture or 
history, for Honohan republican citizenship is based not on extra-political commonality 
but on the political recognition of multiply generated independencies, and on the 
interaction that takes place within the framework of a state. Honohan says that in a 
republican state there are no cultural restrictions on membership, and if there are common 
cultural values they are the outcome of political interaction, provisionally embodied and 
open to change. According to Honohan: 
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The republican conception of citizenship outlined here is closer to that of a liberal 
nationality, in which citizenship is defined in terms of membership of a shared 
public culture, rather than a deeper culture or ethnicity. But it is still distinct from 
it, since republican citizenship rests fundamentally on the possibility of self-
government of those who share a common fate rather than on specifically 
articulated public values.105 
In stark contrast to Honohan’s view, cultural republicans make a common national 
identity and culture the basis of the political community (as is evident in Rousseau’s 
Constitution for Corsica and Government of Poland), and they hold that while loving 
liberty and the laws is important, the love of country must also be synonymous with the 
love of nation. Honohan acknowledges that it has been argued that, in practice, 
individuals will recognize the importance of republican citizenship only if it is rooted in 
some type of common culture. Essentially, “the argument is that in large modern states, 
in which people cannot personally identify with others, citizens’ virtue, or active 
participation, supporting the common good and accepting the degree of redistribution 
which republican politics requires, depends on their being able to share certain sentiments 
and identity, or at least to give priority to a shared public culture.”106 On this account, the 
nation is the necessary foundation for the republican community. Miller believes that 
“nationality gives people the common identity that makes it possible for them to conceive 
of shaping their world together.”107 In this regard, Miller’s view is in line with 
Rousseau’s, who also believes that only a common national identity can create the bonds 
necessary for establishing a community of virtuous republican citizens capable of seeing 
beyond their individual interests and embracing the common good. For Rousseau, the 
common good consists of actively promoting the kind of civic virtue and citizen character 
that ensures the development of a spirit of fraternity, solidarity, and reciprocity, which is 
made possible only by the strong social bonds of a national community. 
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 Nevertheless, Honohan argues against rooting republican citizenship in a common 
culture and nationality because modern nations are by and large not ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states. As we live in a diverse and pluralistic world, Honohan 
believes that giving precedence to an existing common public culture will be 
advantageous for some and exclusive or even oppressive to others. It is important to note, 
however, that while cultural republicans clearly root republican citizenship in a common 
national culture, they are not actually advocating for the establishment of ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states that are open only to members of one particular ethnicity or 
culture. What they want is the promotion of a shared national culture that includes all of 
the diverse ethnicities and subcultures which already exist within the modern state, and 
yet still forms an encompassing national identity that all citizens can embrace. While 
citizens may belong to various ethnic, cultural, or territorial groups, and while they 
should be free to maintain those ties, they should also be willing to embrace a common 
national culture that transcends sectional identities and unites the citizens into a single 
national community (for more on this, see Chapters 5 and 6). Honohan maintains that 
republican solidarity should be understood as a commitment to the people with whom we 
are interdependent within the political community, and that it should not be defined in 
terms of either liberal institutions and political principles, or loyalty to a nation, whether 
ethnic, cultural, or civic. According to Honohan, “sharing a common fate may often be 
enough to motivate support for policies which aim at the common good without there 
needing to be a deeper sense of belonging together, which a shared national identity 
would involve.”108 
 Moreover, in claiming that the interdependence of the citizens’ fate and future 
ought to constitute a sufficient foundation for the political community, Honohan goes so 
far as to raise the possibility of a “republican cosmopolitanism” that allows for multiple 
sovereignties and more porous boundaries, referencing the European Union (EU) as a 
potential example of this new type of community. A republic which does not depend on 
pre-existing and extra-political cultural commonalities would provide a model for future 
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transnational political communities, and the EU is the most vivid modern example of 
attempting to establish the institutions of government at levels other than the nation. 
Honohan argues that, like the relationships between colleagues, the relationships and 
obligations of republican citizens can be more permeable and extensive than those 
between the members of a single common culture.109 Thus, Honohan offers the 
possibility of a cosmopolitan citizenship emerging from the bottom up, “through the 
development of increasing webs of relationships or ranges of overlapping economic, 
environmental and cultural interdependencies, rather than depending on the prior 
existence of a world-state or based on a priori principles of a universal humanity.”110 She 
concludes that the recognition and special obligations of citizens are rooted in 
interdependence rather than commonality, cultural identity, or feelings of attachment, and 
that instead of having to choose between nationally based obligations and cosmopolitan 
obligations, “we should think of people as having responsibilities in irregularly extending 
and overlapping networks in which citizenship rather than nationality constitutes one of 
the most important frameworks.”111  
 This is what Honohan calls the republican conception of citizenship (colleagues 
model of citizenship), and she contrasts this model with what she believes to be two 
polarized alternatives; the liberal model (capable of extension but too thin), and the 
cultural nationalist model (demands commitment at the cost of excluding or oppressing 
non-members). And yet by calling her colleagues model of citizenship the republican 
conception of citizenship, she again ignores the friendship model of citizenship of 
Aristotle and the family model of citizenship of Rousseau. Rousseau argues that loving 
one’s fellow citizens as members of an extended family (as opposed to treating them like 
colleagues), loving the community, and loving the nation constitute the prerequisites for 
establishing the rule of the general will (for more on this, see Chapters 3 and 4). As such, 
his ideas were crucial to the development of our modern understanding of national 
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identity and culture, and his philosophy provided the moral justification for nationalism. 
In the Constitution for Corsica, Rousseau declares: “Every people has or ought to have a 
national character, and if it lacks one it would be necessary to begin by giving it one.”112 
He believes that a common national identity has intrinsic value, and that this identity 
helps shape citizens into virtuous members of the republic. Furthermore, Rousseau 
stresses that a proper republican state should be defensive in character, limited in size, 
and that it must remain autonomous and sovereign. Rousseau would never have endorsed 
Honohan’s views about a “republican cosmopolitanism” with multiple sovereignties and 
porous borders akin to those of the EU. Aside from the bureaucratic complexities and 
democratic deficits of the EU, Rousseau would have seen such supranational projects as 
dangerous infringements on the sovereignty of the republic and as threats to the 
preservation of its distinct national character. Moreover, as Catherine Frost argues: 
Transnational democratic institutions have turned in disappointing results when it 
comes to capturing the loyalty or allegiances of the multinational populations they 
serve (Kymlicka 2004: 257-61). Such institutions may be established, and often 
with the best of intentions, but representation cannot be imposed on a population. 
In the absence of a pre-existing frame of reference that reflects this structure, a 
multinational or transnational representational order is unlikely to have much 
meaning or legitimacy for a population. And at present any transnational or 
multinational frameworks that exist (such as the European  Union, for instance) 
are weak as compared to national ones (Kymlicka 2004: 258; Murphy and Harty 
2003:  186). While they may present a more pluralist alternative to nationalism, 
then, these new political forms may also reduce the representational resources a 
population can bring to bear on its political and cultural life.113 
As we can see, the views of a contemporary civic humanist like Honohan are very 
different from a cultural republican like Rousseau, and also from other contemporary 
republican thinkers like Miller. Just like Rousseau, Miller believes that the virtues 
required by republican citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nation-
state, and a common national identity and public culture are essential for producing the 
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kind of solidarity that is needed for a system of inclusive deliberative democracy to take 
shape.114 A common public culture should not be so all-embracing that it destroys private 
subcultures, but it should have substantial content and meaning for members of the 
national community.115 Consequently, Miller posits that “political communities should as 
far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common national 
identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group 
identities.”116 Although Honohan and others tend to classify them as “communitarian,” 
republicans like Miller rightly resist the label because it does nothing to clarify the debate 
within republicanism, and I argue that Miller’s theories fall within a distinct cultural 
strand of republicanism that is rooted in the works of Rousseau. Cultural republicanism 
differs from both instrumental republicanism and civic humanism, but it remains an 
integral part of the wider republican tradition. In the next chapter, I take a closer look at 
Rousseau’s specific brand of republicanism and how it relates to our modern 
understandings of democracy, culture, and nationalism. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Rousseau’s Republicanism 
 In this chapter I address some misconceptions about Rousseau’s political 
philosophy and its relationship to the French Revolution and beyond. I then go on to 
consider Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and I identify his most important 
contributions to republican political theory, including his notions about the two social 
contracts and the problem of inequality, as well as his understanding of  the people as 
sovereign, the general will, and the moral republic. In Chapter 4, I argue that Rousseau is 
both a distinctly republican thinker and the father of modern nationalism, and that his 
unique brand of republicanism has important implications for contemporary debates in 
nationalist theory. 
3.1 Addressing Misconceptions: Rousseau and the French 
Revolution 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) left a lasting legacy on republican political 
theory and on the wider discipline of political science. The influence of his ideas can be 
seen in the works of such diverse thinkers as Kant, Wollstonecraft, Hegel, Marx, Rawls, 
and Derrida. Rousseau’s ideas are said to have inspired the ideals of the French 
Revolution, and it is believed that Robespierre carried a copy of Rousseau’s Social 
Contract everywhere he went. Consequently, liberal thinkers from Benjamin Constant to 
Isaiah Berlin have suggested that the excesses of the French Revolution (including the 
Terror) have their roots in Rousseau’s work. Further still, some have suggested that the 
brutal totalitarian movements of the 20th century can be traced back to Rousseau’s 
philosophy. As J.S. Maloy observes: 
Rousseau's efforts to develop an account of moral economy have supplied much 
of the ammunition over the years for those who have charged that Rousseau's 
politics are essentially "totalitarian.” The dangers of trying to realize an antique 
conception of virtue under modern conditions were flagged as early as 1819 in 
Constant's famous speech on "ancient" and "modern liberty." But the twentieth 
century added Nazism and Stalinism to Jacobinism on the list of horrors for which 
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Rousseau could be blamed. The question of moral psychology was paramount in 
all this, for Rousseau was considered to have advocated just the sort of tampering 
with human nature which the totalitarian regimes of mid-century had tried to 
instantiate.117 
To use Constant’s terminology, Rousseau is known for defending “ancient” liberty which 
defines citizenship as a moral obligation to actively participate in politics, and which 
requires self-realization and considerable self-sacrifice with regards to the citizen’s time 
and energy. This is distinct from “modern” liberty, which is defined primarily in terms of 
equal legal status, the rule of law, and freedom from undue interference by 
government.118 Although the “totalitarian thesis” in Rousseau has largely been 
discredited among committed students of his work, the residue of totalitarianism still 
hangs over discussions of Rousseau in lecture halls and seminar rooms of twenty-first 
century universities. The underlying assumption is always that “Rousseau did indeed 
defend, in the name of the radical alteration of human character, authoritative and 
robustly transitive mechanisms of psychological influence and control.”119 Rousseau 
argued for the regulation or redirection of natural inclinations or passions, but he did not 
advocate wholesale psychological transformation (a defining characteristic of totalitarian 
regimes).120 As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau did believe in freedom as self-
mastery (FSM) and in channeling the passions in constructive rather than destructive 
ways. Nevertheless, Rousseau condemned all forms of authoritarian rule by a single 
person or group of people, argued for a profoundly democratic society in which all 
sovereign power rests in the general will of the people, and insisted that all individuals 
must be treated as autonomous moral agents. As such, I interpret Rousseau’s philosophy 
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to be not only incompatible with but directly opposed to all types of totalitarian rule. A 
careful study of Rousseau’s work must begin with this basic understanding. 
 There is little doubt that Rousseau’s republican ideals had a profound influence on 
the French Revolution, but it is important to address some of the misconceptions 
regarding this influence. Contrary to claims that the actors of the French Revolution were 
attempting to faithfully implement Rousseau’s theoretical principles in practice, François 
Furet points out that “the revolutionaries were quite unfaithful to the Social Contract: 
between 1789 and 1800, they devoted all their energy to founding a representative 
government, the very type Rousseau had declared intrinsically corrupt, since the will of 
the people could not be transferred and therefore could not be represented.”121 
Revolutionaries like the Abbé Sieyès argued that the unenlightened masses did not 
possess sufficient virtues of citizenship to take a direct and active part in governing, and 
his solution was the representation of the less enlightened by the more enlightened. He 
proclaimed that “without alienating their rights, citizens may delegate their exercise,” a 
statement that appears contrary to the principles of the Social Contract. The institutions 
that were established during the French Revolution were “obviously incompatible with 
Rousseau’s insistence in the Social Contract on the formation of the law by the general 
will.”122 Furthermore, Rousseau cannot be blamed for the fact that the French 
revolutionary period was so receptive to an absolutist conception of sovereign power. 
The reality is that prerevolutionary France was also the France of absolutism; the 
revolutionaries carried over the tradition of absolute sovereignty in France from 
monarchy into republicanism. Tocqueville demonstrated that the absolute monarchy of 
prerevolutionary France “constituted in itself a first revolution that was in itself a 
necessary condition for that of 1789,” and as Furet observes, France’s “experience of 
absolutism led directly to a unitary concept of sovereignty. Experience and the habits it 
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bred were surely more compelling than the effects of reading the Social Contract―which 
had hardly been a best-seller.”123  
 For more than two centuries critics have tried to implicate Rousseau’s ideas in the 
excesses of the French Revolution and the terrible crimes that took place during the 
Terror. Robespierre, the leader of the Jacobins, is often portrayed as a zealous follower of 
Rousseau and his actions are presented as the inevitable consequence of trying to 
implement Rousseau’s ideas in practice. Jacob Talmon went so far as to directly blame 
Rousseau’s philosophy for the rise of that he calls “totalitarian Messianic democracy,” 
claiming that “Rousseau's ‘general will’, an ambiguous concept, sometimes concocted as 
valid a priori, sometimes as immanent in the will of man, exclusive and implying 
unanimity, became the driving force of totalitarian democracy, and the source of all its 
contradictions and antinomies.”124 While Rousseau’s republican ideals, including his 
notions about the two social contracts, the people as sovereign, the general will, and the 
moral republic, appealed to many of the revolutionaries, it would be academically 
dishonest to blame Rousseau’s ideas for the actions of the revolutionaries, or to hold him 
responsible for the Revolution’s failings. The revolutionaries, including Robespierre, had 
their own agendas, and in pursuing them they did not hesitate to disregard Rousseau’s 
fundamental ideas and principles. A close study of his work shows that Rousseau would 
not have condoned the excesses of the Revolution and, as Allan Bloom argues, 
“Rousseau would… certainly have disapproved of Robespierre.”125 In fact, it was widely 
understood that Rousseau had neither predicted the Revolution nor anticipated the 
bloodshed that followed, to say nothing of condoning it. As William Doyle writes: “It is 
hard to imagine either Voltaire or Rousseau reveling in the events which, from only 
eleven years after their deaths, were often so glibly attributed to their influence. 
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Robespierre, as proud a disciple as any of the Enlightenment, declared: ‘Political 
writers… had in no way foreseen this Revolution.’”126  
 Although Robespierre paid lip service to Rousseau’s notion of popular 
sovereignty (the people as sovereign) in the early years of the Revolution, after expelling 
the Girondins from the National Convention, Robespierre “would unceasingly defend the 
national representation against any popular intervention, and his notion of the dictatorship 
of public safety, which he exercised by virtue of powers granted by the Convention and 
only the Convention, no longer resembled in any way the ideas of the Social 
Contract.”127 Furthermore, even if Robespierre had been genuinely committed to 
Rousseau’s ideals in principle, his methods were obviously incompatible with Rousseau’s 
philosophy and Rousseau himself would surely have condemned them. Rousseau stressed 
that the general will could not be represented by any one man or committee of men and 
he abhorred political factionalism; as such, the mass executions of the Terror, conducted 
without due process and carried out as a means to the end of eliminating perceived 
opponents of the Jacobin faction, would have shocked Rousseau. And while the 
revolutionaries were certainly aware and respectful of the republican writings that 
Rousseau produced in an era dominated by political absolutism, they never attempted to 
directly follow his political formulas during the course of the Revolution. Nevertheless, 
Rousseau’s work remains a critical tool for evaluating the successes and failures of a 
Revolution that was inspired by the same spirit of freedom and equality that he first 
brought to life in his writings.   
3.2 The Two Social Contracts and the Problem of Inequality 
In this section I discuss the lasting importance of Rousseau’s ideas about the two 
social contracts and the problem of inequality. I emphasize that these aspects of 
Rousseau’s philosophy are firmly rooted in republican political thought, and that they 
                                                 
 
126
 William Doyle. The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 74. 
 
127
 Furet, “Rousseau and the French Revolution,” 177. 
57 
 
make an important contribution to republicanism. When I say “the two social contracts,” 
I am referring to the fact that Rousseau distinguished between the current social contract 
(which Hobbes and Locke sought to explain and defend in their own different ways, and 
which Rousseau believed to be illegitimate and therefore immoral), and the new social 
contract proposed by Rousseau (which is the subject of his Social Contract, and which he 
believed to be legitimate and therefore moral).  
According to Rousseau, those like Thomas Hobbes who claim that the state of 
nature is one of violence and competition, and who then go on to draw conclusions about 
the nature of the social contract based on this view, do not go back far enough. In the 
Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau contends that before the development of society man 
led a simple and peaceful way of life. The differences that set man apart from all the 
other creatures was his unique ability to consciously share in his own operations, as well 
as his capacity for self-improvement. Unlike animals, understood by Rousseau to be 
ingenious machines of nature governed solely by instinct, man is a creature governed by 
free will. All animals are born with amour de soi, a self-regarding love of self that is 
independent of the opinions of others, but it is man’s free will and capacity for self-
improvement that gives him the unique ability to act against his natural instincts. It is his 
free will and the ability for self-improvement (perfectibility) that distinguishes man from 
other animals and eventually leads him to develop complex and interdependent social 
relationships with other human beings that go beyond the mere instinct for self-
preservation. Out of these complex social relationships we see the eventual development 
of pre-political societies (communities of people who live together but have not yet 
established formal political institutions or laws), and the formation of these permanent 
communities ultimately gives rise to what Rousseau calls amour-propre (an artificial love 
of self that is dependent entirely on the opinion of others). Rousseau explains: 
Amour-propre must not be confused with the love of self [amour de soi]: for they 
differ both in themselves and in their effects. Love of self [amour de soi] is a 
natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and 
which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity 
and virtue. Amour-propre is a purely relative and fictitious feeling, which arises in 
the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than any other, 
and is the real source of the ‘sense of honour.’ This being understood, I maintain 
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that, in our primitive condition, in the true state of nature, amour-propre  does 
not exist.128  
 Amour-propre is synonymous with narrow self-interest, selfishness, vanity, and 
an extreme dependency on the opinions of others (we see ourselves through the eyes of 
others, and our own identity depends on what others think of us).  According to 
Rousseau, as men in the state of nature become more social, they begin to compare 
themselves to others, become mindful of their opinions, and develop a sense of pride that 
often degenerates into jealousy and rivalry. Amour-propre, this uniquely human 
characteristic, becomes the source of all the inequality and corruption in society as men 
engage in endless competition over property, honour, and power, thereby becoming 
selfish, petty, and ruthless creatures. Simply put, amour-propre is the root cause of all the 
vices in civil society and the primary source of injustice in the modern world. In 
Rousseau’s view, natural man is self-regarding and compassionate; when Hobbes spoke 
of the “state of nature” that was a state of war of all against all, he was not talking about 
man in his natural state, but about the social man already corrupted by the negative 
effects of amour-propre. Hobbes fails to see the state of nature as it was before pre-
political societies were formed, and he also fails to acknowledge the universal principle 
of compassion which governs natural man. Rousseau says: 
There is another principle which has escaped Hobbes; which, having been 
bestowed on mankind, to moderate, on certain occasions, the impetuosity of 
[amour-propre], or, before its birth, the desire of self-preservation, tempers the 
ardour with which he pursues his own welfare, by an innate repugnance at seeing 
a fellow creature suffer. I think I need not fear contradiction in holding man to be 
possessed of the only natural virtue, which could not be denied him by the most 
violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of compassion, which is a 
disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject to so many evils as we 
certainly are: by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, as it comes 
before any kind of reflection; and at the same time so natural, that the very brutes 
themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it.129 
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As men begin comparing themselves to others in society, they begin competing for 
wealth, esteem, and property (private property itself being the primary cause of material 
inequality in the modern world), and they also begin exploiting each other for their own 
private advantage. As the state of pre-political society becomes a state of war, those who 
had amassed great wealth and property by exploiting their fellow man find their ill-gotten 
riches constantly threatened by the poor masses who know that the rich have no 
legitimate claim to their unequal wealth; the rich are nothing more than usurpers of the 
fruits of the earth, which belong equally to all. Rousseau famously states: 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of 
saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real 
founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how 
many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling 
up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening 
to this imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth 
belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.130 
Rousseau argues that this constitutes “the first step towards inequality, and at the same 
time towards vice.”131 Eventually, the rich minority decided to protect their own unequal 
wealth from the poor majority by creating political institutions which, under the guise of 
preserving order and security, secured the usurpations of the rich against retaliation from 
the poor. With that, the first (and current) social contract was established.  
 Just as he rejects Hobbes’ account of human nature, Rousseau disavows Locke’s 
take on private property. Rousseau argues that free and equal people would never consent 
to the great inequalities of wealth that characterize modern society. For Rousseau, the 
social contract that Locke describes in effect justifies and defends class divisions, 
exploitation, and large inequalities in wealth because Locke is primarily concerned with 
the “rational and industrious man” and his “right” to protect his property from both the 
king and the poor masses. Rousseau is concerned with all citizens, and while he believes 
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that private property is justified within reason, he asserts that for a republican society to 
remain free and democratic, there have to be firm limits on material inequality.132  
 As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau tells us that no citizen ought to be 
wealthy enough to buy another, or so poor as to have to sell himself. 133 In the Discourse 
on Political Economy, he emphasizes that “it is therefore one of the most important 
functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away 
wealth from its possessors, but by depriving all men of means to accumulate it; not by 
building hospitals for the poor, but by securing the citizens from becoming poor.”134 Firm 
limits on material inequality are necessary in order to allow all individuals to achieve 
their full potential as citizens; meaningful democratic citizenship is impossible for those 
who are so poor that they depend entirely on others for their very survival. Rousseau 
distinguishes between two types of inequality: the first is natural inequality, which 
includes disparities in physical strength, intellectual capacity, age, and health. The second 
is moral inequality, which is an artificial form of inequality that arises only in society. 
Whereas natural inequality is simply the way things are by nature, moral inequality is 
socially constructed and can be either just or unjust. Rousseau believes that as far as 
moral inequality is concerned, citizens ought to be distinguished based on their 
contributions to society; social privileges should not be distributed to all citizens 
indiscriminately, but to each according to his deserts. According to Rousseau, 
“distributive justice would oppose this rigorous equality of the state of nature, even were 
it practicable in civil society; as all the members of the State owe it their services in 
proportion to their talents and abilities, they ought, on their side, to be distinguished and 
favoured in proportion to the services they have actually rendered.”135 Although he is a 
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strong proponent of meritocracy, Rousseau concedes that some degree of material 
inequality is bound to exist within society (he does not believe in complete equality of 
outcome or in abolishing private property), but he argues that material inequality, being 
entirely manmade, can be either justified or unjustified.  As Frederick Neuhouser 
explains, “in saying, for example, that the state’s goal should be to bring the extremes of 
rich and poor ‘as close together as possible,’ Rousseau acknowledges that absolute 
equality in ‘power and riches’ is too severe a demand (SC, II.11.ii). Thus, the mere 
artificiality of inequality does not imply that it is unjustified; its artificiality merely means 
that it is appropriate for normative questions regarding its legitimacy to be raised.”136  
 Rousseau stresses the importance of limiting material inequality in society 
because excessive dependence on others destroys freedom; those who are very poor will 
be forced to do things to survive that they may never have done under other 
circumstances, and those who are very rich will be able to use their wealth to gain undue 
influence over others. Neuhouser correctly notes that according to Rousseau, equality is 
instrumentally valuable for freedom because material inequality greatly exacerbates the 
dependence of citizens on others; inequality is derivative of freedom in that too much 
inequality threatens freedom. 137  As Neuhouser states, 
That Rousseau condemns economic inequality because of its consequences is 
made clear in his discussion of the constraints that considerations of freedom 
place on inequality, especially in his well-known claim that the general will has 
two principal aims—freedom and equality—and that equality (in wealth and 
power) is such an aim because “freedom cannot subsist without it” (SC, II.11.i.). 
Here Rousseau states  unambiguously that we should seek economic equality 
because (and only when) it threatens social members’ freedom.138 
Material inequality is acceptable only in so far as it does not threaten the fundamental 
interests of any citizen, including his freedom and the basic social conditions of his well-
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being. As such, the legitimate republic (once established by the new social contract) has 
both the right and the obligation to set policies that ensure that material inequality will be 
limited in this way. It must be stressed, however, that the specific type of freedom that 
Rousseau is interested in promoting is freedom as self-mastery or FSM, which requires 
citizens to be ruled by laws that they make for themselves. Neuhouser does an excellent 
job of connecting Rousseau’s understanding of freedom and equality to his emphasis on 
the importance of participation, stating: 
If laws—even good laws—are to avoid being a source of domination, they must 
actually be made by those subject to them. Because legislation must be a 
collective enterprise, I can determine the laws that govern me only by actively 
participating in a democratic process in which those laws are made. As a citizen, I 
determine for myself what I am to do only insofar as I am an active member of 
the group that literally makes the laws that govern all of us. Moreover, my 
participation in that process must be sufficiently substantial that the claim that the 
laws issue from me—from an us that incorporates me as an active participant—is 
not merely a hollow slogan, even when some of the laws that emerge from that 
process diverge from my opinion of what our collective ideals and interests 
require us to do. This is why  participatory democracy is not a peripheral feature 
of Rousseau’s vision of the legitimate republic; it is, rather, essential to avoiding 
domination in such a republic, and on this issue his differences from traditional 
republicans could hardly be starker. Rousseau agrees with them that “law that 
answers systematically to people’s . . . interests . . . does not compromise people’s 
liberty,” but only on the further condition that those laws are, in a robust sense, 
collectively issued by the very people subject to them.139 
 Rousseau holds that we must have firm limits on material inequality in order to 
make meaningful democracy possible. This satisfies the first requirement of FSM, which 
states that citizens must have a direct say in shaping the laws that govern them (see table 
in Chapter 2). The other requirement of FSM is that citizens must learn to overcome their 
mere appetites and narrow self-interests in the name of the common good, and setting 
firm limits on material inequality is also fundamentally important for this second 
requirement. David Lay Williams explains:  
Perhaps the most pernicious effects of economic inequality, for Rousseau, are 
wrought on the soul. Tremendous wealth, on his reasoning, enfeebles the 
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conscience. We social animals are always driven to distinguish ourselves, to 
prove ourselves better than others.  This is not always socially destructive, insofar 
as distinction is granted for the right reasons – namely, civic and sociable 
behavior.  Society, however, has increasingly not only rewarded distinction with 
wealth, but made wealth a distinction worthy of respect. Where this happens, 
one’s status owes not just to one’s wealth per se, but to one’s wealth relative to 
the poverty of others.  Rousseau worried that in the most unequal societies, the 
rich would acquire a “pleasure of dominating” that renders them “like those 
ravenous wolves which once they have tasted human flesh  scorn all other food, 
and from then on want only to devour men.” Against a mind degraded in this way, 
addicted to the pleasure of domination, no appeal to justice, fairness, or any other 
value we like to think defines us, can have any effect; and no just society can 
stand on such foundations.140 
In sum, equality is instrumentally valuable for Rousseau because it makes FSM possible. 
Although we cannot eliminate it completely, in the legitimate republic established by the 
new social contract we must set firm limits on material inequality in order to ensure that 
all citizens have the ability to fully express their freedom through self-realization and 
political participation. A civil society which fails to live up to these standards is 
illegitimate; in allowing excessive material inequality it denies freedom in the fullest 
sense and is in effect governed by the principle of “might makes right.” 
 Rousseau declares that civil society in its current form fails to live up to the 
aforementioned standards, and that the social contract as it exists today is illegitimate 
because it “irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and 
inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of 
the few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery, and 
wretchedness.”141 Simply put, those who currently rule over the people do not have 
legitimate authority. This is because the current social contract formalizes and 
institutionalizes the law of the strongest, a condition it was originally designed to remedy. 
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It is a contract into which mankind entered unwittingly and under false pretences. On that 
basis, Rousseau declares the current social contract null and void, and he sets out to 
establish a new, legitimate contract that has the moral and political authority to govern 
man.  
3.3 The People as Sovereign, the General Will, and the 
Moral Republic 
Having argued that the current social contract is illegitimate because it is founded 
upon arbitrary force and therefore has no moral basis, Rousseau sets out to develop a new 
legitimate social contract founded upon morals and reciprocity. According to Rousseau, 
“society must be studied by means of men, and men by means of society. Those who 
want to treat politics and morals separately will never understand anything of either of the 
two.”142 For Rousseau, politics is not merely about security or private property, it is about 
morality. It is worth noting that both Hobbes and Locke saw their own visions of political 
sovereignty as moral visions, but Rousseau rejects their claims, arguing instead that the 
social contracts they described were illegitimate and therefore immoral. Conceding that it 
is no longer possible for man to return to the state of nature, Rousseau wants to find a 
way to bring diverse groups of individuals together in civil society and turn them into a 
sovereign people in a way that would end the unequal dependence of men on each other 
(such as the dependence of the poor on the rich, and vice versa) and replace it with the 
reciprocal dependence of each individual on the whole. This new contract must somehow 
ensure that each man gives himself to all and yet remains as free as before.  
 In the Social Contract, Rousseau seeks to establish legitimate sovereign authority, 
and he does so by providing what he believes to be the only moral foundation for 
sovereignty―the general will. As G.D.H. Cole observes: 
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Rousseau’s purpose in the Social Contract is to show that the ‘sovereign’―the 
people, considered collectively as a body with the authority to lay down 
absolutely binding law for each of its members ―has a moral claim on our 
allegiance that stems from our having (whether actually or in thought) given 
ourselves to its authority without reservation. This supposes that we are so 
completely members of the state to which we all owe allegiance that there is no 
competing moral authority in our lives; and Rousseau gave great offence to his 
contemporaries by relegating religion to a subordinate role in the political system, 
and doing everything possible to remove the possibility of conflict between our 
duties to God and our duties to the ‘sovereign’.143 
By relegating religion and other competing moral authorities to a subordinate role in 
politics, Rousseau follows in the classical republican tradition of Machiavelli, who 
famously divorced civic from Christian values. In fact, J.G.A. Pocock claims that 
“Rousseau was the Machiavelli of the eighteenth century,” adding that “as with 
Machiavelli, it took time to discern the extraordinary strength of intellect which kept 
Rousseau a major classical theorist in the humanist succession.”144  
 When I say “the people as sovereign,” I am referring to Rousseau’s belief that the 
general will cannot be represented, and that all citizens are therefore obliged to take an 
active part in creating the laws that govern them. According to Rousseau, the true 
sovereign is neither a ruling class nor the formal institutions of the state, but the citizen 
body as a whole. The people govern through the general will; a will that is indivisible and 
always aims at the common good. To be a citizen of a community governed by the 
general will requires overcoming one’s narrow self-interest in the name of the common 
interest―overcoming one’s particular will in the name of the general will (FSM). The 
particular will is defined as being solely concerned with what is in each individual’s 
private interest, even if said interest can only be satisfied at the expense of the community 
as a whole. Conversely, the general will always considers what is in the common interest 
of the community and holds that what is best for the whole is ultimately best for the 
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individual, who is an intrinsic part of that whole. It is this general will―this enlightened 
part of ourselves that aims only at the common interest―that pulls us up by our chains 
and forces us to be free; forces us to reciprocate the virtues, duties, and responsibilities of 
our compatriots; forces us to be citizens.  
 Rousseau’s republicanism distinguishes itself from the instrumental 
republicanism of someone like Machiavelli (and contemporary instrumental republicans 
like Pettit and Skinner) by its strong emphasis on morality and the good. I use the term 
“moral republic” to refer to the society that Rousseau hopes to establish through the new 
and legitimate social contract that he proposes because, according to Rousseau, all other 
political communities are illegitimate and therefore immoral; they merely 
institutionalized the principle of “might makes right” and thus failed to promote 
meaningful freedom for their citizens. For Rousseau, only a republic ruled by the general 
will is a moral republic. It is important to note that Rousseau is not merely interested in a 
well-armed and stable republican state that can protect its citizens from foreign invasion 
and tyranny. Rather, he wants to establish a strong republic with a firm moral grounding. 
He seeks not only the formation of stable political institutions, but also to reform the 
moral character of citizens and to synthesize civic duty and pragmatic notions of the 
common good with the classical pursuit of morality and justice. Rousseau insists that 
strict laws alone cannot instill proper morals into the citizens of a republic; laws ought to 
draw their force from proper morals, not the other way around. Furthermore, citizens 
should not only observe but love the laws as an embodiment of good morals and civic 
virtue. Rousseau references Ancient Sparta, where “laws and morals [manners], 
intimately united in the hearts of the citizens, made, as it were, only one single body.”145  
According to Rousseau, the only proper laws are laws which are derived from proper 
morals and from the noble values of the citizens themselves. Unlike Machiavelli, 
Rousseau asserts that no laws, no matter how noble, can bring prosperity to a society that 
has already embraced vice. Good laws and strong armies are not sufficient to secure the 
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continued existence of a political community; promoting good morals is just as 
important. What this means for Rousseau is simple: citizens must do more than merely 
abide by the laws of the state; rather, they must actively strive to become better people, to 
pursue self-realization and self-overcoming, and to learn to put the common good before 
their own private interests. Furthermore, they must take an active part in creating the laws 
that govern them through direct political participation. In essence, republican citizens 
must embrace FSM, which requires genuine moral and civic virtue; for Rousseau, the 
good man and the good citizen are one and the same. 
 Rousseau sees the general will as a shared moral consensus that all citizens strive 
to establish, and this will alone constitutes sovereignty. The general will establishes a 
moral and collective body, le moi commun (the public person), which Rousseau defines 
as “a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the 
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, 
may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.”146 Rousseau explains: 
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of 
association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members 
as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common 
identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all 
other persons, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or 
body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when 
active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are 
associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called 
citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws 
of the State.147 
Rousseau declares that the moral republic must be governed by the people directly, i.e. by 
the general will of the people, because only the general will aims at the common good of 
all. Joshua Cohen tells us that “in strikingly spare, intense prose, [Rousseau] gives us a 
picture of a free community of equals, a social-political world in which individuals realize 
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their nature as free by living together as equals, giving the laws to themselves, guided in 
those lawgiving judgments by a conception of their common good.”148 This is a complex 
concept, and Rousseau’s critics often claim that it is difficult to determine the general 
will in practice. Furthermore, critics argue that it is equally difficult to determine whether 
the general will ultimately aims at the common good. After all, is it not possible for a 
large group of people to collectively decide to plunge the state into war and chaos? Is it 
not possible for the general will to become destructive and harmful for society as a 
whole?  
 Rousseau holds that the general will is always right and always tends to the public 
advantage because “undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only 
because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work 
for others without working for ourselves.”149 For Rousseau, the only human law that is 
worthy of obedience is the law we make for ourselves. The general will presupposes a 
reciprocal agreement between citizens who share common interests; in making political 
decisions, we ourselves must submit to all of the conditions we impose on others. At the 
heart of this moral project lies the idea of self-overcoming, or the ability and willingness 
of the citizen to move past his narrow self-interests in order to grasp, understand, and act 
upon what is in the common interest. This capacity for willing generally constitutes a 
new kind of freedom; a freedom which moves beyond the satisfaction of mere appetites 
and allows us to make genuine moral choices. This is a form of human rationality clearly 
distinct from the strictly self-regarding calculation of personal benefit. Humans are 
uniquely free because they can choose to resist their appetites and attain a level of self-
realization that allows them to serve a good greater than themselves. This is what makes 
human beings unique among all living creatures; for Rousseau, self-realization and self-
overcoming in the name of the common good constitute the most meaningful form of 
human freedom (FSM).150 The ability to will generally allows citizens to achieve their 
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full potential as human beings and accomplish feats that would have been impossible 
outside of the moral republic. In other words, citizens of the moral republic have at their 
disposal unique choices and opportunities that they would not have anywhere else. In line 
with the republican understanding of the relationship between freedom and laws, citizens 
of the moral republic are more free than other men; by overcoming the inclination to only 
satisfy their mere appetites at the expense of everything else, citizens stop being slaves to 
their appetites and become free in the most meaningful sense. As Bloom explains, 
“obedience to the general will is an act of freedom.”151 In submitting himself to the rule 
of the general will, the citizen commits himself to the pursuit of the common good; the 
good of society as a whole, and by extension, the good of each individual member of 
society. In obeying the general will man obeys only himself. As Rousseau outlines in the 
Social Contract, “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the 
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole.”152 Only through this reciprocal moral 
commitment can citizens manage to simultaneously live in civil society and yet still 
remain free by the standards of FSM. 
 It is important to note that the general will is not the sum of particular wills. The 
particular will of each citizen represents the private interest of said individual; it does not 
take the common good of the community into consideration, and it is often directly 
opposed to it. By contrast, the general will represents the shared (or general) interest of 
the republic as a whole, including the common good of all the members of the 
community. I will use an example to demonstrate the distinction between a particular and 
general will: a wealthy citizen studying to become a doctor may feel that it is in his 
particular interest for medical school tuition rates to be raised to a point where most other 
people are unable to afford them. If this were the case, the wealthy citizen would have 
less competition in the job market and would likely have his pick of prestigious medical 
positions due to a lack of other qualified candidates. However, although it would benefit 
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the wealthy citizen in the short-term, the tuition hike would eventually lead to a reduced 
quality of medical care and a dangerous shortage of qualified doctors in the community. 
This would have profoundly negative long-term effects on the community as a whole 
and, inevitably, on the wealthy citizen himself, on the members of his own family, on his 
descendents, and so forth. As such, it is clear that the tuition hike in question is 
incompatible with the common good and is therefore contrary to the general will. 
 It is also important to note that the general will is not necessarily unanimous, 
although for a will to be general the votes of all citizens must be counted.153 Rousseau 
explains:  
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general 
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away 
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the 
general will remains as the sum of the differences.154 
Put simply, the general will is the will that remains once particular wills are canceled out, 
and this general will always aims at the common good, never at the particular good of 
individual parts at the expense of the whole. Although narrow self-interest may at times 
cloud the judgment of individual citizens, thereby leading them to will particularly rather 
than generally, in the majority of cases citizens of the moral republic will be able to 
recognize the general will. Referring back to the tuition hike example, a few wealthy 
citizens studying to become doctors may still support the tuition hike for selfish reasons, 
but a society which encourages the kind of self-realization and self-overcoming that 
Rousseau advocates is unlikely to have many individuals who are so blinded by 
selfishness that they would push for policies that are sure to cause great harm to the entire 
community in the long run (and, ultimately, to themselves). 
 The general will is indivisible, and because it is indivisible an act of the sovereign 
is not the convention between a superior and an inferior but a convention between a body 
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and its parts. Rousseau argues that the sovereign cannot be represented and must be made 
up of all the citizens collectively, while the executive branch of government, which is 
made up of representatives, must serve only as an intermediary between the sovereign 
and its subjects, executing the laws enacted by the sovereign while preserving civil and 
political liberty. For Rousseau, the government and the sovereign are two distinct 
concepts. Government officials are mere officers of the people and not its masters; they 
must be accountable to the sovereign at all times. The fact that the sovereign cannot be 
represented means that all of the citizens collectively constitute the sovereign power, and 
hence they must all participate in the democratic process. As Cohen notes: 
Sovereign authority lies in effect in the shared understanding of the common 
advantage in which the interests of each are taken into account. This is the force 
of Rousseau’s remark that the sovereign is not a determinate individual or a 
determinate collection of individuals, but a “collective being” (SC2.I.2.), a we that 
is constituted by a collection of persons who share an understanding of the 
common good and accept the authority of that common good in matters of 
collective decision, not a collection united in submission to  a single will.155 
It is clear that Rousseau’s political vision of sovereignty is one of participatory 
democracy, a system in which all citizens take an active part in governing themselves 
(the people as sovereign). But this system can exist only within the moral republic, where 
the principle of “might makes right” has been rejected in the name of morals and 
reciprocity. Furthermore, the rule of the general will cannot be established unless the 
citizens learn to overcome their narrow self-interest in the name of the common interest. 
In the following section I argue that, according to Rousseau, citizens must learn to 
overcome their narrow self-interest and become free in the most meaningful sense (FSM) 
by embracing the balance of loves. 
3.4 The Balance of Loves: Amour de soi, Amour-propre, 
and Compassion 
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How can republican citizens come to will generally, rather than simply pursue 
their own private agendas? They do so by setting aside narrow self-interests and 
committing themselves to the common good of society as a whole. We arrive at the 
general will by equating the fate of all our fellow citizens with our own individual fate, 
and the common good of all citizens with our own individual good. In short, we wish 
unto others as we wish unto ourselves. That said, there are two essential preconditions 
that must be satisfied for the general will to take shape. The first precondition is to 
rediscover a sense of amour de soi in the face of the corrupting influence of amour-
propre; we must find a healthy balance between our natural self-regarding love and our 
social love of self that is dependent on the opinions of others. In the Discourse on 
Inequality, Rousseau tells us that in the state of nature amour de soi (the self-regarding 
love of self) leads every animal to look to its own preservation. However, while in 
animals amour de soi simply amounts to the natural instinct for self-preservation, in 
human beings it takes on a larger role; according to Rousseau, amour de soi “guided in 
man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue.”156 Thus, 
natural man’s uniquely advanced sense of reason coupled with compassion is able to 
guide and modify man’s amour de soi into a quintessentially human quality which creates 
humanity and virtue. The rise of society and the birth of amour-propre corrupts man and 
turns his gentle natural passions into hateful artificial ones; as such, the key difference 
between natural man and the social man is “that the savage lives within himself, while 
social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of 
others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from 
the judgment of others concerning him.”157 If the social man has any hope of overcoming 
the negative consequences of amour-propre (and Rousseau thinks he does, otherwise the 
entire project of the Social Contract would be meaningless), the social man must first 
rediscover some sense of amour de soi. Although it is impossible to return to a state of 
nature where amour de soi reigns supreme and amour-propre is nonexistent, the social 
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man must learn to “step back” from the web of dependencies cast by amour-propre in 
order to critically assess them. As long as social man receives, as Rousseau says, “the 
consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others,” he will be 
unable to conceive of himself outside the mingled web of amour-propre; he will identify 
completely with what others think of him, and he will see himself solely as others see 
him. Such a man could not possibly break through the corrupting influence of amour-
propre and rediscover his humanity and virtue, because he would be completely unable to 
look beyond the paradigm of amour-propre. The first step must be to rediscover a sense 
of amour de soi, which amounts to the realization that I as a human being have intrinsic 
worth, and that this intrinsic worth is independent of the opinions of others, of the social 
relationships that bind me to others, of the public roles I adopt, and so forth. In the state 
of nature this sense of intrinsic worth, coupled with a natural sense of compassion, is the 
whole story of man. However, in civil society I have social relationships and both public 
and private roles and obligations that I cannot hope to escape entirely. Nevertheless, once 
I realize that those social bonds are not the entirety of my existence and that my worth as 
a human being does not depend on the opinions of others, I am able to “step back” from 
amour-propre, critically assess its consequences, and channel the passions associated 
with it in more positive and constructive ways. I am able to discern which effects of 
amour-propre are justified and which are not, how much moral inequality is just and how 
much is unjust, which social expectations are reasonable and which are unreasonable, and 
so on. 
In book 2 of Emile, Rousseau tells us that amour-propre, despite its many 
negative effects, is not intrinsically good or bad; it becomes good or bad “only by the 
applications made of it and the relations given to it.”158 In Emile in particular, Rousseau’s 
task is to avoid the negative effects of amour-propre by raising his pupil according to 
nature and removing him from the opinions and judgments of society until reason, the 
guide of amour-propre, becomes fully developed. As noted previously, in civil society 
reason gives way to rational prejudices and overshadows our natural compassion, 
                                                 
158
 Rousseau, Emile, 92. 
74 
 
allowing for the development of excessive amour-propre. Rousseau believes that if his 
pupil can remain uncorrupted by the depravity of modern society for long enough to 
develop a sense of reason independent of the negative effects of amour-propre, he can 
rediscover a sense of amour de soi and lead a life of virtue despite the corruption of civil 
society. In other words, by remaining uncorrupted for long enough to realize that he as a 
human being possesses intrinsic worth independent of the opinions of others, Emile can 
tame (though not completely eliminate) his amour-propre by rejecting its excesses and 
channelling its passions in a more constructive direction.159 This means that although 
amour-propre is the source of the corruption of modern man, it can also have a positive 
and constructive character. In fact, Rousseau believes that within a political community 
made up of citizens who are capable of reforming their character and embracing FSM “all 
of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and 
freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises 
him to virtue.”160  
In his book Rousseau, Nicholas Dent notes that amour-propre is not inherently 
competitive and aggressive, although it often takes on these characteristics within modern 
society. In fact, if amour-propre was always and inevitably destructive, the fact that we 
cannot hope to eliminate amour-propre in modern society would make it pointless for 
Rousseau to have written the Social Contract in the first place.161 Dent emphasizes the 
role of compassion in taming amour-propre in order to arrive at a healthy balance of 
loves between amour-propre and the rediscovered sense of amour de soi. Dent defines 
the role of compassion in Rousseau as that of “the mainspring for a more humane and 
productive basis for moral union between people.”162 Compassion is for Rousseau the 
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sole natural virtue, and out of compassion flow all of the social virtues; although 
compassion has been silenced by excessive amour-propre within modern society, 
compassion can also give birth to a more benign amour-propre that allows us to have a 
positive regard for others while still respecting ourselves.163 For Rousseau compassion 
refers to more than mere pity, and so “even benevolence and friendship are, if we judge 
rightly, only the effects of compassion, constantly set upon a particular object: for how is 
it different to wish that another person may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish 
him happy?”164 Thus, natural compassion does not stop at hoping that others won’t suffer 
unnecessary harm; we also wish for others to be happy, and our social virtues, such as 
benevolence and friendship, are the effects of compassion set upon a particular object. As 
Rousseau points out: 
It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling which, by moderating the 
violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the 
whole species. It is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief 
of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place 
of laws, morals, and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey 
its gentle voice.165 
Compassion moderates “the violence of love of self in each individual,” and while it 
comes naturally and pre-reflectively in the state of nature where it is “obscure yet lively,” 
in the state of society where there is excessive amour-propre compassion is “developed 
yet feeble.”166 This means that the social man still has a sense of compassion, but it has 
been silenced by amour-propre. In order to successfully moderate the negative effects of 
amour-propre, the next step after rediscovering a sense of amour de soi must be to 
discover anew the sole natural virtue: the virtue of compassion.  
With amour de soi alone, we have a regard for ourselves but not necessarily for 
others; in the state of nature where amour-propre is nonexistent man has no love for the 
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public good. Conversely, with excessive amour-propre we come to possess the kind of 
vanity and selfishness that prevents us from seeing the public good. Essential for the 
balancing of these two extremes is our natural compassion; compassion is what allows us 
to overcome the corrupting influence of amour-propre and lift ourselves out of the greed 
and vanity of modern society and into a union of reciprocal regard with our fellow 
citizens that goes beyond the solitary existence of natural man. Even in the state of 
nature, compassion compels us to help our fellow human beings who are in need. As 
such, compassion leads us to look beyond merely our own self-preservation and teaches 
us to have a positive regard for others. In his analysis of Emile, Dent does an excellent 
job of expounding this view. As Dent points out, 
Compassion, spontaneously shown and not used to trap, control or patronise, 
elicits gratitude as its natural  response and by that the compassionate person is 
thanked and cherished by the one they have helped. A union of mutual regard and 
esteem is established, created by these interconnections of feeling and concern. 
Thus it is that another can have a place in our life but without at once being 
experienced as presenting a challenge and confrontation.167 
This union of mutual regard and esteem that arises out of compassion takes on a new 
importance once man leaves the state of nature and establishes the permanent 
relationships of a civil society. We know that compassion is the only natural virtue, and 
that all social virtues flow out of compassion, but compassion can also be silenced by 
excessive amour-propre that exists in civil society. Rousseau believes that once he has 
rediscovered a sense of amour de soi, the social man must next learn to channel his 
natural compassion in a way that will give rise to a more benign form of amour-propre; 
with the help of compassion, man must lift himself out of the egoism of civil society and 
into a union of reciprocal regard with his fellow citizens.168 In order to accomplish this 
task, Rousseau wants to turn man’s natural compassion from a particular other or a 
particular group of others to the political community as a whole; our natural compassion 
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must be directed towards the bond generated by a shared pride in country and nation. In 
short, we must direct our natural compassion towards the national community.  
 Here we arrive at the intrinsic link that Rousseau makes between republicanism 
and nationalism, a relationship which will be thoroughly examined in the following 
chapter. For now, it is important to note that the bond which Rousseau wants to foster 
must go beyond particular attachments to certain people or groups (factionalism), but it 
cannot extend beyond the national community; the bonds that bind us to wider regional or 
global communities are too thin to become meaningful objects of our compassion. 
Moreover, the development of a common language is critical to the project of directing 
one’s natural compassion towards the nation as a whole; a common language allows 
people to join together and pursue common purposes as a community. As Anne M. 
Cohler points out, “a language which embodies men’s passionate concern for each other, 
men’s pity [compassion], can be used to call the people speaking it to a common pity 
[compassion] for their common existence. They can come freely to a common opinion 
and common activity.”169 Once a common language is established by members of a 
community, they no longer act merely in terms of animal self-preservation; their common 
language brings them closer to each other and allows them to feel the kind of compassion 
for one another that would have been impossible in the state of nature. As such, Rousseau 
believes that the moral republic must be founded on the nation; the state must be rooted 
in the sociability and compassion of the nation, rather than the defense of property or 
anything along those lines.170 As Cohler notes, “different languages and their 
accompanying customs are the specific characteristic of nations, and they permit men to 
use their capacity both to feel pity [compassion] and to make standards, their most 
specifically human characteristics.”171 For Rousseau, the only way to establish the new 
                                                 
 
169
 Anne M. Cohler, Rousseau and Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970) 124. Note: 
I feel that the word “compassion” is a better translation of Rousseau’s pitié than “pity”, which is Cohler’s 
preferred term. I noted earlier that Rousseau’s idea of compassion goes well beyond our conventional 
understanding of “pity.” 
 
170
 Cohler, Rousseau and Nationalism, 127.  
 
171
 Ibid, 124-125.  
78 
 
and legitimate social contract which is grounded in morals and reciprocity is to direct our 
natural compassion towards the national community. 
 Compassion plays the crucial role of balancing our natural love and our selfish 
love; compassion allows us to moderate our amour-propre and to channel it in more 
constructive ways, while at the same time keeping our rediscovered sense of amour de 
soi connected to the community and to the public good. Compassion is the key to finding 
the proper balance of loves so that we will not seek either to exploit others for our own 
selfish ends or to abandon society altogether and pursue a life of solitude; compassion 
allows us to become both, good men and good citizens. This ambitious project requires a 
significant amount of self-realization and self-overcoming on the part of each citizen; the 
moral republic requires citizens to rediscover a sense of amour de soi, direct their natural 
compassion towards the nation, and overcome their narrow self-interests and the excesses 
of amour-propre in the name of the common good.  
 As I hinted at earlier, one of the preconditions for establishing the political 
community ruled by the general will is a shared national character and strong love of 
country, to which citizens owe not only their lives, but also the morality of their actions 
and the love of virtue. According to Rousseau, it is within one’s country that man “learns 
to struggle with himself, to conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest to the common 
interest,” and thus, without one’s country, man would never attain virtue, morals, or 
meaningful freedom.172 Rousseau emphasizes that in order to achieve the balance of 
loves needed for willing generally, we must forge strong social bonds of shared pride in 
country and nation, and a sense of common identity, history, and destiny. We need a 
shared sense of common life with our fellow citizens, and this is why Rousseau stresses 
the importance of patriotism, shared customs, public education, and civil religion; his aim 
is to sustain the unity of society under laws addressed to the common good.173 
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3.5 Rousseau’s Republicanism and Democracy 
Rousseau’s emphasis on freedom as self-mastery on the one hand, and on a shared 
national identity and love of nation on the other, clearly distinguishes his brand of 
republicanism from instrumental republicanism and civic humanism. Some readers of 
Rousseau have a habit of intentionally downplaying his commitment to FSM and the love 
of nation, while others have rightly referred to Rousseau as the founder of a distinct brand 
of republicanism, as well as the father of modern nationalism. I will discuss the 
connection between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and nationalism in the next 
chapter, but for now it is enough to note that Rousseau’s vision of the moral republic 
reflects a conception of sovereignty that is more directly democratic than that of 
contemporary liberal democracies. One of Rousseau’s biggest contributions to republican 
political theory is his conception of a more democratic sovereign; the people as 
sovereign. According to Rousseau, sovereignty cannot be divided or represented, it takes 
shape through the general will of the citizens themselves, and it stands as the source of all 
moral authority and legitimacy within the political community. No political thinker prior 
to Rousseau succeeded in justifying on moral grounds why a citizen of a democratic state 
ought to obey laws which he considers contrary to his self-interest; it was Rousseau who 
revealed to us that beyond the narrow particular wills of mankind lies an enlightened will 
that requires overcoming oneself and committing oneself to the common good. As Bloom 
outlines: 
Only Rousseau found the formula for that, distinguishing self-interest from moral 
obligation, discerning an independent moral interest in the general will. He 
discovered the source of moral goodness in modern political principles and 
provided the flag democracy could march under. So, at least, it was understood. 
Regimes dedicated to the sole preservation of man do not have the dignity to 
compel moral respect.174 
Rousseau conceives of a political community that is fundamentally democratic in 
character, and his contributions to both republican political theory and the democratic 
tradition would come to influence everyone from Alexis de Tocqueville to contemporary 
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proponents of deliberative and radical democracy. He leaves us with the inescapable 
feeling that our own representative political systems are missing something fundamental, 
and that they fail to deliver on the liberty and equality they promise. In the next chapter, I 
take a look at what distinguishes Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism from 
liberalism, and I examine the fundamental connection between Rousseau’s republicanism 
and nationalism. 
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Chapter 4  
4      Is Rousseau a Liberal? Comparing Cultural 
Republicanism and Liberalism 
I begin this chapter by distinguishing between Rousseau’s unique brand of 
republicanism and various forms of liberalism. I then go on to address the misconceptions 
that some liberal thinkers appear to have about Rousseau’s political philosophy, before 
examining the inherent link that Rousseau makes between republicanism and 
nationalism. My argument is that while Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism shares 
some commonalities with liberal theory, other aspects of his philosophy make it 
sufficiently distinct from liberalism to merit consideration as an altogether separate 
perspective. 
4.1 Political Neutrality and Perfectionism 
When it comes to the relationship between politics and conceptions of the good, 
liberals can be roughly divided into two camps: neutralists and perfectionists. Stephen A. 
Gardbaum argues that among contemporary liberals there exists a divide between liberal 
neutralists and liberal perfectionists, and that most contemporary liberals have largely 
accepted the principle of state neutrality toward conceptions of the good. 175 This political 
neutrality goes beyond purely procedural concerns and represents a substantive 
conception of state neutrality regarding theories of what is valuable in life. As Gardbaum 
explains, “according to this view, the state must remain neutral not only with respect to 
religious conceptions and ways of life, as the establishment and free exercise clauses are 
often taken to mandate, but also with respect to, and among, secular conceptions.”176 
Liberal neutralists defend the principle of neutrality of justification, which holds that the 
state must justify its actions without assuming the superiority of one conception over 
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others. And while many contemporary liberals tend to defend substantive state neutrality 
as both descriptively and normatively valid, some republican critics of liberalism accept 
the descriptive claim of neutrality while openly criticizing modern liberalism at the 
normative level, arguing that liberal neutrality represents a shallow political ideal. In 
contrast to liberal neutrality, some forms of “republicanism [hold] that the ends of 
government should be richer and more extensive; in particular, the state should promote 
the primacy of public over private life and inculcate civic virtue among its citizens.”177 
Nevertheless, Gardbaum argues that it is the content of the good pursued, rather than the 
mere desire to pursue the good, that truly distinguishes liberals and their critics (including 
republicans).  
 One of the most prominent contemporary liberal perfectionists is Joseph Raz, and 
in The Morality of Freedom he famously offers a liberal foundation for a political 
morality. Raz believes that while it is important that governments do not abuse their 
power or infringe on individual liberties by unduly interfering in the lives of citizens, 
governments are also justified in acting to actively promote individual freedom.178 Raz 
identifies two related views often embraced by modern liberal neutralists: the first is that 
governments ought to be blind to the truth or falsity of moral ideals or conceptions of the 
good, and the second is that governments must be neutral regarding different people’s 
conceptions of the good. According to Raz, both of these views “are inspired by the 
thought that people are autonomous moral agents who are to decide for themselves how 
to conduct their own lives and that governments are not moral judges with authority to 
force on them their conceptions of right and wrong. That is why anti‐perfectionism is 
often regarded as being a doctrine of political freedom.”179 Anti-perfectionists believe 
that implementing and promoting ideals of the good life, even when these ideals are 
worthy in themselves, is not a legitimate role of government; government action ought to 
be neutral regarding ideals of the good life. As such, “the doctrine of political neutrality 
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advocates neutrality between different conceptions of the good,” and Raz associates 
political neutrality with the work of such liberal thinkers as Nozick and Rawls.180 
However, Raz believes that Rawls and others who argue for political neutrality ultimately 
fail to establish their case, and that they are too quick to assume a connection between 
neutrality and autonomy. According to Raz, “political neutrality, conceived of as the 
exclusion of ideals, prevents governments from acting for reasons, which appeal to 
conceptions of the good, whether valid or invalid. Such a position relies on an elusive 
distinction between one part of morality, the good, and another, the right.”181 Raz argues 
that the traditional autonomy-oriented understanding of individual freedom leads to a 
“moralistic” doctrine of political freedom (one that is based on the moral value of 
individual liberty).182 
 Raz’s view is perfectionistic in that he believes that governments in liberal 
societies ought to actively promote the ideal of personal autonomy as an essential 
element of the good life. Raz describes the ideal of autonomy as follows: 
Autonomy is an ideal of self‐creation, or self‐authorship; it consists in an agent's 
successful pursuit of willingly embraced, valuable options, where the agent's 
activities are not dominated by worries about mere survival. Autonomy in its 
primary sense is to be understood as the actual living of an autonomous life; 
autonomy in its secondary sense is to be understood as the capacity to live 
autonomously. To be  autonomous, agents have to meet three conditions: they 
must possess certain mental capacities, they must have an adequate range of 
valuable options, and they must enjoy independence from coercion and 
manipulation. Autonomy should be distinguished from self‐realization, as 
autonomous persons may choose not to realize their capacities. Autonomy itself, 
in an environment that supports autonomy, is not similarly optional, as living 
autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy‐supporting 
environment.183 
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Raz distinguishes his understanding of personal autonomy from the idea of self-
realization, which is so crucial for FSM, but he nonetheless states that living in an 
environment that supports autonomy cannot be merely optional in liberal societies; 
governments cannot be neutral about autonomy and they must actively promote and 
foster an autonomy-supporting environment. Raz believes that once we embrace the ideal 
of autonomy, we become morally committed to pluralism; in order to provide citizens 
with an adequate range of valuable options, we must endorse moral pluralism.184 Raz’s 
objective is to demonstrate that a powerful argument in support of political freedom is 
derivable from the value of personal autonomy, and to show that liberalism can be 
founded on the perfectionistic ideal of personal autonomy. As Raz explains: 
The moral outlook the implications of which we have explored is one which holds 
personal autonomy to be an essential element of the good life. We saw that such a 
morality presupposes competitive pluralism. That is, it presupposes that people 
should have available to them many forms and styles of life incorporating 
incompatible virtues, which not only cannot all be realized in one life but tend to 
generate mutual intolerance. Such an autonomy‐valuing pluralistic morality 
generates a doctrine of freedom. It protects people pursuing different styles of life 
from the intolerance which competitive pluralism has the inherent  tendency to 
encourage, and it calls for the provision of the conditions of autonomy without 
which  autonomous life is impossible.185 
 It is worth noting that contemporary liberal neutralists like Ronald Dworkin are 
also concerned with moral ideas; in fact, Dworkin argues that political neutrality grows 
out of an ethical commitment.186 Dworkin believes that since the government must treat 
all citizens as equals, and since those citizens disagree in their conceptions of the good 
life, the government fails to treat citizens equally if it prefers one conception of the good 
over another. For Dworkin, the constitutive morality of liberalism is “a theory of equality 
that requires official neutrality amongst theories of what is valuable in life.”187 As such, 
                                                 
 
184
 Ibid, 399.  
 
185
 Ibid, 424-425.  
 
186
 Ronald Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality”, in Equal Freedom (Selected Tanner 
Lectures in Human Values), ed. Stephen Darwall, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995),  229. 
 
187
 Ibid, 203.  
85 
 
liberal neutralists differ from liberal perfectionists not in that they disregard morality 
altogether, but in that their ethical commitments lead them to draw different conclusions 
about the legitimate role of government. 
 Gardbaum states that “the structure of the general argument for political 
perfectionism (whether of the liberal or nonliberal variety) is as follows: (a) one way of 
life is better than others; (b) as a result, the state should promote it.”188 While this 
statement is a bit misleading in that liberal perfectionists like Raz believe that personal 
autonomy is an essential element of the good life rather than a substantive conception of 
the good in and of itself, Gardbaum’s distinction between propositions (a) and (b) is 
useful for differentiating between liberal perfectionism and neutralism. Several versions 
of liberalism, including those associated with Locke, Kant, and Mill, confirm that 
proposition (a) has no particular political implications and is not necessarily antiliberal. 
Furthermore, Kant and Mill, who argued that personal autonomy represents a superior 
way of life, also affirmed proposition (b); they held that the state should actively promote 
this particular conception of the good. In order for the state to do so, Kant and Mill 
believed that “the state must remain neutral with respect to all other particular values, for 
autonomy requires that the individual freely choose her ends and not be coerced into 
them.”189 In his book J. S. Mill, Dale E. Miller notes that while Mill is an advocate of 
permissive neutrality, which forbids coercing people into adopting certain forms of life 
and avoiding others, unlike Rawls or Dworkin he is not an advocate of persuasive 
neutrality, which forbids the state from advocating certain forms of life over others. As 
Miller observes, for Mill “society in general and the state in particular can actively 
encourage people to choose temperate and productive ways of living. It can even 
encourage them to develop their higher faculties and cultivate their individuality.”190 
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 If we take John Stuart Mill as an example, we can say that he is a liberal 
perfectionist because he believes in the superiority of the ideal of personal autonomy, and 
because he argues that the state must promote this ideal. Furthermore, while Mill opposes 
coercing people into adopting certain forms of life and avoiding others, he holds that the 
state can actively encourage citizens to choose productive ways of living over 
unproductive ones, and he also believes that the state can foster the development of the 
citizens’ higher faculties, thereby cultivating their character. In this sense Mill can be 
distinguished from liberal neutralists, who believe that the state should be excluded from 
the duty to promote any particular way of life over another.191 But how does Mill’s 
perfectionism, which we have classified as liberal, differ from other forms of 
perfectionism? Gardbaum contrasts Mill’s liberal perfectionism with the communitarian 
perfectionism associated with MacIntyre and Sandel, noting that “communitarianism 
advances the ‘communal’ way of life as better than (or rationally superior to) the ‘liberal’ 
and clams that, as a result, politics should be structured to promote it.”192 Although this 
applies specifically to “communitarianism,” we can say that the distinction also applies to 
Rousseau’s republicanism. Liberal perfectionism distinguishes itself from communitarian 
and republican perfectionism by the content that it assigns to the rationally superior way 
of life; liberal perfectionists may advocate the promotion of the moral ideal of personal 
autonomy while republican perfectionists advocate the promotion of the moral ideals of 
participation and civic virtue. As Gardbaum explains, “communitarians and liberal 
perfectionists disagree only about the content of the better way of life, and not about the 
role of politics or the relationship between politics and morality. The political 
communitarian sees in the liberal perfectionist not moral emptiness, but moral error.”193  
 Ultimately, both liberal perfectionists like Mill and republican perfectionists like 
Rousseau may readily concede that whether or not we can identify a way of life that is 
inherently better than others, people in society will in fact continue to espouse different 
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views about the good. However, a commitment to neutrality does not necessarily follow 
from this reality. Perfectionists, both liberal and republican, “can claim that this diversity 
of beliefs is precisely why the state has the affirmative duty to foster rationally superior 
ways of life. Without the state’s help and guidance, people left to their own devices will 
not be in a position to lead the most valuable life available to them.”194 A version of this 
argument, which emphasizes the essential educational and moral role of political 
institutions, is explicit in Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government and 
Rousseau’s Considerations on the Government of Poland.195 In the following section, I 
compare the political perfectionism of Mill to that of Rousseau in order to gain a better 
understanding of the differences between liberalism and Rousseau’s republicanism. 
4.2 Mill vs. Rousseau: Contrasting Liberal and Republican 
Perfectionism 
Although there is great diversity among liberal thinkers, for the sake of clarity I 
will continue to use the example of Mill’s liberal perfectionism and compare it directly to 
Rousseau’s particular brand of republicanism. Because Mill is a perfectionist whose 
arguments have notable parallels with Rousseau’s, comparing Mill and Rousseau will 
help us clarify the distinction between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and liberalism. 
Mill has a clear vision of the content of the good life: it consists of preserving and 
promoting personal autonomy in order to enable individuals to develop their higher 
faculties and cultivate their citizen character by choosing their own path in life, making 
their own decisions, and interacting freely with others on a fair and equal basis. 
According to Mill, preserving the good of individual liberty represents utility in the 
largest sense and intervention for the sake of preserving this good and the benefits it 
provides to the individual and to society as a whole is sometimes justified. Mill’s vision 
of the good life remains a liberal vision, but it is clearly a moral and perfectionistic 
vision.  
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 Without neglecting the importance of reason and intellectual faculties which are 
so central to Mill, Rousseau is nevertheless primarily concerned with the sentiments. 
Rousseau believes that the passions lie at the heart of good citizenship and the cultivation 
of proper character, arguing that without the passions we would be bad citizens; although 
the passions can have a negative influence on our behaviour, they can also be channeled 
in constructive ways that engender civic virtue. J. S. Maloy argues that Rousseau 
ultimately seeks to reform human nature in order to create noble and virtuous citizens in a 
world that has been corrupted by the negative effects of amour-propre.196 As Maloy 
points out, “in line with the best ancient examples of statesmanship, and in self-conscious 
opposition to modern practice, Rousseau constantly emphasized the role of moeurs 
(‘mores’ or ‘morals’) in shaping political outcomes.”197In fact, his deep concern with 
moral psychology and his emphasis on the importance of recovering virtue have 
“garnered Rousseau recognition as a precursor of a ‘formative project of republican 
politics’ meant to endow citizens with the civic traits appropriate to self-government.”198 
Rousseau stresses that the domain of moeurs merits as much attention from statesmen as 
the domain of law; while laws regulate conduct, it is moeurs that regulate attitudes and 
dispositions.199 As Maloy observes, “to the extent that conduct depends on disposition, 
then, moeurs are the most fundamental element of politics.”200 Hence, since moeurs are 
prior to laws and institutions, they play a crucial role in developing citizen character and 
fostering civic virtue. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau famously 
proclaims: “Make men, therefore, if you would command men: if you would have them 
obedient to the laws, make them love the laws.”201  
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 Rousseau saw disposition and customs as central to fostering civic virtue and 
proper citizen character, and he “sought to repair the moral fiber of the modern state and 
to shore up its longevity.”202 As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau believes that 
citizens must rediscover a sense of amour de soi in the face of the corrupting influence of 
amour-propre and, by directing their natural compassion towards the nation, channel 
their amour-propre in more positive and constructive ways. According to Rousseau, in a 
political community made up of citizens who are capable of reforming their nature and 
character “all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil 
state, and freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality 
which raises him to virtue.”203  
 Rousseau believes that narrow self-interest engendered by excessive amour-
propre harms the public good, and he holds that political authority must rest with the 
general will of the citizens. The general will refers to the enlightened will of the people 
that “is always for the common good”; the rule of the general will amounts to the “rule of 
justice.”204 In the Social Contract, Rousseau maintains that “the general will alone can 
direct the forces of the State according to the end of its institution, which is the common 
good.”205 Because citizens corrupted by the passions of excessive amour-propre are 
incapable of seeing beyond their narrow self-interest and willing generally, in order to 
establish proper political institutions we must reform the character of the citizens 
themselves. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau contends that “the main-
spring of public authority is in the hearts of the citizens, and that nothing can replace the 
morals in sustaining government”206 For Rousseau, justice has to be reciprocal, and in 
order for citizens to look beyond their narrow self-interest for the sake of justice, the 
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citizens must have favorable dispositions. Thus, favorable dispositions must prevail 
among the citizens if the state is to be ruled by the general will (rather than the particular 
will of either a ruling elite or a self-interested majority). The citizens must be disposed to 
embrace the general will, for when “the people is seduced by private interests … the 
public deliberation will be one thing, and the general will another thing entirely.”207 As 
Maloy points out, “it was imperative that [the citizens] refuse to see the freedom of 
fellow citizens sacrificed to factional or private interests: fraternity and solidarity are 
central to Rousseauvian civic virtue.”208 Like Mill, Rousseau stresses the importance of 
cultivating a specific citizen character and a “civic ethos,” but Rousseau places much 
more emphasis on fostering fraternity and solidarity than Mill does. Mill believes that 
preserving individual liberty and fostering a public environment of open factionalism and 
contestation leads to the cultivation of strong citizen character and ultimately to the 
greatest happiness, whereas Rousseau  puts more emphasis on cultivating a citizen 
character that fosters solidarity as part of a shared moral consensus.209  
 Much like Mill, Rousseau believes that human moral dispositions are shaped 
environmentally, and thus we ultimately need to create a social environment that nurtures 
morality and civic virtue. With this in mind, Rousseau identifies specific social 
institutions which can foster favorable dispositions among citizens and cultivate citizen 
character, including: 1) a public education system that rears children “in common in the 
midst of equality,” and nurtures pupils in the spirit of solidarity, 2) public spectacles 
which promote a sense of solidarity and regulate behaviour through public scrutiny, 3) a 
civil religion which promotes loyalty and commitment to the greater good, 4) strictly 
defensive citizen militias which require that all citizens be prepared to defend the nation 
against foreign invaders, and 5) a self-organized civil society, such as the civil “circles” 
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of Geneva, which engage in independent discussion and criticism of the government.210 
As such, we can see that Rousseau is deeply concerned with moral reform, channelling 
the passions in more constructive directions, and cultivating virtue and a specific type of 
citizen character. As Maloy observes, the moral “transformation” that Rousseau 
advocates is “neither radical or deep in nature, nor invasive, coercive, or violent in 
method”; rather, Rousseau wants to foster favorable dispositions among citizens and 
cultivate a civic ethos that “redirects amour-propre from pursuing personal exploitation 
to positive public enterprises.”211  
 Rousseau’s republicanism is perfectionistic in that it seeks to cultivate a specific 
type of citizen character for the sake of promoting a particular conception of the good. 
Despite claims to the contrary, Rousseau’s vision of the good is not incompatible with a 
democratic society, but his understanding of democracy rests on the premise that a moral 
consensus among citizens is possible, and that the purpose of the political process must 
be to arrive at this consensus. As such, citizens must not approach the political process 
with the intention of promoting their own narrow self-interest at the expense of the public 
interest; rather, they must be committed to promoting the public interest and the common 
good in the spirit of solidarity and reciprocity. Rousseau believes that this spirit of 
solidarity and reciprocity can arise only within the relatively small republican 
community, and Rousseau’s vision of the good is rooted in strong social bonds of shared 
pride in country and nation, and a sense of common history and destiny. Over the years 
some liberals have tried to place Rousseau’s theories within the liberal camp, and in so 
doing they deliberately downplayed what they refer to as the “more communitarian” 
strands within Rousseau’s work. Joshua Cohen acknowledges that he himself had been 
guilty of this prior to 1999, but he now concedes that the strong emphasis on social 
solidarity and national attachment in Rousseau’s work cannot be ignored (even though 
Cohen himself finds these aspects of Rousseau to be “unattractive”).212 Ultimately, I 
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argue that Rousseau is not a liberal; rather, he is the founder of a unique strand of 
republican political theory which I refer to as cultural republicanism, and which is 
distinct from liberalism. 
 In the previous chapter I mentioned that, for Rousseau, there are two 
preconditions for establishing a society ruled by the general will. These preconditions 
are: (1) citizens who embrace freedom as self-mastery (FSM) and are able to rediscover a 
sense of amour de soi while using their natural compassion to channel amour-propre in 
more constructive ways, and (2) a shared national identity and a strong love of country 
that engender fraternity and solidarity. In endorsing FSM as the preferred conception of 
freedom, Rousseau distinguishes himself from Mill (and contemporary liberal 
perfectionists like Raz) by embracing self-realization as a central aspect of the good life. 
As noted earlier, the ideal of personal autonomy that liberal perfectionists like Raz 
endorse is distinct from the idea of self-realization because autonomous individuals may 
choose not to realize their capacities, whereas for Rousseau a citizen who fails to 
embrace FSM is not fully free. Rousseau also condemns factionalism; unlike a political 
community governed by the general will, societies governed by competing factions such 
as political parties are unjust because they split the general will and turn the political 
process into a struggle between competing particular wills. Factionalism and partisanship 
are inherently unjust for Rousseau; in the Social Contract he famously states that “it is 
therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be 
no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own 
thoughts.”213 Factionalism entails advantaging some at the expense of others, and 
Rousseau believes that the more divided the citizens become, the farther away they are 
from justice. The content of Rousseau’s vision of the good life is therefore unique to his 
particular brand of republicanism; unlike Mill, whose understanding of the good entails 
preserving and promoting personal autonomy along with pluralism and contestation in 
order to enable individuals to develop their higher faculties and properly cultivate their 
citizen character, Rousseau’s conception of the good entails promoting FSM (including 
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self-realization), a shared moral consensus, and a spirit of solidarity and reciprocity made 
possible by the strong social bonds of a national community. Although Mill and 
Rousseau both espouse perfectionistic theories which allow for political institutions to 
play an important role in cultivating proper citizen character and in establishing the kind 
of political and social environment that is most conducive to advancing the good, they 
ultimately disagree about the specific content of the good, and about the best strategy to 
promote it. 
 For a liberal perfectionist like Mill, the good consists of preserving and promoting 
the ideal of personal autonomy in order to enable individuals to develop their higher 
faculties and cultivate their citizen character by choosing their own path in life, making 
their own decisions, and interacting freely with others on a fair and equal basis. This 
ultimately increases happiness by leading to the improvement of individual character and 
to the progress of society as a whole. To promote this good, society must remain neutral 
with regard to all other particular values in order to foster an environment of pluralism 
and contestation which allows for individuals to freely choose their ends without being 
coerced into them. It is free choice and the diversity of opportunities that makes character 
development and social progress possible, and so neutrality about other ideals is in this 
case only a means to the end of advancing the ideal of autonomy.  
 For Rousseau, political participation and a shared national identity hold intrinsic 
value and are therefore fundamental elements of the good life; moreover, the public good 
consists of promoting FSM and the kind of citizen character that ensures the development 
of a shared moral consensus and a spirit of solidarity and reciprocity made possible by 
the strong social bonds of a national community. Political and social institutions must 
strive to nurture the development of this moral consensus, rather than promote the kind of 
pluralism and partiality that are so important for Mill. That is not to say that Mill neglects 
the importance of community, or that Rousseau rejects the value of autonomy. Mill is 
certainly concerned with fostering a public spirit and with nurturing a commitment to 
community, and Rousseau sees political autonomy (each citizen thinking only his own 
thoughts) as essential for the general will to take shape. The difference is simply that Mill 
views liberty in terms of free choosing among diverse options, which allows individuals 
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to determine the best choice, thereby improving their own character and advancing the 
good, while Rousseau views liberty as self-realization and believes that advancing the 
public good requires the development of a shared moral consensus.214 Rousseau’s moral 
republic makes meaningful moral and civic freedom possible because it enables citizens 
to will generally, but the ability to do so presupposes a different type of freedom 
(freedom as self-mastery).215 Rousseau’s understanding of FSM enables citizens to move 
beyond the mere satisfaction of appetites and allows them to make genuine moral 
choices; rather than making decisions based on their own self-interest (which does not 
constitute a “moral” choice), they are able to look beyond their own private good and 
make decisions based on the common good (which constitutes a “moral” choice). This is 
because certain moral choices are only available within the community ruled by the 
general will, and citizens of other political communities do not have the same sets of 
choices available to them. Because citizens of other communities cannot look beyond 
their own self-interest, they are always competing with their fellow citizens rather than 
working together to achieve ends greater than themselves. As a result, citizens of other 
communities fail to develop the kind of solidarity that is needed for a more efficient 
pursuit of the common good. Without a shared moral consensus and the fraternity and 
solidarity it engenders, certain common goods will forever remain out of reach for the 
citizens of other communities. As they do not live within a moral community that is 
governed by laws that they have made for themselves, and as they have not attained 
freedom as self-mastery (as opposed to some other conception of liberty), these citizens 
are unable to achieve their full potential as human beings (self-realization). These citizens 
are not free in the most meaningful sense of the word because those who are incapable of 
looking beyond their narrow self-interests continue to be slaves to their appetites; their 
options are limited to self-interested pursuits and political factionalism, and so the unique 
possibilities that the collective pursuit of the common good offers are denied to them.  
                                                 
 
214
 Self-realization can only be achieved through political participation and by sharing in the same 
national identity and culture as one’s fellow citizens, which is why participation and a shared national 
identity hold intrinsic value for Rousseau. 
 
215
 See table in Chapter 2.  
95 
 
4.3 Liberal Misrepresentations of Rousseau’s 
Republicanism 
To further emphasize the distinction between Rousseau’s republicanism and 
liberalism, I will examine Joshua Cohen’s Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. 
Cohen is a student of John Rawls, and in his book on Rousseau he rightly points out that 
Rawls was influenced by Rousseau’s ideas. In fact, Cohen states that “[Rawls] once said 
in passing that his two principles of justice could be understood as an effort to spell out 
the content of the general will.”216 With this in mind, Cohen tries to trace the 
development of some of Rousseau’s most important ideas through thinkers like Hegel 
and Kant all the way to Rawls and his political liberalism. While Cohen’s book provides 
meaningful insights into Rousseau’s work, there are some important points of 
disagreement between my own understanding of Rousseau’s philosophy and Cohen’s 
reading. Namely, Cohen claims that Rousseau can be read as philosophically liberal and 
sociologically communitarian, arguing that “the social compact itself and the conception 
of a free community of equals do not establish strong communitarian demands of 
solidarity: those demands are part of Rousseau’s political sociology of a free community 
of equals.”217 The implication here is that liberals can accept those aspects of Rousseau’s 
political philosophy which they find compelling, while distancing themselves from his 
communitarian sociology, which is less compelling because it imposes demanding 
conditions of civic solidarity as preconditions for a “free community of equals.”218 As 
Cohen points out, “convictions about the possibility of a free community of equals need 
some story about civic solidarities. If Rousseau’s is too narrowly confining, an alternative 
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is needed.”219 I argue that Cohen is mistaken in his attempt to separate Rousseau’s 
philosophy, which he claims is “liberal,” from his sociology, which he labels 
“communitarian.” These two aspects of Rousseau’s work cannot be considered 
separately, and any attempt to do so amounts to selectively picking and choosing 
individual parts of his philosophy, even when this is incoherent. My argument is that 
Rousseau is a cultural republican whose philosophy and sociology form a single, 
comprehensive, and unified body of work. 
 One of the lynchpins of Cohen’s argument is the following claim: 
Rousseau’s political ideal of a free community of equals has a strongly liberal 
cast: it is founded on values of individual self-love and freedom, justified through 
a compact among individuals conceived of as free and equal, aimed at advancing 
the basic interests of individuals, concerned to establish relations of equality 
under law, and it requires that equal citizens give priority in politics to their 
common good. The arguments are secular; the only reason for the exercise of 
political authority is public utility; there is no trace of an organic conception of 
society; nor is authority designed to serve the cause of human perfection.220 
There are several problems with this statement. When Cohen says that Rousseau’s 
political ideal of a moral republic has “a strongly liberal cast,” he is actually saying that 
the specific parts of Rousseau’s work that he deliberately chooses to focus on are not 
incompatible with liberalism. Furthermore, when he calls the arguments “secular” he is 
ignoring Rousseau’s considerable emphasis on the importance of civil religion. When 
Cohen claims that “the only reason for the exercise of political authority is public utility” 
he is ignoring the fact that Rousseau’s understanding of morality is not utilitarian,221 and 
when he says that authority is not designed to serve the cause of “human perfection,” he 
is telling a half-truth. If by “human perfection” Cohen is referring to an abstract notion of 
perfection, then he is certainly right; human beings are inherently imperfect creatures, as 
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Rousseau readily acknowledges. However, if by “human perfection” Cohen is referring 
to the perfectibility of citizens, then his argument is simply wrong (as Rousseau’s 
endorsement of freedom as self-mastery and his emphasis on self-realization 
demonstrates). Cohen deliberately downplays the importance of a substantive idea of the 
good in Rousseau in order to make his philosophy more compatible with that of Rawls, 
emphasizing instead how both thinkers believe in according equal consideration to 
individual members of the political community.222 Cohen goes on to claim that Rousseau 
does not seem to count the cultivation of human capacities and self-realization as part of 
a common good to be promoted through collectively authorized laws and regulations.223 
This is a half-truth. Self-realization and self-mastery may not be “part” of a common 
good to be promoted, but they form the first of two necessary preconditions for 
recognizing the common good and willing generally in the first place. Only those 
individuals who embrace FSM and learn to fully realize themselves as citizens to the 
extent that they are able to overcome their narrows self-interests are capable of 
understanding the common good and willing generally. Furthermore, these citizens must 
take an active part in creating the laws that govern them. Without such citizens, a 
political community ruled by the general will is impossible. Without self-realization and 
self-mastery, Rousseau’s moral republic is unattainable.  
 The second necessary precondition for recognizing the common good and willing 
generally is a shared national identity and strong love of country that engender fraternity 
and solidarity. This is an aspect of Rousseau’s thought that Cohen finds “unattractive,” 
and which he tries to separate from other more appealing concepts (separating “liberal” 
philosophy from “communitarian” sociology). Again, this cannot be done. We know that 
Rousseau says: “Every people has or ought to have a national character, and if it lacks 
one it would be necessary to begin by giving it one.”224 Hence, he believes that a shared 
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national identity is intrinsically valuable and necessary because the national character 
shapes citizens into virtuous members of the republican nation. In Emile he proclaims:  
O Emile, where is the good man who owes nothing to his country? Whatever 
country it is, he owes it what  is most precious to man―the morality of his actions 
and the love of virtue. If he had been born in the heart of the woods, he would 
have lived happier and freer. But he would have had nothing to combat in order to 
follow his inclinations, and thus he would have been good without merit; he 
would not have been virtuous; and now he knows how to be in spite of his 
passions.225  
Rousseau goes on to say that it is only within his country that man “learns to struggle 
with himself, to conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest to the common interest. It is not 
true that he draws no profit from the laws. They give him the courage to be just even 
among wicked men. It is not true that they have not made him free. They have taught him 
to reign over himself.”226 As is often the case with Rousseau, these few passages alone 
speak volumes about his unique brand of republicanism. First, we see that national 
identity and the love of country are not something secondary in Rousseau; they are not an 
afterthought in the form of a “communitarian” sociology designed to prop up a “liberal” 
philosophy. We see that a shared national identity and the love of country are not merely 
instrumentally valuable for the purpose of sustaining stable political institutions; rather, 
they are also intrinsically valuable because they shape the character of citizens, teach 
them to be moral and free, and allow them to attain the kind of self-realization that 
enables them to will generally and perceive the common good. As such, a shared national 
identity and love of country are a necessary precondition for establishing the moral 
republic; without this precondition the general will cannot express itself. Second, these 
passages from Emile also point us back to the first precondition―freedom as self-
mastery. Rousseau tells us that a man born in the woods would be happy and free by 
standards of the state of nature, but he would not be virtuous. Without his national 
community, man would never learn to overcome his passions, to struggle with himself 
and conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest for the common interest. Such a man would 
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be incapable of seeing beyond his own private interest and understanding the public 
good; he would be incapable of willing generally. Lastly, in these passages Rousseau 
reveals that natural freedom is not the most meaningful form of freedom. He tells us that 
although natural man is free by the standards of the state of nature, the national 
community and its laws make him freer still because they make meaningful freedom 
possible. What is meaningful freedom? Meaningful freedom requires more than license, 
more than non-interference, and more than non-domination; it requires man to “reign 
over himself,” to overcome his narrow self-interests and attain virtue (which couldn’t 
exist without self-overcoming). Meaningful freedom is freedom as self-mastery (FSM). 
And so we see the two preconditions coming together, each requiring the other: without 
attaining FSM through self-realization and self-overcoming, the general will cannot 
express itself, and without a shared national identity and a love of country to guide our 
amour-propre towards the public good, there can be no FSM. The two preconditions are 
interconnected, and without both of them there can be no “free community of equals,” at 
least not according to Rousseau. Since it is therefore impossible to separate Rousseau’s 
“liberal” philosophy from his “communitarian” sociology, it is clear that Cohen must 
either acknowledge that he is merely picking and choosing those aspects of Rousseau’s 
thought which he finds attractive while unduly dismissing the less attractive ones, or he 
must abandon hope of making Rousseau’s philosophy compatible with Rawlsian 
liberalism.227  
 Nevertheless, Cohen claims that his book is attempting to give a genuine and 
holistic account of Rousseau’s philosophy, which he believes is closer to liberalism than 
most people realize. Unfortunately, he makes several errors in his representation of 
Rousseau’s ideas. Cohen says that “the interest in self-development appears not to play 
any role in Rousseau’s account of the common good.”228 This is clearly wrong, because 
while Rousseau does not give specific ways of developing ourselves as part of the content 
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of the common good (for instance, he does not say that the common good demands that 
all citizens learn Latin), he does believe that self-development in the sense of self-
realization and self-overcoming constitute a necessary precondition for understanding the 
common good and actively pursuing it. Regarding the notion of a social association 
regulated by the general will, Cohen states: 
The ideal is a political community―a we, a people―unified by a shared 
understanding of the common good defined in terms of the common interests of 
the members, and a shared willingness on the part of the citizens to place 
considerations of the common good above other considerations, and in particular 
considerations of personal advantage, with well-founded confidence that the 
society conforms to their understanding. It is a free community of equals: a 
community because of the shared allegiance to the common good; a community of 
equals because the content of the idea of the common good reflects a commitment 
to treat other members as equals by giving their interests equal weight along with 
one’s own; and a free community of equals because the members, assumed to 
endorse the common good as the basis for legitimate law, have their own will as a 
rule.229 
Here Cohen is talking about a shared allegiance to the common good, an equal regard for 
fellow citizens, and freedom in the sense of self-rule. There is nothing wrong with these 
three points as such, but Cohen fails to recognize the common thread that runs through all 
of these concepts: freedom for Rousseau means FSM, which is a demanding conception 
of freedom that requires self-overcoming and self-realization, and this freedom, along 
with a shared national identity and love of country, constitutes a necessary precondition 
for establishing the community ruled by the general will in the first place. According to 
Cohen, “solving the fundamental problem [of living under a sovereign without giving up 
one’s freedom] requires a political community regulated by a shared understanding of the 
common good. Only then, in the society of the general will, can people both be assured 
the protection of their person and goods, and express the freedom that belongs to their 
nature.”230 Cohen seems to believe that the “communitarian” aspects of Rousseau’s 
thought are merely strategies that he employs in order to preserve and sustain the society 
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of the general will once it has already been established, and can be thought of as separate 
from his “liberal” philosophy which establishes this society in the first place. Cohen does 
not seem to understand that these “communitarian” aspects, including a shared national 
identity and love of country as well as self-realization and self-overcoming, form the 
necessary preconditions for the initial establishment of the society of the general will. It 
is true that people can fully express the freedom that belongs to their nature once the 
society of the general will has been established, but this freedom (in the form of FSM) 
must be there to begin with, otherwise citizens would be incapable of willing generally. 
Cohen also says: “under conditions of social interdependence, we can express our nature 
as free and thus achieve moral freedom only if we have a general will, and having such a 
will constitutes civic virtue. And that is to say that virtue, which is possible for us, is also 
required for realizing our nature.”231 But the general will does not take shape in just any 
given society under any given conditions: Rousseau clearly tells us that it requires 
citizens who are free in the most meaningful sense (FSM), have a shared national identity 
and culture, and love their country and its laws. We can fully express our moral freedom 
only if we have a general will, but in order to have a general will we must have achieved 
FSM and been part of a national community to begin with. 
 Regarding the necessary conditions for having a general will, Cohen says: 
Because having a general will requires giving equal weight to the interests of each 
citizen, people will only develop a general will if their conditions are 
fundamentally equal, whatever the differences in the particular circumstances. In 
the earlier discussion of “motivational complements,” I sketched the background 
conditions of the formation of a general will, indicating how reciprocity, 
generalized compassion, and the sense of self-worth might all come to support an 
allegiance to the general will, assuming appropriate  institutional conditions―in 
particular, conditions in which we are regarded as equals and experience others as 
such.232 
All of this is accurate, but it is not the whole story. Cohen only gives us part of the story 
in order to stay true to his narrative, claiming that for Rousseau “justice commands 
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reciprocity, not saintly self-sacrifice.”233 Throughout the book, Cohen tries to move away 
from the demanding preconditions Rousseau establishes for forming the society of the 
general will. Cohen wants to separate the “more attractive” aspects of Rousseau’s work 
from the “less attractive” ones, including the need for self-realization and self-
overcoming (overcoming mere appetites and private interests in the name of the common 
good), and for a shared national identity and strong love of country. The reason for his 
strategy is simple: most liberals have an aversion towards the kind of self-realization and 
self-overcoming that FSM calls for, and for the strong national bonds (including a shared 
national identity) that are indispensible to Rousseau. Cohen wants to reconcile 
Rousseau’s work with Rawlsian liberalism, and so he chooses to focus on equality, 
reciprocity, compassion, and self-worth, while sweeping FSM and a shared national 
identity under the rug. Unfortunately, by doing so he fails to give us the whole story 
about Rousseau’s republicanism. We certainly need equality, reciprocity, compassion, 
and self-worth, but these are fully embraced only by those individuals who attain FSM 
and live inside a national community of fiercely patriotic citizens. Without these 
preconditions, a society ruled by the general will would be impossible, because the 
citizens would be incapable of overcoming their narrow self-interests and willing 
generally in pursuit of the common good. That, at least, is what Rousseau believes. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 I argue that the community ruled by the general will also presupposes a 
shared moral consensus about conceptions of the good, a point that both Rawls and 
Cohen would surely reject in their own work, but a point that Rousseau endorses when he 
implies that political participation and a shared national identity constitute necessary 
elements of the good life.  
 In Rousseau and Nationalism, Anne M. Cohler makes it clear that, for Rousseau, 
national compassion is a prerequisite for the general will, and that the nation is the 
foundation of the social contract. Cohler states that “the basis of a government or the 
social contract is a certain kind of opinion, an attachment of the men in a political order 
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to the whole, grounded in their national similarities.”234 Rousseau asserts that the sole 
way to improve public morals and make men virtuous is to make them love their country, 
stating: “It is certain that the grandest miracles of virtue have been produced by love of 
one’s country: this agreeable and lively sentiment that joins the force of amour-propre to 
all the beauty of virtue, giving it an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes of it the 
most heroic of all the passions.”235 Loving one’s country and sharing a common national 
identity with one’s fellow citizens allows individuals to turn their particular wills towards 
the common good, and to replace individual self-interest with the common interest. For 
Rousseau, the national community is unique and our attachment to it holds special value: 
attachments to one’s family or faction are too narrow, and attachments that go beyond the 
nation, such as an attachment to all of mankind, are too broad to sustain a community 
ruled by the general will.  As such, only passionately patriotic citizens can hope to 
establish the rule of the general will, for it is “patriotic intoxication which alone can raise 
men above themselves, and without which freedom is only a vain word and legislation 
only an illusion.”236  Liberals like Cohen and Rawls may disagree with Rousseau on this 
point, but if they choose to abandon the non-liberal preconditions that Rousseau imposes 
on his moral republic (including FSM and a shared national identity), then they must 
acknowledge that they are abandoning some of the most fundamental aspects of 
Rousseau’s philosophy. We cannot separate these preconditions from Rousseau’s work 
without losing the entire spirit of his philosophy, and we cannot selectively choose only 
those of his ideas which we find attractive while ignoring the others in order to 
(mis)represent him as a liberal. I have argued that while Rousseau’s philosophy shares 
some common principles and concerns with liberalism, his cultural republicanism 
constitutes an altogether different perspective. Cohen’s interpretation of Rousseau is 
incomplete, and therefore incoherent. In the following section, I discuss the fundamental 
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connection between Rousseau’s republicanism and nationalism. It is important to note 
that some liberals also identify as nationalists, and liberal nationalism is a vibrant 
theoretical strand within contemporary nationalist theory. Nonetheless, in Chapter 6 I 
compare and contrast what I refer to as republican nationalism (a distinct strand of 
nationalism inspired by Rousseau’s philosophy) with the liberal nationalism of Tamir and 
Kymlicka. My argument is that republican nationalism constitutes a separate strand of 
nationalist theory, and that it represents a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism.  
4.4 Cultural Republicanism and Nationalism 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that Rousseau made an important contribution to the 
republican theoretical tradition, and that his philosophy constitutes a distinct strand of 
republican theory which I refer to as cultural republicanism. Rousseau’s cultural 
republicanism emphasizes two important preconditions that the political community must 
satisfy in order to establish the rule of the general will. The republic must consist of (1) 
citizens who embrace FSM and are capable of rediscovering a sense of amour de soi 
while using natural compassion (directed toward the national community) to channel 
their amour-propre in more constructive ways, and (2) citizens who have a shared 
national identity and a strong love of country, which engender fraternity and solidarity. 
At this point I want to argue that along with being an important thinker of the republican 
tradition, Rousseau is also the philosophical father of modern nationalism. Perhaps the 
single most comprehensive account of the intrinsic connection between Rousseau’s 
republicanism and nationalism is Cohler’s aptly named Rousseau and Nationalism, and I 
will pay special attention to it in this section. 
 According to Cohler, “Rousseau was the chief founder of the doctrine of 
nationalism”237 and “the first true nationalist.”238 Marc F. Plattner states that “the thinker 
perhaps most commonly identified as the key source of the nationalist idea is none other 
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than Jean-Jacques Rousseau.”239 Hans Kohn claims that Rousseau “provided the modern 
nation with its emotional and moral foundations” and prepared “the modern basis” of 
“the identification of nation and state.”240 A 1939 volume by the British Royal Institute of 
International Affairs states: “The importance of Rousseau’s thought in the development 
of the idea of nationalism can hardly be exaggerated…. Rousseau provided the 
theoretical foundations upon which alone the nationalism of the nineteenth century could 
be built.”241 Rousseau’s emphasis on the importance of a distinct national character and 
the love of country as prerequisites for establishing a society ruled by the general will 
laid the foundation of the modern understanding of national identity. Rousseau’s 
philosophy provides nationalism with a moral justification that continues to appeal to 
nationalist thinkers well into the twenty-first century. Plattner argues that “whatever 
Rousseau’s deepest intentions or hopes for the political future of Europe may have been, 
without question his thought played a crucial role in laying the foundations of modern 
nationalism.”242 All of the national independence movements and revolutionary struggles 
that came after him owe their philosophical roots to Rousseau. Furthermore, Plattner 
suggests that Rousseau may not only be the founder of modern nationalism, but also of 
modern internationalism, which is fundamentally defined by the nation-state system 
which Rousseau helped create. According to Plattner: 
 
One might say that modern nationalism, unlike the patriotism of the ancient city, 
does not necessarily entail harshness to foreigners. Indeed, a Georgian political 
thinker, Ghia Nodia, has argued that “the idea of nationhood is an idea of 
membership in humanity” and points out that the United Nations, based on the 
principle of respect for national sovereignty, is the first political organization to 
embrace virtually the whole world. Thus it may not be so paradoxical as it first 
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appears that Jean-Jacques Rousseau might be viewed simultaneously as a founder 
of both modern nationalism and modern internationalism.243 
 Rousseau defines nations as groups of people who live together and share a 
common language, as well as common habits and manners.244 According to Rousseau, 
the movement of men from the state of nature to civil society takes place gradually and is 
made possible by certain characteristics that are unique to mankind. In the state of nature 
men are independent and self-sufficient, and they come into contact with other members 
of their species only when driven to do so by necessity (e.g. the need to procreate). 
However, men are eventually compelled by various circumstances, including the 
particularities of territory and climate, to come together and form pre-political 
communities (permanent settlements which lack formal political institutions). Life in 
these communities leads to the formation of a common language, as well as shared 
customs and manners, resulting in the development of an unconscious sociability 
grounded in these pre-political similarities. Over time these groups develop a distinct 
character and culture, as well as strong social and communal bonds. Rousseau believes 
that these pre-political communities come to constitute what we now think of as nations, 
and so through his account of the state of nature “Rousseau has made it theoretically 
possible to find a prepolitical sociability on which nations could be based.”245 According 
to Rousseau, within every community language must develop before politics. A 
community of individuals who decide to live together must first form a nation constituted 
by a common language and customs rather than by politics.246 Once groups of people 
beyond the family unit are forced to live together by physical circumstances stemming 
from natural divisions of the land, the concentration of resources in particular areas, and 
so forth, they begin to form nations. As Rousseau states: “Men, who have up to now been 
roving in the woods, by taking to a more settled manner of life, come gradually together, 
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form separate bodies, and at length in every country arises a distinct nation, united in 
character and manners, not by regulations or laws, but by uniformity of life and food, and 
the common influence of climate.”247 Thus, the external circumstances which compel 
men out of the state of nature lead them to form nations with their own distinct national 
character and culture.  
 In his understanding of what constitutes a nation, Rousseau extends the term to 
include all groups of people that can be distinguished by a unique language and distinct 
customs and manners. In his discussion of southern languages in particular (languages 
that formed in milder climates, such as in Southern Europe), Rousseau praises them for 
embodying a passionate concern for other members of the nation. Rousseau believes that 
while the harsh climate forced northern peoples to develop languages which are closely 
tied to their self-preservation, southern peoples lived in less dire circumstances and were 
thus able to develop more colorful and passionate languages that allowed them to appeal 
to common purposes extending beyond bare survival. For this reason, Rousseau feels that 
men in southern nations in particular have all the distinguishing characteristics of men; 
rather than acting merely in terms of animal self-preservation, they created a language 
that brought them closer to each other and allowed them to feel the kind of compassion 
for one another that would have been impossible in the state of nature. One need not 
necessarily accept Rousseau’s distinction between northern and southern languages to 
understand the point that he is making about the importance of a common language for 
establishing the kind of communities that make allegiance to a shared national identity 
possible. As Cohler points out, “different languages and their accompanying customs are 
the specific characteristic of nations, and they permit men to use their capacity both to 
feel pity [compassion] and to make standards, their most specifically human 
characteristics.”248 Rousseau would argue that any legitimate political community must 
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be founded on nations, because, as noted earlier, the mutual regard and compassion 
required for the general will to take shape is only possible within nation-states. 
 While the type of generalized compassion that exists in political communities first 
developed within nations, it has since been overwhelmed in modern society by amour-
propre, which takes the form excessive competitiveness, greed, and vanity. As we know 
from the Discourse on Inequality, the development of amour-propre ultimately led to the 
establishment of an illegitimate social contract through which the rich tricked the poor in 
order to preserve their unequal property. Rousseau claims that this is the nature of the 
social contract described in various ways by Hobbes and Locke, a social contract which 
formalized the principle of might makes right and “converted clever usurpation into 
unalterable right.”249 However, Rousseau’s ultimate goal is to establish a new, legitimate 
social contract that is grounded in morals and reciprocity, and that institutionalizes the 
rule of the general will. In order to achieve this, Rousseau believes that the state must be 
founded on the sociability and compassion of a nation, rather than the defense of 
property.250 A group of individuals living in a national community develop pre-political 
similarities, including a common language and shared customs and manners (a national 
identity and culture), which provide them with the common ground for morality and the 
capacity to act collectively as a group. In book 1 of the Social Contract, Rousseau says 
that the fundamental problem of the entire work is to find a form of association in which 
each man “while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as 
free as before.”251 The conclusion he reaches is that the association in question can only 
be the nation (sub-national associations are too narrow, supra-national associations are 
too broad), and that the political institutions of the political community ruled by the 
general will must be built around the nation. As Choler indicates: 
Can men both preserve themselves and express their freedom? To preserve 
themselves, men must come  together and act according to a single standard. To 
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be free, a man must act according to a standard that he has prescribed for himself. 
To be free together, a group of men must all act with respect to a single standard 
to which they have all agreed.252 
This single standard emerges to a sufficient extent only within the nation (shared national 
identity and culture, moral consensus on conceptions of the good), and so in order for the 
social contract to be legitimate and for man to remain free even within civil society, the 
political community must be grounded in the national community. 
 Once nations have been formed, it becomes necessary to give these nations 
legitimate political institutions. In the Constitutional Project for Corsica, Rousseau 
advises the Corsicans to form the type of government that has the least costly 
administration, requires the smallest number of official categories, and has the shortest 
chain of command. According to Rousseau, this “is in general the republican and in 
particular the democratic state.”253 Here Rousseau distinguishes his preferred brand of 
republicanism, which is participatory and hence democratic, from more institutional and 
aristocratic versions of republicanism.254 He then goes on to tell the Corsicans that every 
people ought to have a unique national character, and that love of country is the best 
foundation for establishing lasting political institutions. Rousseau asserts that “the best 
motive force of a government is love of the fatherland and this love is cultivated along 
with the fields.”255 Thus, we see a direct connection between Rousseau’s cultural 
republicanism and nationalism: the government formed by the legitimate social contract 
must be republican and democratic, but it must also be grounded in the nation. In 
Considerations on the Government of Poland, Rousseau directly links love of country 
with republican virtue and freedom, and he argues that only citizens who love their 
country can sustain strong republican institutions. Rousseau tells the Poles that they must 
direct the passions of their citizens towards the love of country, because “loving the 
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fatherland, they will serve it out of zeal and with all their heart. With this feeling alone, 
legislation, even if it were bad, would make good Citizens; and it is never anything but 
good citizens who make up the force and the prosperity of the State.”256 He praises the 
Poles for having survived as a nation despite having been conquered by more powerful 
states throughout their history. In so doing, Rousseau makes it clear that the Poles 
constitute a pre-political nation with commonalities that can endure various forms of 
political rule, including rule by foreign powers. He then tells the Poles that the only way 
to secure the stability of their state for the future “is to establish the Republic so much in 
the hearts of the Poles that it continues to exist there in spite of all its oppressors’ 
efforts.”257  
 Rousseau advises the Poles to establish national institutions which will preserve, 
cultivate, and further develop their distinct national character. He indicates that political 
institutions must be grounded in the nation, but he also acknowledges that the national 
identity and culture are subject to change; once national institutions are established, they 
have an important role to play in shaping and guiding the development of the national 
character. According to Rousseau, “national institutions are what form the genius, 
character, tastes and morals of a people; what make it itself and not another, what inspire 
in it that ardent love of the fatherland founded on habits impossible to uproot, what make 
it die of boredom among other peoples in the bosom of delights of which it is deprived in 
its own.”258 From this we can see that Rousseau believes in building on a pre-existing and 
pre-political group, the nation, but he does not claim that the political institutions built 
around the nation are going to leave it unchanged. In fact, as Cohler observes: 
To build a political order on a nation alters the nation irrevocably. Even 
systematic expression of the pre-existing opinion would alter it, and Rousseau 
proposes more than this in the development of passionate attachment to a political 
order that did not previously exist. It seems, therefore, that Rousseau expresses 
both the opinion of later nationalists that political order ought to be built on 
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nations and a further opinion, which they never publicly admit, that this building 
will make radical changes in the nations.259 
Rousseau wants the Poles to ground their new republic in the Polish nation, but he also 
wants them to establish social institutions that will encourage an attachment to the new 
national political order, including public education taught by citizens and intended for 
fostering a common national spirit, bestowing public honors on those who contribute 
most to the nation, and ending the luxury and privilege enjoyed by the nobles. The 
ultimate goal of all social institutions is to make the citizens passionately attached to the 
political order, which is grounded in their common membership in the nation.260  
 Rousseau asserts that the people will not form a strong attachment to their 
political institutions without a public education. The citizens must be taught from a very 
young age to identify with the country as a whole instead of seeing the world solely 
through the lens of individual self-interest. This type of national education is not only 
desirable for Poles but for all free men, and it is absolutely necessary in a republican 
society. As Rousseau explains: 
It is education that must give the national form to souls, and direct their opinions 
and their tastes so that they will be patriots by inclination, by passion, by 
necessity. Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see the fatherland and until 
death ought to see nothing but it. Every true republican imbibes the love of the 
fatherland, that is to say, of the laws and of freedom along with his mother’s milk. 
This love makes up his whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only 
for it; as soon as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland, 
he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.261, 262 
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Again we see in Rousseau a clear and unshakable link between nationalism and 
republicanism; a shared national identity and the love of nation are (along with FSM) the 
necessary preconditions required for establishing a republican political community ruled 
by the general will. Without a shared national identity and a strong love of nation, 
citizens would not be capable of looking beyond their individual self-interest and 
committing themselves to the common good. Rousseau’s cultural republicanism is 
therefore intrinsically linked to nationalism, and his republican ideals cannot be 
considered separately from his defense of nationalism. When Liah Greenfeld argues that 
nationalism was the form in which democracy first appeared in the modern world 
(embodied in the idea of the people as bearers of sovereignty), meaning that nationalism 
originally developed as democracy, she is surely thinking of Rousseau. For Rousseau as 
for Greenfeld, democracy and nationalism are “inherently linked, and neither can be fully 
understood apart from this connection.”263 
 We know that Rousseau’s philosophical starting point is the nation as a pre-
political group with particular characteristics. The legitimate government and the social 
institutions that support it must be built on the nation, because only within the nation is it 
possible to develop the kind of passionate attachment to the political order that is required 
for the general will to take shape. This type of attachment requires both nations and 
politics; it leads to the establishment of a common will or opinion that is based on the 
nation but expressed through politics (the general will).264 As Cohler observes: 
 
Men were to be made to love their laws and the government to serve them 
through good administration of the laws. This procedure assumes that the political 
and national cores are there to be found by the good politician; his task is to seek 
out and try to strengthen the cores with institutions designed to make men 
attached to their nation and to establish good opinion.265 
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The nation is the foundation for the legitimate social contract, and national attachments 
which lead to a strong feeling of compassion for one’s fellow citizens (love of nation) are 
a prerequisite for the general will. This is because in nations men share a certain character 
and culture that exist prior to the social contract, including a common language, customs, 
and manners. These men immediately recognize their similarities, such as their ability to 
communicate in the same tongue, and as a result they form the strong bonds required for 
willing generally. Cohler notes that “Rousseau did settle on nations, as we have seen in 
the Considerations on Poland, for the pre-existing community upon which a free political 
convention could be established,” adding that for Rousseau “the nation should be the 
foundation for the social contract.”266  In order to be legitimate, the social contract must 
reflect the general will of the governed, and only members of a national community are 
capable of feeling enough compassion for each other to equate the fate of their fellow 
citizens with their own fate as individuals, and to overcome narrow self-interest in the 
name of the common interest. Thus, “the basis of a government or the social contract is a 
certain kind of opinion, an attachment of the men in a political order to the whole, 
grounded in their national similarities.”267 This does not mean that the nation will not 
change over time, or that the national culture cannot accommodate new members, but it 
asserts the existence of a common national culture that can survive independently of the 
political system, which is why the Polish nation could endure the rule of foreign powers 
and still remain distinct.  
 In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau makes two claims: that the 
government must be made to follow the general will, and that the citizens must be made 
to love the laws. Simply put, particular wills must be made to agree with the general will, 
but this can only be achieved once the people learn to love their nation, its laws, and its 
ways of living. So we see that for Rousseau, forming a legitimate political order is 
directly connected to the love of nation.268 The legitimate political community is 
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grounded in the nation, a group of people defined by their pre-political characteristics, 
but the will and character of the nation and its members is best expressed through 
politics. Cohler explains: 
In Rousseau’s understanding, the expression of men’s peculiar humanity can only 
be achieved for most  men through politics. He denies the possibility put forth by 
the Enlightenment and by Kant that the universality of the arts and sciences is an 
adequate substitute for political community. In order to be moral, men cannot act 
merely on the basis of their freedom, or their capacity to create standards; rather 
they must limit that freedom to some appropriate use. In national politics, the 
expression of men’s peculiarity is carefully limited to a feeling of unity with some 
other men. This feeling of unity, however, is based on common membership in a 
nation whose criteria are nonpolitical.269 
And while the nation is the starting point for the political community, we also know that 
nations change over time. Rousseau acknowledges that all societies change; the chief task 
of the political order is to allow the expression of these changes and to adapt to them. The 
character and culture of the nation are not set in stone, and the content of the general will 
changes over time. Nevertheless, the “adaptation” and “integration” of these changes can 
only take place within a pre-existing national community.270 
 Once a legitimate political order is established around the nation, the next step is 
to ensure that the republic remains free and virtuous in a world of rival states and 
aggressive foreign powers. When it comes to international affairs, Rousseau advocates a 
defensive form of nationalism that seeks to preserve the nation’s sovereignty and distinct 
character and culture, while respecting the sovereignty and culture of other nations. 
Unlike Machiavelli, Rousseau opposes all forms of military expansionism at the expense 
of other nations, and unlike Madison, he wants to keep the republic small and self-
sufficient. In Government of Poland, Rousseau famously states that “whoever wants to be 
free ought not to want to be a conqueror.”271 At the same time, he claims that the best 
way to keep a nation from itself being conquered is to ensure that all its citizens are 
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endowed with civic virtue and the love of nation. With regards to Poland, Rousseau 
proclaims that “a single thing is enough to make it impossible to subjugate; love of the 
fatherland and of freedom animated by the virtues that are inseparable from it.”272 If its 
citizens are honorable, virtuous, and fiercely patriotic, no foreign power will find it 
profitable to invade the republican nation; invaders would not only be fighting a monarch 
or an army, but an entire people, each individual citizen committed to defending every 
inch of the fatherland with his life. Rousseau urges the Poles to cultivate that “patriotic 
intoxication which alone can raise men above themselves, and without which freedom is 
only a vain word and legislation only an illusion.”273 This is because only the love of 
nation can compel men to look beyond their narrow self-interest and risk their very lives 
in the name of the common interest; without this love, the general will cannot express 
itself. 
 We can see that for Rousseau the strength of a nation depends on the virtue of its 
citizens, not on military power or commercial success. In fact, Rousseau is a staunch 
critic of the excessive inequality between the rich and poor that characterizes most 
modern states (for more on this, see Chapter 3). Rousseau believes that a nation which 
allows the love of country to be replaced by a love of money in the hearts of its citizens 
becomes weaker and less prosperous; as individual citizens accumulate vast amounts of 
wealth, they are no longer concerned with the common good, but only with their own 
private interest. This threatens national solidarity and destroys the general will. As he 
warns the Poles, “the immense distance between the fortunes that separate the Lords from 
the petty nobility is a great obstacle to the reforms needed for making the love of the 
fatherland the dominant passion. While luxury reigns among the Great, cupidity will 
reign in all hearts.”274 Rousseau believes that all economic institutions must be 
subordinate to the political: economics have no logic separate from the common good, 
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and economic activities which are intended to benefit individuals at the expense of the 
whole are to be discouraged because they take away from national patriotism.275  
 Once all of these aspects of Rousseau’s philosophy are taken into account, it 
becomes clear that his understanding of FSM has three interconnected layers: individual 
self-mastery, political self-rule (in the form of a participatory democracy), and national 
self-determination. Referring back to McCallum’s typology, the agent for self-mastery is 
the individual, and the goal is to overcome the obstacles of mere appetites and narrow 
self-interests in order to realize one’s full potential and pursue the common good. The 
agent for political self-rule is the citizen body, and the goal is for all citizens to 
participate actively in politics in order to be governed by laws that they make for 
themselves. Finally, the agent for national self-determination is the nation-state, and the 
goal is to preserve and promote the sovereignty of the state within an international system 
of rival powers. More will be said about these three layers of self-rule in the coming 
chapters, but for now it is enough to emphasize that all three are interconnected and 
critically important for Rousseau’s understanding of freedom: existing states can have 
self-determination without political self-rule or individual self-mastery (e.g. authoritarian 
states), or they can have both self-determination and some form of political self-rule 
without individual self-mastery (e.g. modern liberal democracies). Theoretically, a state 
could possess individual self-mastery and national self-determination without political 
self-rule (e.g. some version of Plato’s ideal city). Nevertheless, for Rousseau the three 
layers are interconnected, and they are inseparable from his understanding of FSM. 
 Rousseau is rightly considered the philosophical father of modern nationalism, 
and there is a clear and unshakable connection between his republican philosophy 
(cultural republicanism) and nationalism. Rousseau is a strong advocate for republican 
and democratic political institutions, and he wants all citizens to take an active part in 
shaping the laws that govern them. In addition, he believes that the legitimate political 
community must be grounded in the nation, because only a common national identity and 
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culture allows for the developments of the kind of strong social bonds that are required 
for the general will to express itself. This is because only citizens who embrace both FSM 
and the love of nation are capable of overcoming narrow self-interests in the name of the 
common interest. It is therefore clear that we cannot separate Rousseau’s nationalism 
from other aspects of his work without losing the essence of his philosophy. In the 
following chapter, I consider the importance of Rousseau’s philosophy in the twenty-first 
century, and I look at the connection between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and the 
work of contemporary republican thinker David Miller. I argue that Rousseau’s work 
gives rise not only to a distinct strand of republican political theory, but also to a unique 
strand of cultural nationalism which I call republican nationalism. I believe that 
republican nationalism makes an important contribution to the current debate within 
nationalist theory, and that it represents a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. 
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Chapter 5  
5      Republican Nationalism 
In the preceding chapters I argued at length that Rousseau is both the father of 
modern nationalism and a major thinker of the republican political tradition. Rousseau 
recognizes the importance of stable republican institutions and participatory democracy, 
and he also defends the need for a shared national identity and love of nation. In this 
chapter, I consider whether we can combine republican citizenship with nationalism as 
Rousseau attempts to do. In so doing, I will pay special attention to the works of 
contemporary political theorist David Miller, who embarks on a similar project to that of 
Rousseau 
5.1 Nationalist Theory Today 
In the past two decades, the idea of liberal nationalism has emerged as an attempt 
to bridge the divide between liberalism and nationalism. Will Kymlicka says that “the 
failure of liberalism to understand nationalism is directly related to its failure to 
acknowledge the inevitable connection between state and culture,” and liberal nationalists 
along with other cultural nationalists have sought to address this problem.276 Liberal 
nationalists seek to formulate a theory of nationalism that is neither too exclusive nor too 
individualistic, and that takes the “illiberal sting” out of nationalism by making 
nationalism compatible with liberal principles and practices.277 However, Ronald Beiner 
worries that this proposed liberal compromise may rob nationalism of some of the things 
that make it so philosophically interesting. According to Beiner,  
The national idea has been such a potent force in the modern world, and opens up 
a far-reaching  philosophical alternative to liberal conceptions of the meaning of 
life.… precisely because it involves  profound ideas of national belonging, 
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national destiny, rootedness in a community of experience, memories of a shared 
past, and so on. These are powerful notions, and I am not sure that one is able to 
do justice to them by seeking to split the difference between liberalism and 
nationalism.278 
I would argue that the liberal nationalism of someone like Tamir or Kymlicka amounts to 
more than an attempt to merely “split the difference” between liberalism and nationalism, 
but it is clear that the liberal nationalist project has its critics. In addition, theorists like 
David Miller have challenged some proposed liberal compromises, such as Maurizio 
Viroli’s patriotism as an alternative to nationalism. Miller asserts that “nationalism 
helped to form an inclusive political community from people divided by attributes such 
as class and religion. Since that is still our predicament today… we need the cement of a 
common culture to underpin our democratic politics.”279 Miller wants to embrace the 
values of republican citizenship as a form of politics and the values of nationhood as a 
form of political identity, and he is interested in how to best implement these values in 
the modern world. Miller links republican citizenship with a more participatory 
conception of politics and with deliberative democracy, and he argues that republican 
citizenship is better suited to bring diverse groups of people into public discourse than 
alternative conceptions of citizenship.280 According to Miller, the types of virtues that are 
required for republican citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nation, 
and a common national identity and culture are essential for producing the kind of 
solidarity that is needed for a system of inclusive deliberative democracy to take shape.281 
Consequently, Miller posits that “political communities should as far as possible be 
organized in such a way that their members share a common national identity, which 
binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group identities.”282 
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 Miller identifies four areas where liberals and nationalists will likely come into 
conflict. These include 1) the question of whether national membership is freely chosen 
or whether it is part of a cultural inheritance, 2) the question of whether the political 
community is based on individual consent or whether political institutions ought to 
express the collective will of the national community, 3) the question of whether public 
life and political participation have intrinsic value (according to Miller, while liberals see 
little intrinsic value in it, “nationalists, by contrast, are likely to attach intrinsic value to 
public life, and to adopt a republican view of citizenship, according to which the citizen 
should be actively engaged at some level in political debate and decision-making.”283), 
and 4) the question of whether the state should be neutral with regards to culture (most 
liberals tend to favor neutrality, but nationalists advocate non-neutrality with regards to 
the shared national culture because an encompassing national culture gives the society its 
distinct identity).284 Having identified four areas of likely contention, Miller maintains 
that nationality is not in itself an illiberal idea. Our understanding of the principle of 
nationality will undoubtedly affect how we think about important issues such as culture, 
citizenship, education, minority rights, political boundaries, and so on, but Miller argues 
that one can be a liberal and still value nationality. Miller appears to consider his own 
perspective to be a variant of liberal nationalism, nevertheless, as Bhikhu Parekh points 
out in his critical assessment of Miller’s theory, “although Miller is a liberal and wants 
the nation to be constituted along liberal lines, he realizes that [liberalism and 
nationalism] might conflict, and then he tends to privilege nationalism. Since the national 
culture gives a society its distinct identity, he insists that the state cannot and ought not to 
be neutral with respect to it.”285 Miller’s work constitutes an important contribution to the 
current debate within cultural nationalism, and his project has clear parallels with 
Rousseau’s work. Miller examines the relationship between republican citizenship and 
nationality (shared national identity) in his three major works: On Nationality, 
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Citizenship and National Identity, and National Responsibility and Global Justice. In the 
following section, I consider Miller’s arguments and how they relate to the connection 
that Rousseau makes between republican political theory and nationalism. Although 
Miller tends to identify his own perspective as a variant of liberal nationalism, I suggest 
that his theory points towards a distinctly republican approach to nationalism.  
5.2 Republican Citizenship and the Nation 
In Citizenship and National Identity, Miller looks at the meaning of citizenship in 
the modern world, and he considers whether nationality continues to be a defensible 
principle around which we should organize our politics. Miller believes that citizenship 
and nationality are fundamentally connected; the conception of citizenship that he 
advocates (he himself calls it “republicanism”) is feasible only where it can call upon the 
ethical resources of the national community.286 Miller wants to “reassert the underlying 
values of republican citizenship as a form of politics and nationhood as a form of political 
identity, while simultaneously thinking about how to best implement these values in the 
contemporary world.”287 Miller contrasts the republican model of citizenship with two 
other models: liberal and libertarian. He claims that republican citizenship is better suited 
to bring the diverse groups of people inhabiting modern nation-states into the public 
discourse, and he advocates for a form of deliberative democracy that is more 
participatory in nature than contemporary liberal democracy. Nevertheless, Miller 
stresses that the types of virtues that are required by the republican model of citizenship 
can only be cultivated within national borders, and that a shared national identity 
constitutes a necessary precondition for achieving the solidarity necessary for a 
functional system of deliberative democracy.288 We can already see that Miller’s project 
has many parallels with Rousseau, who also believed that the moral republic had to be 
grounded in the nation.  
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 Miller defines republican citizenship as follows: 
The republican conception of citizenship conceives the citizen as someone who 
plays an active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society through 
political debate and decision-making. It takes the liberal conception of citizenship 
as a set of rights, and adds to it the idea that a citizen must be someone who thinks 
and behaves in a certain way. A citizen identifies with the political community to 
which he or she belongs, and is committed to promoting its common good 
through active participation in its political life.289  
Proponents of republican citizenship believe that through open public discussion the 
citizen body can arrive at a substantial degree of consensus on issues of common 
concern, including the question of what constitutes the public good. Liberal critics of 
republican citizenship would challenge this view and argue instead that in modern 
political communities the search for consensus is incompatible with the fact of 
plurality.290 As such, republican citizenship is more in line with Rousseau’s claim that a 
moral consensus among citizens is possible, and that this consensus constitutes the 
general will of the people. Miller argues that the republican conception of citizenship 
places no limits on the types of demands that can be put forward in the political forum, 
and it doesn’t discriminate between demands stemming from personal conviction or 
demands stemming from group identity. Republican citizenship requires citizens to 
provide reasons for what they are claiming, but it does not require them to give up their 
potentially controversial conceptions of the good when entering the public sphere. 
Furthermore, republican citizenship can be said to uphold a particular conception of the 
good which may conflict with the private conceptions of individual citizens because it 
clearly values a life of public participation over a strictly private life.   
 Miller believes that while the republican tradition has held up the active and 
virtuous citizen as the model of good citizenship, one need not endorse active 
participation in politics as the highest good in order to be a republican.  According to 
Miller, the republican view also supports the more modest position that politics 
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constitutes a necessary part of the good life, but that individual citizens can assign 
different weight to political participation depending on their own personal values.291 
Miller is not always clear about whether he believes that political participation holds 
intrinsic value, though he implies that this is the case when he says that nationalists are 
“likely to attach intrinsic value to public life.”292 He states that it should “be part of each 
person’s good to be engaged at some level in political debate,” indicating that 
participation is a necessary part of the good life for everyone, but he maintains that this 
“is consistent either with regarding political activity as intrinsically fulfilling or regarding 
it as a necessary precondition for other activities which do have intrinsic value.”293 He 
also states that those individuals who voluntarily exclude themselves from politics 
(anarchists or religious fundamentalists, for instance) cannot be regarded as full citizens 
on the republican view, even if they have the formal rights of citizenship. Moreover, 
having such individuals living in a republican society would be “regrettable” and 
republicans “may want to take steps to discourage the formation of such groups.”294 With 
that said, it seems that Miller does personally believe that political participation holds 
intrinsic value, but he also wants to stress that the republican conception of citizenship 
can be embraced by those individuals who see participation as not holding intrinsic value 
in and of itself, but believe that participation constitutes a necessary precondition for 
carrying out other activities with intrinsic value. To further illustrate my claim, consider 
what Miller says about the role of politics in the lives of republican citizens: 
The republican citizen plays an active role in both the formal and informal arenas 
of politics. Political participation is not undertaken simply in order to check the 
excesses of government―voting out a corrupt administration―or in order to 
promote sectional interests―lobbying for the producer group that you belong 
to―but as a way of expressing your commitment to the community. Because the 
citizen identifies with it, he or she wants to have a say in what it does. And he or 
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she also wants as far as possible to reach an agreement with other citizens so that 
what is done is done in the name of all of them.295 
To me this says that Miller sees political participation as more than merely instrumentally 
valuable; rather, just like Rousseau, Miller connects political participation with self-
realization, and his ultimate goal in politics is the expression of a general will.   
 Miller contrasts republican citizenship with the liberal model, arguing that “on the 
liberal view to be a citizen just is to accept a certain set of principles, and to regulate your 
private conduct within the boundaries set by those principles. This means that the liberal 
has nothing to say to someone whose own conception of the good is not liberal except 
that he must set that conception aside for political purposes.”296 As such, “groups who 
wish to influence the parameters of politics, but attempt to do so by conceptions of the 
good that are not already tailored to liberal requirements, are personae non gratae in this 
perspective.”297 Consequently, Miller believes that the liberal view fails to address the 
challenges of modern pluralism precisely because it excludes non-liberal political 
arguments, thereby alienating those citizens whose very identity may depend on 
expressing non-liberal views. Miller states that the republican view differs from liberal 
citizenship in that it makes no such a priori demands, but demands only that citizens try 
to persuade others of the truth of their claims through free and fair civil discourse. This 
applies to both liberal and non-liberal political arguments; on the republican view each 
citizen can try to convince others of the truth of his beliefs, be they liberal or not, as long 
as he does it through civil discourse and not through the use of force. The only groups 
that may be excluded from citizenship are those that exclude themselves voluntarily, such 
as radical religious sects who reject all forms of state authority.298 Republicanism does 
not set limits on the types of arguments that can be advanced in public, which means that 
even such major questions as interpreting the constitution will be up for public debate and 
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discussion in a republican system (i.e. constitutional questions are not simply left up to 
judges, but more will be said on this later). This is because the republican model of 
citizenship holds that all rights, even the most fundamental ones, are ultimately grounded 
in politics and public discussion. By contrast, some liberals believe that certain 
constitutional rights, such as the right to property, are primary or “pre-political”, meaning 
that they cannot be overridden by a democratic majority. Miller sums up the contrast 
between republican and liberal citizenship as follows: 
The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not that the liberal 
recognizes the value of entrenched rights whereas the republican does not, but 
that the liberal regards these rights as having a pre-political  justification while the 
republican grounds them in public discussion. One institutional corollary is that 
liberals will seek to make the judiciary the supreme arbiters of constitutional 
rights – in effect the interpretation of liberal citizenship is entrusted to them – 
while the republican gives this role to the citizen body as a whole.299 
Thus, in the republican model, “there will be constitutional politics and not merely, as the 
liberal would want, constitutional interpretation by judges.”300  
 Miller tends to describe himself as a defender of the “principle of nationality” 
rather than a “nationalist.” Nonetheless, the two concepts appear to be synonymous, and I 
will treat them as such for the purposes of this dissertation.301 Miller states that the 
principle of nationality comprises three interlinked propositions: 1) a national identity is a 
defensible source of one aspect of personal identity, 2) nations are ethical communities 
that impose reciprocal obligations on members which are not owed to outsiders, and 3) 
nations have a good claim to be politically self-determining (though not necessarily 
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outright independent states).302 Although modern nation-states are not culturally or 
ethnically homogeneous, Miller believes that the nation-state model can be adapted to 
deal with this complex reality. He also believes that while there are certain limits to what 
nation-states can do (limits which are set by the demands of global justice), nation-states 
still have a wide range of options at their disposal, and the nation remains the primary 
model of political organization in the modern world.303 In Chapter 1, I identified the five 
elements that, according to Miller, distinguish nationality from other collective sources of 
identity. In short, nations are imagined communities constituted by mutual belief, 
extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and 
distinguished from other communities by the distinct traits of their members. Although 
the nation is an imagined community often founded upon national myths that are 
historically inaccurate, it establishes a real common culture with substantive power and 
influence over its members.304 Ideas of nationality are consciously created and recreated 
by members of the national community, and nationalist ideas are diverse and have been 
associated with left-wing movements as often as with movements on the right. With 
strong echoes of Rousseau, Miller describes his defense of nationalism as follows: 
I want to argue that nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the 
modern world, namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states 
that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the 
kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction. That we need 
such solidarity is something that I intend to take for granted here. I assume that in 
societies in which economic markets play a central role, there is a strong tendency 
towards social atomization, where each person looks out for the interests of 
herself and her immediate social network. As a result it is potentially difficult to 
mobilize people to provide collective goods, it is difficult to get them to agree on 
practices of redistribution from which they are not likely personally to benefit, 
and so forth. These problems can be  avoided only where there exists large-scale 
solidarity, such that people feel themselves to be members of an overarching 
community, and to have social duties to act for the common good of that 
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community, to help out other members when they are in need, etc. Nationality is 
de facto the main source of such solidarity.305  
Miller rightly distinguishes between the types of nationalism that proclaim the superiority 
of one nation over others (chauvinism), and the types of nationalism that are defensive in 
character and recognize the equal claims of other nationalities.306 Like Rousseau, Miller 
wants to defend this second conception of nationalism, which inherently rejects 
expansionism, militarism, and imperialism. Also like Rousseau, Miller believes that this 
second conception of nationalism can only take root within a republic that is limited in 
size (not global), national in character, and that embraces republican citizenship and 
deliberative democracy.307 Miller juxtaposes republican citizenship with two rival 
conceptions of citizenship, liberal and libertarian. Although all three models of 
citizenship attempt to accommodate the pluralism of modern nation-states, Miller 
believes that republican citizenship is best equipped to deal with the challenges of 
pluralism. He understands liberal citizenship as presupposing a set of rights enjoyed 
equally by all members of society, including social, political, and civil rights. Liberal 
citizenship establishes rights to a certain minimum of education, income, housing, and so 
on that every citizen should have access to, but it does not include a direct obligation to 
participate actively in politics.308 Miller goes on to address Rawls’ political liberalism in 
some detail, and concludes that according to this model, as long as citizens acknowledge 
shared principles of justice they are not required to participate in politics. Miller takes 
issue with liberal citizenship’s lack of emphasis on direct political participation, and he is 
also critical of the idea put forth by liberal neutralists like Rawls that citizens should 
refrain from making appeals to controversial ideals of the good when engaging in public 
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discourse. According to Miller, Rawls’ view does not allow for arguments that rely on the 
truth of, for instance, a particular religious belief, even though a citizen’s identity may 
depend precisely on that belief being true. As such, Rawls implies that all citizens must 
first and foremost accept liberal principles about the justification and foundation of 
rights, while agreeing to pursue their own particular visions of the good exclusively 
through private and non-political means. However, some citizens may refuse to accept 
the notion that fundamental questions about the justification and foundation of rights 
should be off the table, or that one’s conception of the good is merely a private matter, 
which will put them at odds with the liberal political order. Miller believes that in cases 
such as these, liberalism’s only solution will be to assert the supremacy of the liberal 
model, forcing all citizens to accept it.309 Miller concludes by claiming that “the liberal 
conception of citizenship does not constitute a fully adequate response to pluralism” 
because on this model “everyone is to be treated as a liberal citizen, and political claims 
and demands which do not conform to the liberal model are simply ruled out as 
inadmissible”; as such, “members of [non-liberal] groups will inevitably feel alienated 
from the political realm.”310 
 On the other hand, Miller states that the libertarian model of citizenship tends not 
to value citizenship for its own sake; citizenship is merely a means for individuals to 
demand goods that require public provision. Miller believes this view to be expressed in 
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, the State and Utopia, “where the state is seen as originating in 
the competition of protective associations to provide their customers with rights-
enforcement services.”311 The state is seen as having a monopoly on the enforcement of 
basic personal and property rights, and the citizens are regarded as parties to a universal 
contract which gives the state that authority.312 Miller argues that the libertarian 
conception of citizenship is ultimately unstable because there are certain public goods 
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which will always be underproduced by the market, including cultural goods and non-
profitable goods such as roadways or streetlights. According to Miller, citizenship at its 
core includes collective goods and rights enjoyed in common that are not adequately 
provided for by the market; even though individuals living in the suburbs may not want 
to pay taxes intended to address the problems of inner city neighborhoods, the well-being 
of the society at large may require them to do so.313 Furthermore, even though individual 
citizens may have no personal interest in advancing the cultural claims of certain 
minorities (or the national culture at large, for that matter), the common good of the 
community as a whole may require the use of taxpayer money for advancing common 
cultural projects. Just like liberal citizenship, libertarian citizenship fails to address the 
challenges posed by pluralism in modern nation-states; although libertarianism takes the 
diversity of modern communities seriously, it fails to account for common rights and 
goods that are enjoyed collectively rather than individually and that are not adequately 
provided for by the market. Miller presents the republican conception of citizenship as a 
superior alternative to both liberal and libertarian citizenship.  
5.3 Miller’s Republicanism and Deliberative Democracy 
Miller argues that the republican model of citizenship requires more than 
representative political institutions as they exists in modern liberal democracies (where 
political participation is optional, judges are the supreme interpreters of the constitution, 
and so on). Republican citizenship requires a more participatory model of democracy―it 
requires deliberative democracy. In recent decades the modern liberal state, which 
functions within a system of competitive representation and embraces conventional forms 
of rights-based constitutionalism, has come under attack by thinkers who advocate a 
more participatory and deliberative approach to democracy, one that is more open and 
engaging than liberal pluralism and competitive representation. These thinkers refer to 
themselves as radical or deliberative democrats, and they call for rethinking interest-
based politics in modern liberal societies. In essence, deliberative democracy combines 
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elements of direct democracy and representative democracy in an attempt to develop a 
more participatory political system that is feasible in the modern world. In this, radical 
and deliberative democrats draw inspiration from Rousseau’s vision of the people as 
sovereign, and his commitment to ensuring that all citizens take an active part in making 
the laws that govern them. As Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung explain: 
Radical-democratic ideas join two strands of democratic thought. First, with 
Rousseau, radical democrats are committed to a broader participation in public 
decision-making. Citizens should have greater direct roles in public choices or at 
least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that 
officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgments. Second, radical 
democrats emphasize deliberation. Instead of a politics of power and interest, 
radical democrats favour a more deliberative democracy in which citizens address 
public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them – in which 
no force is at work, as Jürgen Habermas (1975: 108) said, “except that of the 
better argument.”314    
 Deliberative democracy places greater demands on citizens than its liberal 
counterpart. Liberal democracy requires citizens to, at the very least, abide by the law and 
respect the autonomy of others and, at the very most, maintain vigilance over political 
elites. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, requires citizens to be well-informed 
and educated, to be rational and open-minded, to engage actively in the democratic 
process, to think critically about the views of their fellow citizens and about their own 
views, and to sacrifice their own time and personal resources for the public good. As 
Weinstock and Kahane emphasize: 
Deliberative democracy in almost all of its forms requires a more active citizenry 
and one with crucial dispositions, aptitudes, and virtues. Deliberative democratic 
citizens must be disposed to seek agreement with other citizens, possess 
deliberative traits that facilitate this process, and adopt a questioning, potentially 
critical, attitude toward their own conceptions of the good. Plainly, the 
development of the deliberative democratic personality requires an ambitious 
educational project.315 
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In many ways, modern theories of deliberative democracy are inspired by Rousseau’s 
republican conception of citizenship and his emphasis on the need for overcoming narrow 
self-interest in the name of the common good. Weinstock and Kahane explain: 
Deliberative democracy clearly places moral demands on citizens. They cannot 
simply press their self-interest but must be willing to exchange reasons with their 
fellow citizens and to accept that the force of the better argument―the “balance 
of reasons”―might lead to outcomes less favourable to their interests than could 
have been obtained through a more confrontational politics.316 
Therefore, its proponents “must remain alive to the possibility that deliberative 
democratic politics will sometimes mean citizens doing less well by the standard of their 
narrow self-interest.”317 Deliberative democracy depends directly on the citizens’ ability 
to overcome their narrow self-interests and on their willingness to treat fellow citizens 
with the same respect they afford themselves. This echoes Rousseau’s general will, a 
fundamentally democratic vision of sovereignty that requires all voices to be heard and 
always aims at the common good.   
 Miller defines the deliberative ideal as follows: 
A democratic system is deliberative when the decisions it takes are arrived at 
through a process of open discussion to which each participant is able to 
contribute freely, but is equally willing to listen to and consider opposing views; 
as a result, the decisions reached reflect not simply the prior interests or prior 
opinions of the participants, but the judgments they make after reflecting on the 
arguments made on each side, and the principles or procedures that should be 
used to resolve disagreements.318 
He argues that deliberative democracy rests on a different conception of ‘human nature in 
politics’ from the liberal view. According to Miller, the liberal view “stresses the 
importance of giving due weight to each individual’s distinct preferences,” while the 
deliberative view “relies upon a person’s capacity to be swayed by rational arguments 
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and to lay aside particular interests and opinions in deference to overall fairness and the 
common interest of the collectivity.”319,320 Miller believes that public discussion has a 
moralizing effect on citizens (if someone commits themselves to a particular position 
publicly, it would be demeaning for them to then retreat to a more selfish posture), and he 
cites a number of psychological studies (dealing with the behavior of juries and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma) which provide empirical evidence for this claim.321 Miller also 
believes that engaging in public discussion makes citizens feel like they are a part of the 
larger group and thus makes them more likely to cooperate with one another. Even those 
citizens who ultimately disagree with the outcome of deliberation understand how and 
why the outcome was reached, feel that they had the opportunity to have their voices 
heard, and believe that they can contribute to more favorable outcomes in the future.  
 Miller argues that a major weakness in the liberal conception of democracy is the 
vulnerability of preference-aggregating procedures to problems of social choice (standard 
social choice theory invites us to pick a mechanism for aggregating preferences 
regardless of the content of those preferences), and he claims that deliberative democracy 
deals with this problem more effectively because it encourages people not only to express 
their pre-existing political opinions through opinion polls, voting, and so on, but to form 
their political opinions through political participation, including public debate and 
discussion (because the content of people’s preferences emerges in the course of 
deliberation, we can select the decision procedure most appropriate to the case in 
hand).322 Miller also differentiates between deliberative democracy and epistemic 
democracy; epistemic democracy holds that there is an objectively correct answer that 
can be arrived at through majority rule. This epistemic view is sometimes attributed to 
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Rousseau, but Miller argues that Rousseau’s view remains ambiguous between epistemic 
and deliberative democracy. The epistemic view sets a standard that Miller believes is 
unrealistically high, because in most cases democratic decision-making will deal with 
questions that are not likely to have a single correct answer. Instead, deliberative 
democracy aims at a consensus regarding substantive norms and procedures, but does not 
necessarily aim for a single objectively correct answer. According to Miller, “the 
emphasis in the deliberative conception is on the way in which a process of public 
discussion in which all points of view can be heard may legitimate the outcome when this 
is seen to reflect the discussion that has preceded it, not on deliberation as a discovery 
procedure in search of a correct answer.”323 
 Having made the case for deliberative democracy, Miller goes on to claim that 
democratic deliberation is most likely to take root in national communities whose 
members share a common identity that transcends their group-specific identities. Simply 
put, deliberative democracy is best realized in a political community with a shared 
national identity.324 A shared national identity creates the kind of solidarity and mutual 
trust among citizens that makes deliberative democracy possible; citizens in national 
communities are more likely to look beyond their sectional interests in the name of the 
common good. This means that they will be more willing to hear others out, to accept the 
force of the better argument, and to potentially abandon a position they feel strongly 
about in order to reach a compromise (as long as others are willing to reciprocate). 
According to Miller, “among large aggregates of people, only a common nationality can 
provide the sense of solidarity that makes this possible. Sharing a national identity does 
not, of course, mean holding similar political views; but it does mean being committed to 
finding terms under which fellow-nationals can agree to live together.”325 As such, Miller 
believes that political communities should as much as possible strive to promote a 
common national identity which will unite them as citizens in the face of their many 
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diverse private and group identities.   Miller strongly opposes identity politics (sometimes 
referred to as politics of recognition), a perspective which holds that no single identity 
should be privileged in the public sphere (not even the national identity), and demands 
public endorsement and special treatment for sectional identities. By contrast, Miller 
emphasizes that only an encompassing national identity can create the type of solidarity 
that democratic politics requires, and he claims that republican citizenship asks citizens to 
adopt an inclusive national identity which ultimately transcends their sectional identities 
as women, religious minorities, and so on326 As Miller explains, 
It is important for democratic politics that all perspectives should be represented 
in the political arena, but in reaching policy decisions, citizens should set aside 
their personal commitments and affiliations and try to assess competing proposals 
in terms of shared standards of justice and common interest. (This aspect of the 
model found its most extreme expression in Rousseau’s demand that all factions 
must be banned from  public assemblies if the general will was to emerge).327 
In fact, the strong connection Miller draws between deliberative democracy and national 
identity is very similar to Rousseau’s position. As we observed in the previous chapters, 
Rousseau believes that a common national character and love of nation constitute a 
necessary precondition for establishing the kind of participatory democracy that he 
envisions. Without this precondition, Rousseau claims that citizens would be incapable of 
looking beyond their narrow self-interests and committing themselves to the common 
good. Just as Miller argues that a community without a shared national identity would 
have a much harder time establishing deliberative institutions, Rousseau believes that a 
community in which the citizens lack a common national character would not be ruled by 
the general will (i.e. it would not be democratic in the participatory sense). Therefore, just 
as Rousseau’s cultural republicanism is intrinsically linked to his nationalism, so too is 
Miller’s conception of republican citizenship and deliberative democracy fundamentally 
connected to his principle of nationality. As Miller explains,  
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The principle of nationality points us towards a republican conception of 
citizenship and towards deliberative democracy as the best means of making 
political decisions. If a nation is to be self-determining, its members should aim as 
far as possible to achieve consensus about the policies they wish to pursue, and 
the only way to achieve this is through an open dialogue in which all points of 
view are represented. The institutions of politics should be structured in such a 
way as to maximize the chances for such an open dialogue.328 
Ultimately, Miller argues that the principle of nationality and the continued existence of 
the nation-state are the necessary preconditions for preserving and promoting republican 
citizenship, deliberative democracy, political autonomy, and social justice. Miller sums it 
up as follows: 
Where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to implement a scheme of 
social justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; and its members are to 
a greater or lesser extent able collectively to  determine its common destiny. 
Where the citizens of a state are also compatriots, the mutual trust that this 
engenders makes it more likely that they will be able to solve collective action 
problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice forms of 
deliberative democracy. Together these make a powerful case for holding that the 
boundaries of nations and states should as far as possible coincide.329 
Like Rousseau, Miller believes that political communities which are national and 
bounded (as opposed to transnational or global) are best suited for implementing the 
principles of republican citizenship, including a system of deliberative democracy and 
social and redistributive justice.  The parallels between the two thinkers are substantial, 
but there are also notable differences. For instance, Miller does not endorse Rousseau’s 
ideas about the need for a Legislator, or his radical opposition to political factionalism 
that seems to demand an outright ban on all political parties, lobbyists, and special 
interest groups. Nevertheless, I argue that Miller’s approach is strongly influenced by 
Rousseau’s work and constitutes a sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s 
republican philosophy. In the following section I consider the connection between 
Rousseau’s republicanism and Miller’s contemporary republican perspective in greater 
detail. I argue that the type of republican citizenship that Miller advocates has its roots in 
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Rousseau, and that the fundamental link that both thinkers make between republicanism 
and nationalism points towards a distinct perspective which offers a defensible alternative 
to liberal nationalism, and which I refer to as republican nationalism.  
5.4 Rousseau, Miller, and Republican Nationalism 
Miller argues that our understanding of citizenship must for the foreseeable future 
remain within the boundaries of national political communities. He believes that genuine 
and meaningful citizenship is impossible to achieve on a transnational or global level, and 
that those who advocate for such proposals are either aspiring to utopian aims or 
deliberately diluting the definition of citizenship to accommodate communities larger 
than the nation. EU citizenship is an interesting example: despite the union’s 
unprecedented economic integration, the vast majority of EU citizens still primarily 
identify with their particular nation, and many complain that EU institutions suffer from 
bureaucratic elitism and serious democratic deficits. According to Miller, Rousseau 
admirably articulates the small-is-necessary perspective on citizenship; Rousseau argues 
that active republican citizenship can take root only within a bounded national 
community.330 To be clear, Rousseau’s ideal republic is much smaller than the modern 
nation-state (the closest empirical example to his ideal is Corsica in 1765), but during his 
lifetime Rousseau did advise the much larger nation of Poland on how to establish proper 
republican and democratic institutions, so he clearly thought that the effort was 
worthwhile even for larger nation-states. The republican tradition has historically 
emphasized the importance of cultivating public virtue and combating corruption, 
understood as putting private interests ahead of public responsibilities. Republican 
thinkers like Rousseau emphasize that this requires strong patriotic loyalty, which was 
best achieved in fairly small city-states.331 In the Social Contract Rousseau blames the 
vastness of the state, along with the waning of patriotism and the pursuit of private over 
public interests, for the decline of active citizenship. According to Rousseau, when the 
close social bond between citizens is broken, “the general will becomes mute: everyone, 
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guided by secret motives, expresses opinions no more like those of a citizen than if the 
state had never existed, and iniquitous decrees which have no other end than the private 
interest, are falsely passed under the name of laws.”332 As such, in the Discourse on 
Political Economy and other works Rousseau specifically states that the first thing to be 
done in order to make citizens virtuous is to make them love their homeland. Miller 
points out that when confronted with the challenge of designing a constitution for a larger 
state like Poland, Rousseau stresses the importance of common nationality even more 
fervently, advising the Poles to actively promote the Polish national identity through the 
mandatory wearing of national costumes, special sporting events and festivals, and a 
system of education that emphasizes the importance of patriotism, common nationality, 
and love of country.333  
 Rousseau’s discussion of Poland in particular, a relatively large state with a 
distinct national character, is more applicable to modern nation-states than his discussions 
of smaller city-states like Geneva, and Miller believes that in the modern world 
“nationality has served as at least a partial replacement for the patriotic loyalty of the 
city-state as a foundation for republican citizenship.”334 More effective methods of 
communication and transportation made it possible for larger groups of people to identify 
with a shared cultural character that set them apart from other groups, thus moving 
beyond the city-state and turning the nation into the focus of identity and allegiance in the 
modern world. If every citizen could no longer meet face-to-face to deliberate, some 
other factor had to generate the kind of mutual trust and loyalty that citizenship requires. 
According to Miller, “common nationality has served that purpose in the advanced 
societies.”335 The modern conception of citizenship is no longer attached to small city-
states, but at the same time it is not and has never been purely political or transnational in 
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scope. As Miller points out, “all our experience of citizenship, then, has so far been of 
bounded citizenship: initially citizenship within the walls of the city-state, later 
citizenship within the cultural limits of the nation-state. These boundaries have been 
actively policed. Admission to citizenship has always come with strings attached.”336  
 Miller states that the main rival of the republican conception of citizenship is the 
liberal conception, which looks at citizenship as a set of rights and corresponding 
obligations enjoyed equally by all citizens. Liberal citizens enjoy rights such as free 
speech, voting in elections, and personal security, and have the responsibility to follow 
the laws and to not interfere with the rights of others. As Miller observes, “central to the 
liberal view is the idea of a fair balance of rights and obligations: we can find this 
expressed in the now-classic exposition by T.H. Marshall and more recently in the work 
of John Rawls.”337 The republican conception of citizenship also acknowledges the 
importance of citizen rights, but it places more emphasis on active citizenship and the 
idea of all citizens taking an active part in shaping the laws that govern them. Republican 
citizenship is more than a legal status; it includes taking an active role in public debate 
and deliberation. On the republican view, to be a citizen is both to have certain rights and 
to think and behave in a certain way; to exhibit what republicans have traditionally 
referred to as public virtue.338 Miller identifies four main components of republican 
citizenship, including 1) a set of equal rights (regarding both private and public aims), 2) 
a set of corresponding obligations (respecting the law, paying taxes, and so on), 3) a 
willingness to take active steps to protect the rights of other members of the political 
community and promote its common interests (public spirit), and 4) playing an active role 
in both the formal and informal areas of politics (expressing commitment to the 
community that goes beyond formal political institutions).339 Miller claims that while the 
first two components are shared with liberalism, the third and fourth components are 
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distinctly republican. This is because liberalism is satisfied with the first two components, 
and although some liberals may sympathize with and even encourage the sentiments of 
the third and fourth components, these are not considered necessary for the liberal 
conception of citizenship.  As such, republican citizenship is more demanding than liberal 
citizenship. Republicanism imposes higher costs on an individual’s time because it 
expects citizens to actively carry out the tasks that republican citizenship requires (it is 
not enough to simply obey the laws and pay taxes while leaving all public matters to 
elected officials). Furthermore, republicanism requires citizens to take responsibility for 
promoting the common good, the content of which is more substantive than the liberal 
good (for instance, it includes the duty to participate in politics and embrace a shared 
national identity, but more on this in Chapter 6). This concern for a substantive common 
good means taking a long-term view of the community’s interests and understanding that 
tradeoffs and compromises have to be made in the name of the common good. As such, 
“above all, [republican citizenship] involves being willing to set aside personal interests 
and personal ideals in the interests of achieving a democratic consensus.”340 Miller adds 
that “as Rousseau would have put it, you ask not ‘What is my particular or group will on 
this matter?’ but ‘What is the general will on this matter’ which may require a very 
considerable effort of self-discipline.”341  
 In expounding the concept of republican citizenship and contrasting it to its liberal 
counterpart, Miller makes frequent references to Rousseau.  This is because Rousseau is 
an influential republican thinker who also stressed the fundamental importance of 
national identity for citizenship. Miller further mirrors Rousseau’s view when he argues 
that a purely political citizenship that is unsupported by a shared public culture and 
national identity is unfeasible. It may at times be impossible for a state to appeal to a 
shared national identity, such as in cases where members of the state see themselves as 
belonging to rival nationalities that are openly hostile to one another, but such cases, 
though unavoidable, must be regarded as a second best scenario by anyone who aspires to 
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republican citizenship.342 Miller goes on to argue against the idea of cosmopolitan 
citizenship, maintaining that cosmopolitan law does not amount to citizenship as we have 
come to understand the term. Citizenship means taking an active part in making the laws 
that govern us, and meaningful opportunities for exercising self-rule will, for the 
foreseeable future, continue to exist only within the national community.343 Miller sums 
up his understanding of republican citizenship as follows: 
I take citizenship, especially in its republican form, to be an achievement of 
immense value. It represents  the best way in which people of diverse beliefs and 
styles of life can live together under laws and institutions which they can endorse 
as legitimate. It is a social practice that needs bolstering by institutional change 
and civic education in the liberal democracies. But it has clear empirical 
preconditions; it cannot simply be conjured up ex nihilo. These preconditions are 
not as severe as Rousseau believed, but they exist none the less. International 
peace, international justice and global environmental protection are very 
important objectives, and we must hope that republican citizens will choose to 
promote them externally. But this cannot be achieved by inventing in theory 
cosmopolitan forms of citizenship which undercut the basis of citizenship 
proper.344 
 
Here Miller tries to distance himself from Rousseau by arguing that the preconditions for 
republican citizenship are not as severe as Rousseau believed. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, Rousseau’s two preconditions for establishing a society ruled by the general will 
are freedom as self-mastery and a shared national identity. We know that Miller does not 
take issue with the second precondition; he also believes that republican citizenship is 
best suited for a political community with a shared national identity and strong love of 
nation. Hence, Miller might be following liberal thinkers like Cohen in taking issue with 
the first precondition, freedom as self-mastery or FSM, which states that citizens must 
attain a degree of self-realization which will allow them to overcome their narrows self-
interests, and which will in turn make them capable of willing generally. Cohen and other 
liberals have tried to distance themselves from the demanding preconditions that 
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Rousseau establishes for forming the society of the general will by downplaying the 
importance of self-realization and self-overcoming (Cohen calls it “saintly self-sacrifice”) 
in Rousseau’s work.345 In the previous chapter, I argued that the attempt to downplay 
self-realization and self-overcoming in Rousseau gives us an incomplete picture of his 
philosophy; according to Rousseau, if citizens failed to attain a sufficient degree of self-
realization, the society ruled by the general will would be impossible to establish because 
the citizens would be incapable of overcoming their narrow-self interests and willing 
generally.  
 Nevertheless, from his discussion on republican citizenship and deliberative 
democracy we know that Miller accepts that republicanism is a more demanding 
conception of citizenship than the liberal and libertarian alternatives. Miller does in fact 
believe that citizens must attain a significant degree of self-overcoming (he calls it “a 
very considerable effort of self-discipline”346) in order to look beyond their narrow self-
interests and think in terms of long-term interests of the community as a whole (accepting 
tradeoffs and compromises in the interest of achieving a democratic consensus). What’s 
more, earlier in this chapter I argued that Miller sees political participation as intrinsically 
valuable and connected to the idea of self-realization. When Miller claims that political 
participation is a necessary element of the good life because deliberation has a moralizing 
effect on citizens, he is clearly stating that participating in the deliberative process leads 
directly to self-realization. So if Miller does not follow Cohen in downplaying the 
importance of self-realization and self-overcoming, where exactly does Miller part ways 
with Rousseau? He is not clear on this point, but it is possible that he disagrees with some 
of the practical recommendations Rousseau makes for establishing a society ruled by the 
general will. For instance, we know that in his discussion of deliberative democracy 
Miller talks about the importance of the citizens’ willingness to set aside personal 
commitments and affiliations in order to arrive at a political compromise that serves the 
common interest. Miller mentions that the most extreme expression of this model is 
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found in “Rousseau’s demand that all factions must be banned from public assemblies if 
the general will was to emerge.”347 In the modern world, this would amount to banning all 
political parties, interest groups, and lobbyists from politics, and Miller may find this too 
stringent a precondition for republican citizenship. Nonetheless, if we accept that 
deliberative democracy does require setting aside personal commitments and affiliations, 
we can look for a practical compromise that will minimize factionalism in modern 
democracies without banning political parties outright. For instance, firm steps can be 
taken to curb the influence of money in politics, to limit the disparity between rich and 
poor in order to prevent vote-buying and class-based factionalism, to make elected 
officials more accountable to people rather than party leadership, to regulate the practice 
of lobbying, and so on. In this sense, the distance between Miller and Rousseau may not 
be very great at all, and it may simply amount to a need to modernize Rousseau’s ideas 
and adapt them to the unique circumstances of contemporary political communities. In 
many ways, Miller’s project amounts to a sophisticated attempt to bring Rousseau’s 
republicanism into the twenty-first century. 
 In sum, Miller’s claim that deliberative democracy requires citizens to embrace a 
republican model of citizenship, as well as his claim that a shared national identity and 
common public culture are essential for creating the type of solidarity that republican 
citizenship requires, make Miller a contemporary defender of Rousseau’s cultural 
republicanism. Moreover, I argue that even though Miller at times describes himself a 
liberal nationalist, his philosophy represents an important step towards the development 
of a distinct republican strand of nationalism that is rooted in the works of Rousseau and 
stands as a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. Miller appears to make this 
argument for me as he repeatedly distinguishes his republican citizenship (and his 
defense of the principle of nationality) from the liberal conception of citizenship (and the 
liberal understanding of nationality). For instance, he regularly uses terminology such as 
“the liberal alternative” and “the liberal objection” to differentiate his own view from 
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liberalism.348 Notwithstanding some obvious differences, such as Rousseau’s ideas about 
the Legislator, it appears that Miller is a defender of what is essentially a modernized 
version of Rousseau’s cultural republicanism, a philosophy that combines republican 
citizenship with the principle of nationality.349 For this reason, I believe that Miller’s 
view could more accurately be described as republican nationalism; his unique 
perspective, firmly rooted in the works of Rousseau, should not be viewed as yet another 
take on liberal nationalism but a distinct alternative to liberal nationalism that deserves 
further consideration in its own right. Classifying Miller’s view as republican 
nationalism represents an important step in moving the contemporary debate within 
nationalist theory forward. By offering an academically sophisticated, philosophically 
defensible, and historically rooted republican alternative to liberal nationalism, the debate 
within nationalist theory can move beyond the general distinctions between ethnic, civic, 
and cultural nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is no purely ethnic or purely 
civic nationalism; all nationalisms have a fundamental cultural component, and all 
nationalisms are at some level cultural nationalisms. Nevertheless, there are still major 
differences and disagreements between the theorists of cultural nationalism. I have 
argued that one point of distinction is the difference between liberal nationalism and 
republican nationalism, two unique yet robust and defensible strands of cultural 
nationalism. In the following chapter, I examine this distinction in greater detail and I 
make the case for treating republican nationalism as an alternative to liberal nationalism. 
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Chapter 6 
 6      Distinguishing Liberal and Republican Nationalism 
Most theorists of nationalism now recognize that there is an inherent connection 
between the state and culture, and they acknowledge that nationality has a key cultural 
component. As Kai Nielsen points out, “all nationalisms are cultural nationalisms of one 
kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation, liberal or 
otherwise.”350 Tamir agrees, stating: “one thing that everyone knows but no one can quite 
demonstrate, says Geertz, is that ‘a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture.’”351 
As such, contemporary debates within nationalist theory are taking place within the wider 
framework of cultural nationalism, and many modern theorists of cultural nationalism, 
including Tamir herself, refer to themselves as liberal nationalists. Liberal nationalism is 
a specific strand of cultural nationalism that seeks to bridge the divide between liberalism 
and nationalism; it attempts to develop a nationalist theory that is neither too exclusive 
nor too individualistic; a form of nationalism that is compatible with the tenets of 
liberalism.352 In this chapter, I take an in-depth look at liberal nationalism by analyzing 
the works of two of its most well-known proponents, Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka. I 
then consider the major differences between liberal nationalism and republican 
nationalism, with emphasis on the republican theories of Rousseau and Miller. Finally, I 
argue that the current debate within cultural nationalism would benefit from treating 
republican nationalism as a distinct strand of cultural nationalism and an alternative to 
liberal nationalism. 
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6.1 Yael Tamir and the Right to Culture 
Tamir has done much to expound the liberal nationalist view, and her 1993 book 
Liberal Nationalism is one of the most important works on the subject. Tamir believes 
that nationalism remains attractive in the modern world because “it captures the 
importance of context, of cultural affiliations, of the need for roots, for belonging, for 
human development and self-fulfillment, thereby illuminating a broad range of issues that 
liberal theory tends to brush aside.”353 Liberal nationalism assumes that there is intrinsic 
as well as instrumental value to living inside a national community; beyond solidarity and 
social cohesion, living in a national community contributes to the self-fulfillment of 
citizens. For this reason, questions of cultural belonging need to be taken seriously by 
contemporary liberal theorists; beyond a concern for individual rights and autonomy, 
liberals must recognize the importance of culture for an individual’s sense of identity. In 
Liberal Nationalism, Tamir’s begins with propositions endorsed by contemporary liberal 
theorists, including  “a set of beliefs endorsing individual rights and liberties, affirming 
the right of individuals to equal respect and concern, and presuming that governments 
should be neutral and impartial vis-à-vis individual interests, preferences, and 
conceptions of the good.”354 Tamir’s contribution to liberal theory is her emphasis on the 
right to culture, which claims that individuals must be allowed “to live within the culture 
of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create the culture of the 
community they belong to, and to redefine its borders.”355 The claim that individuals 
have a right “to live within the culture of their choice” is problematic, but I will return to 
this later.  
 Tamir believes that culture in its widest sense is what holds a nation together and 
preserves its distinctiveness, and she argues that in order for the nation to exist as a 
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distinct social unit it must rely on the presence of a public sphere where the national 
culture is expressed.356 The demand for a public sphere in which the national culture can 
be expressed also constitutes the essence of the right to national self-determination, 
which Tamir distinguishes from the concept of political self-rule (more on this distinction 
later). It is important to note that although Tamir stresses the importance of group 
associations and cultural belonging, she has an individualistic understanding of the right 
to culture: culture is important because of the value that individual members of the 
community assign to it. Tamir claims that although they have at times been neglected in 
the literature on liberalism, questions of culture and belonging are deeply rooted within 
liberal political theory. She argues that along with its concern for such things as 
individual autonomy, global justice, and universal human rights, liberalism also takes the 
existence of nation-states for granted. In fact, liberalism already embodies many ideals 
which are also embraced by nationalists. For instance, the majority of liberals begin with 
the assumption that the world is made up of functional states inhabited by specific 
populations, and debates about political participation, obligations, consent, distributive 
justice, and social responsibility take place within this state-centric framework.  
According to Tamir, “these moves have made modern liberal theory dependent on 
national ideals and a national world order, thus leaving liberals little choice. Except for 
some cosmopolitans and radical anarchists, nowadays most liberals are liberal 
nationalists.”357  
 Tamir points out that holding citizenship in a state is indispensible for the well-
being of modern individuals; stateless persons such as refugees are greatly disadvantaged 
because they lack the protection of a state, they lack civil and welfare rights, their 
movement is severely restricted, and so on. For this reason, Tamir believes that in the 
modern world citizenship within a state amounts to a primary good for all, pointing out 
that “modern states, even liberal ones, have adopted the conception of the nation-state, 
and therefore see themselves as communities rather than as associations based on 
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contract.”358 For this reason, questions of group association and cultural belonging are 
crucially important for liberal political theory and cannot be neglected by contemporary 
liberal thinkers. Regarding the nature of liberal nationalism, Tamir states: 
We can now summarise the characteristics of a liberal national entity. This entity 
will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and outwards; its political 
system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will be free to 
practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-plans and conceptions of the 
good. The political entity described here differs from the traditional liberal entity 
in that it introduces culture as a crucial dimension of political life. Its unity rests 
not only on an overlapping consensus about certain values essential to its 
functioning, but also on a distinct cultural foundation.359  
 Tamir’s liberal nationalism takes cultural and national belonging seriously, but 
her approach has faced some criticism; for instance, Ronald Beiner argues that it is 
misleading to call her approach nationalism. According to Beiner, “a more accurate 
description of her position is: liberalism, with an attention to the ways in which people 
care about national identity and wish to see it expressed in some fashion.”360 Beiner says 
that although Tamir assigns intrinsic value to one’s allegiance to a cultural group, and 
though this distinguishes her from ardent liberal individualists such as George Kateb who 
assign only instrumental value to group solidarity, seeing group membership as 
intrinsically valuable does not require embracing any tenets of nationalist politics. Beiner 
claims that Tamir’s position “is not any kind of nationalism, but rather, a form of 
liberalism that is not indifferent to concerns about national identity.”361 I do not follow 
Beiner in disputing Tamir’s nationalist credentials; I believe that despite the skeptical 
reception it has received in some circles, liberal nationalism constitutes a valid and 
defensible theoretical strand within nationalist theory. Nonetheless, Beiner goes on to 
identify what he calls a decisive problem for the project of liberal nationalism, a problem 
which he believes must force liberal nationalists to drop either the liberalism or the 
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nationalism. According to Beiner, “the problem, in a nutshell, is how to privilege the 
majority cultural identity in defining civic membership without consigning cultural 
minorities to second-class citizenship.”362 He brings up the example of Israel as a Jewish 
state and argues that the non-Jewish minorities inside Israel, including the sizable Arab 
minority, will unavoidably be treated as second-class citizens in some sense, even if the 
state is not actively trying to oppress or destroy their minority culture. Contrary to what 
many critics of nationalism claim, it is possible to be a citizen in a nationalist polity 
without embracing illiberalism, violent conflict, and oppression of others; an independent 
Quebec or Flanders would still be relatively liberal political communities. However, an 
expressly nationalist political community is fundamentally different from multicultural or 
multinational communities; nationalist communities seek to foster and promote a single 
shared national culture that all citizens are expected to embrace. Beiner thinks that this 
could amount to reducing citizens who are not born into the majority culture to second-
class status, which is why liberal nationalists like Tamir attempt to resolve the problem 
by embracing a form of liberal multiculturalism that recognizes cultural and group 
belonging as intrinsically valuable, but assigns no special value or privilege to any single 
culture over others. However, Beiner argues that “in Tamir’s statement of the liberal-
nationalist case, the nationalist side of the equation is so watered down that the 
nationalism in her political theory is barely detectable. What nationalists want, typically, 
is not a vaguely defined ‘public space’ for the display of their national identity, but 
rather, control over a state as the vehicle for the furtherance of national self-
expression.”363 Tamir ultimately goes so far as to suggest that the ideal of the nation-state 
should be abandoned altogether, and Beiner points out that a nationalist could not 
possibly endorse this claim; nationalists tend to privilege nations and the idea of a 
common national identity over other forms of group identity. Critics like Beiner argue 
that the liberal nationalist project ultimately fails to bridge the gap between liberalism 
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and nationalism; instead, it waters down nationalism until it becomes unrecognizable.364 
Although I don’t agree with Beiner’s characterization of liberal nationalism as not being 
nationalist enough, his critique of Tamir’s approach points to a number of issues that will 
be considered later; for republican nationalists in particular, the notions of a shared 
national identity and the nation-state as a vehicle for national self-expression are 
absolutely crucial, and they represent important points of distinctions between liberal and 
republican nationalism. 
6.2 David Miller and Encompassing National Identity 
Although David Miller has described himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, I 
argue that there are major differences between his view and Tamir’s liberal nationalism. 
In his discussion of the various forms of group identity, Miller argues that although 
diverse subgroups may exist within the nation, including ethnic, racial, cultural, and 
territorial minorities, meaningful democratic politics requires embracing an 
encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens and that engenders trust and 
solidarity. Miller believes the republican model of citizenship to be incompatible with 
“identity politics” or “politics of recognition” because the republican model asks all 
people to adopt an inclusive identity as citizens which transcends their sectional identities 
as racial, cultural, or territorial minorities.365 According to Miller, the politics of 
recognition aims to solidify sectional identities and give them public expression, which 
actually limits the choices of the bearers of those identities because it forces them to 
accept a certain political definition of said identity. In practical terms, this means that the 
politics of recognition must at some point stipulate which identities should be publically 
privileged to the exclusion of others (for example, if disadvantaged groups in society are 
to have veto power in political decision-making, should women have that power, or 
lesbian women, or disabled lesbian women?). Furthermore, the politics of recognition 
strive to give public expression to sectional identities, but it is not clear which identity an 
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individual ought to identify with primarily (e.g. is a citizen primarily a woman, or black, 
or Nigerian?).366 Finally, not all identities can be said to have equal social value. Some 
citizens may consider “Islamic fundamentalist” to be their primary identity, and although 
they may in some ways constitute a disadvantaged minority vis-à-vis the majority of 
society, if their beliefs include a call to eradicate other religions they cannot expect their 
identity to be valued and affirmed equally in society. We can only ask for recognition 
from people whom we already see as members of a larger shared community, a national 
community that transcends sectional interests. As such, a militant fundamentalist cannot 
expect public recognition and affirmation of their identity in a secular society because the 
very nature of their sectional identity denies the possibility of coexistence with those who 
are different. According to Miller, “there is a general fallacy in regarding common 
nationality as implying cultural homogeneity: there can be a shared public culture which 
defines the national identity (including in most cases a national language) alongside a 
plurality of private cultures (including perhaps minority languages).”367 Miller believes 
that a plurality of private cultures can coexist alongside an encompassing national culture 
within the nation-state. Individual citizens may have diverse sectional identities which 
must not be suppressed by the rest of society, but all citizens must also actively 
participate in a common public culture that shapes an encompassing national identity and 
transcends sectional interests. So while he believes in respecting diverse private cultures, 
Miller clearly privileges and assigns special value to a shared national identity that 
transcends sectional interests.  
 This is significant because it distinguishes Miller’s nationalism from Tamir’s. 
Tamir recognizes the intrinsic worth of cultural belonging but she does not appear to 
privilege one type of cultural belonging over another. Although she talks about the need 
for the political system to reflect a particular national culture, she does not say enough 
about what exactly makes a culture national. She fails to adequately differentiate between 
the national culture and the various subcultures that may exist within society but have no 
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national aspirations, such as immigrant cultures. In reading Liberal Nationalism we 
cannot tell where the national culture begins, what exactly makes it national, or what is 
its relationship to non-national cultures. The only conclusion one can take away from 
Liberal Nationalism is that there is no real difference between the national culture of a 
state and the various minority subcultures that exist within the same state. In fact, Tamir 
suggests that traditional nation-states will eventually wither away entirely, surrendering 
their power to make economic, strategic, and ecological decisions to supranational 
organizations such as the European Community/Union, while the power to form cultural 
policies falls to smaller local national communities.368 According to Tamir, this will 
allow smaller national communities such as the Scots or Catalonians to achieve greater 
cultural autonomy under the umbrella of a larger regional organization, thereby 
eliminating the need for secession. Tamir says that “although it cannot be ensured that 
each nation will have its own state, all nations are entitled to a public sphere in which 
they constitute the majority. The ideal of the nation-state should therefore be abandoned 
in favour of another, more practicable and just.”369 This is drastically different from 
Miller’s view which holds that functional systems of social justice and deliberative 
democracy can only be achieved within nation-states, and that nation-states will remain 
the primary method of human organization for the foreseeable future. Miller also 
maintains that an encompassing national culture holds special value, and that the nation-
state is justified in publically privileging a shared national identity over the various 
subcultures and sectional identities in society.  
 As noted earlier, Beiner suggests that privileging a shared national identity over 
sectional identities can reduce members of cultural and ethnic minorities to second-class 
status. According to Miller, this need not be the case. Miller believes that it is not in the 
interest of minority groups to simply advance their own particular identities at the 
expense of a national identity; a society without a shared national identity would lack 
shared standards for appealing to the common good, and there would be no reason for 
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radically different groups to work together. Politics within a community that lacks an 
encompassing national identity would amount to interest group politics with the gloves 
off; a community where radically different groups with beliefs that are potentially 
incompatible seek to advance their own particular agendas without a willingness to 
compromise for the sake of common goods that transcend sectional identities. As Miller 
notes, “confronting other groups with different perspectives and different demands does 
not entail seeing the justice of those demands; it may simply have the effect of alienating 
groups from each other. If citizens lack a sense of common identity that transcends the 
particularity of their group identities, the prospects of achieving social justice are very 
remote.”370 Miller argues that identity politics is essentially self-defeating because it 
looks to politics to provide affirmation of sectional identities that the political sphere 
simply cannot provide; no one can definitively say which identity should be primary for 
which group of people (Black? Woman? Nigerian?), nor can they say which identities 
should be privileged over others, or to what extent. Furthermore, “in encouraging groups 
to affirm their singular identities at the expense of shared national identities, [identity 
politics] undermines the very conditions in which minority groups, especially 
disadvantaged groups, can hope to achieve some measure of justice for their demands.”371 
In short, Miller rejects Tamir’s multiculturalism because it alienates sub-communities 
from the greater whole, and he believes in equality through equal citizenship in a nation-
state rather than affording special treatment to subgroups. He says that modern political 
thinkers must find a way to generate a strong but inclusive political community, defend 
equal citizenship in the face of economic inequality, and ensure that the self-governing 
community is genuinely democratic.372 According to Miller, accomplishing this difficult 
task is only possible if we embrace a robust republican conception of citizenship, and “in 
                                                 
 
370
 Ibid, 79.  
 
371
 Ibid.  
 
372
 Ibid, 109.  
153 
 
today’s world strong citizenship can only be made to work when it is supported by a 
shared national identity.”373 
 In his critique of nationalism as a theory, Bhikhu Parekh clearly distinguishes 
between the perspectives of Tamir and Miller. Parekh notes that although Miller claims 
that he wants the nation to be constituted along liberal lines, he knows that liberalism and 
nationalism may come into conflict, and when this happens he tends to privilege 
nationalism. Miller assigns considerable ontological and moral significance to 
nationhood; for members of the nation, national identity structures their moral world, is 
constitutive of their identity, and gives them a context for making intelligent decisions. 
For Miller, the state cannot be neutral with respect to the national culture; the national 
culture must be assigned special value in society and privileged over other forms of 
cultural belonging.374 Miller argues that political legitimacy comes from the political 
community’s ability to “express the will of the national community” rather than from 
consent of the individual, and, according to Parekh, Miller concedes that at times 
“illiberal means” (which he does not specify) may have to be used to preserve the 
national culture.375 In short, this means that an encompassing national identity that 
transcends sectional identities must be privileged over other group identities in a way that 
is incompatible with multiculturalism. Unlike Miller, Tamir tends to privilege liberalism 
over nationalism. Whereas Miller sees the nation as a historical and political community, 
Tamir sees it as a cultural community bound by a common language, common values, 
myths, and symbols, and conscious of its distinctive collective identity. The value of 
national identity is tied directly to the value of cultural membership; the ability to make 
autonomous choices depends on the “presence of a cultural context.”376 Over time, 
individuals can question these cultural contexts and voluntarily choose which culture they 
wish to live in. This leads Tamir to conclude that nations do not necessarily need states of 
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their own; they have a right to preserve their distinct culture, but nothing more. This line 
of reasoning allows Tamir to ultimately advocate for moving beyond the paradigm of the 
nation-state; according to her, as long as the right to culture is preserved in some way, 
political institutions need not be strictly national, but can also be local, regional, and even 
global.377 In line with what she believes to be the principles of liberalism, Tamir also 
insists that national membership should be voluntary, in the sense that an individual may 
freely choose to reject or leave outright their national community. However, Parekh 
rightly notes that this is difficult to reconcile with her view that the nation constitutes and 
shapes one’s identity.378 One’s national membership cannot be both constitutive of their 
identity and therefore deeply rooted, and also malleable enough to be strictly voluntary. 
Parekh believes that both Miller’s and Tamir’s nationalist projects fail, and in Tamir’s 
case it appears that her attempt to defend a right to culture without assigning special 
value to an encompassing national identity ultimately leads to the dissolution of the 
nation as she understands it. According to Parekh,  
Tamir wants strongly bonded nations to be happily nestled within a hospitable and 
noninterfering larger  unit, and that is impossible. If they are to live together 
within a single community, they must loosen up, allow internal differences and 
dissent, develop overlapping loyalties and affections, and cease to be the sole or 
even the dominant sources of their members’ identity and values; in short, they 
would stop being nations as Tamir defines them and become relatively open and 
interactive cultural groups.379  
 Liberal nationalism appears to makes two important claims: individual well-being 
requires some type of cultural belonging, and multiculturalism is desirable because 
homogeneity is no longer possible, and because cultural diversity may actually benefit 
society. As such, liberal nationalists do not believe that all cultures have a right to 
statehood, and since the prospect of every culture having its own state is unfeasible, 
diversity and pluralism are not only desirable but also necessary in the modern world. 
Judith Lichtenberg says that the type of commitment to deep diversity that liberal 
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nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka espouse appears attractive, and that it would be nice 
if it were sufficient for social unity. But if it isn’t, “then we must confront hard questions 
about whether the state may or must privilege certain cultural practices, and disadvantage 
others, in the interests of social unity.”380 While liberal nationalists like Tamir emphasize 
the need for a healthy cultural context as a necessary precondition for the individual 
autonomy and well-being of the members of a group, other types of nationalists 
(including the kind of republican nationalist that I believe Miller to be) would appeal 
instead to the importance of a common national identity that transcends sectional 
identities, to shared historical memories, a common destiny, and rights of national self-
determination.381 
6.3 Self-determination and Self-rule 
Looking back at Tamir’s distinction between national self-determination and 
political self-rule, we see another major difference between her liberal nationalism and 
republican nationalism. Tamir argues that the right to self-determination stakes a cultural 
rather than a political claim and that it ultimately amounts to the right to preserve the 
nation as a distinct cultural identity. This is the crux of her right to culture argument, 
which she differentiates from the right to political self-rule. In her own words, she 
“advances a claim that is central to the theory of liberal nationalism, namely, that national 
claims are not synonymous with demands for political sovereignty.”382 This distinction 
leads Tamir to conclude that nationalists need not concern themselves with nation-states, 
and argues that nation-states will ultimately wither away. She cites Seton-Watson’s 
definition of the state as “a legal and political organization with the power to require 
obedience and loyalty from its citizens,” and juxtaposes it to the definition of the nation 
as “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a 
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common culture, a national consciousness.”383 She blames Rousseau’s philosophy for 
contributing to the conflation of the nation with the state, due to the fact that Rousseau 
identified the state with the subjects as a collective rather than with its rulers.  
 Rousseau believes in the holistic character of the nation-state, identifying the 
nation with the people (the citizens) and the people with the state (the political apparatus 
of an organized community).384 This view that the state should be the “institutional 
representation of the people’s will” formed the basis of the American and French 
revolutions, and self-determination came to be seen as “a democratic ideal valid for all 
mankind.”385 This brought about a “shift from a justification relying on democratic 
principles to one based on national ones, from a belief in the right of citizens to self-rule 
to one claiming support for the right of nations to self-determination.”386 Tamir disavows 
this shift, and she argues that the existence of a nation as a distinct social unit requires not 
political self-rule but merely the presence of a public sphere where the national culture 
can be expressed. The demand for a public sphere in which the cultural aspects of 
national life are brought to the forefront constitutes the essence of the right to national 
self-determination for Tamir, which is distinct from the right to democratic self-rule. 
Tamir believes that ensuring the ability of all nations to exercise their right to national 
self-determination will lead to the withering away of the nation-state as economic, 
strategic, and ecological decisions are relegated to the supranational level while cultural 
policies are decided by local national communities.387 Tamir ultimately concludes that 
once they are “sheltered” under a wider regional umbrella, all nations, regardless of their 
size, geographical position, or economic viability, will be able to achieve cultural 
autonomy without resorting to secession. She goes on to cite the European Community 
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(now the EU) as an example of a successful regional organization that ensures that all 
nations are cooperating on an equal basis and provides more cultural autonomy to nations 
who may be too small to attain such autonomy otherwise. 
 There are many points of disagreement between these aspects of Tamir’s liberal 
nationalism and republican nationalism. A republican nationalist would argue that her 
view of regional organizations such as the EU is utopian; we know that the EU has not 
been the democratic success that many had envisioned, with major controversies arising 
around the perceived unequal treatment of newer and smaller member states by older and 
more powerful ones, as well as the democratic deficit and lack of transparency and 
accountability within the EU’s political institutions. A republican nationalist would also 
argue that nationalism has an inalienable political component; on this view, nationalism 
is both cultural and political, and national self-determination cannot be thought of as 
separate from political self-rule. Republican nationalists would classify Tamir’s strictly 
cultural rather than political version of nationalism not as nationalism in the fullest sense, 
but as a liberal culturalism that ignores one of the fundamental aspects of what 
constitutes the nation.  For republican nationalists, a shared and encompassing national 
culture must be expressed through politics, and through politics that take place within the 
confines of a sovereign nation-state. For republican nationalists it is not enough to merely 
express one’s national culture in a localized public sphere that only has the power to set 
cultural policy and nothing more; instead, they believe that the national culture must be 
expressed together with the general will of the nation. As such, political self-rule and 
national self-determination are intrinsically linked: the reason we need a shared and 
encompassing national culture in the first place is because we cannot have meaningful 
democratic self-rule without it. Only this shared national identity and its cultural 
expression through politics can establish the rule of the general will, and this point 
constitutes the crux of the inherent connection that Rousseau makes between 
republicanism and nationalism. In fact, both Rousseau and Miller would argue that shared 
standards of the common good, accountable democratic institutions, and a robust system 
of social and distributive justice can exist only within the nation-state, and that they 
would be impossible to achieve within supranational organizations such as the EU.  
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 As previously noted, Tamir does not say enough about what exactly makes a 
culture national, or where the national culture begins and where it ends in relation to non-
national cultures. In her summary of the characteristics of the liberal nationalist entity, 
Tamir says: “This entity will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and 
outwards; its political system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will 
be free to practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-plans and conceptions of 
the good.”388  But if the nation-state withers away and is replaced by some sort of 
localized public sphere whose powers do not extend beyond setting cultural policy while 
all other powers are surrendered to supranational organizations, then how will the 
political system of the liberal nationalist entity reflect a particular national culture? 
Tamir’s argument appears to be incoherent here; if culture is not political, then how can 
we expect the political system to reflect it? This constitutes the fundamental difference 
between republican nationalism and Tamir’s liberal nationalism: republican nationalism 
is inherently cultural and political; political self-rule goes hand in hand with national self-
determination, and the national culture must be expressed together with the general will 
within the confines of a nation-state. Whereas Tamir tries to define national self-
determination in strictly cultural rather than political terms, and whereas she rejects 
outright the idea of individual self-mastery (she calls her brand of nationalism 
“antiperfectionistic”389), as I noted in Chapter 4, republican nationalists embrace 
individual self-mastery, political self-rule, and national self-determination as three 
interconnected layers of political freedom. According to republican nationalists, the 
individual citizen must attain a significant level of self-realization in order to overcome 
his narrow self-interests and to will generally for the common good (Rousseau’s first 
precondition, FSM), and he must be part of a political community with a shared national 
identity and an encompassing national culture which fosters trust and solidarity 
(Rousseau’s second precondition, shared national identity and love of nation). Only when 
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these two preconditions are met can citizens be seen as fully free and the political 
community as fully democratic and self-determining in relation to other nations.  
6.4 Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship 
Kymlicka is a liberal nationalist who believes that the narrow focus of some 
contemporary liberals on individual rights has exacerbated ethnocultural conflict and 
rendered cultural minorities vulnerable to injustices at the hands of the majority. He 
asserts that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the general category of human 
rights, and he argues that we must supplement human rights with minority rights. 
According to Kymlicka, “a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will 
include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, 
and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures.”390 A 
comprehensive liberal theory of minority rights must explain how human rights can 
coexist with minority rights (Kymlicka ultimately argues that ethnocultural minority 
rights are the latest stage in the development of human rights), as well as how minority 
rights are to be limited by the principles of democracy, social justice, and individual 
liberty. Providing a comprehensive liberal account of cultural belonging is crucial for 
Kymlicka because individual choice depends on cultural contexts. Like Tamir, Kymlicka 
contends that most liberals are in fact liberal nationalists because they take for granted 
that cultures or nations are the basic units of political decision-making.391 Kymlicka notes 
that most people have a very strong bond to their culture, and that individual choice is 
actually dependent on the presence what he calls a “societal culture,” defined by language 
and history. Kymlicka believes that societal culture is particularly relevant to individual 
freedom because it refers to the institutions and practices which cover the full range of 
human activities, including both public and private life. Societal cultures are usually 
associated with national groups, and individual freedom is intimately tied up with 
membership in these cultures. As Kymlicka points out, “the liberal value of freedom of 
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choice has certain cultural preconditions, and hence issues of cultural membership must 
be incorporated into liberal principles.”392 He tells us that “societal culture” is “a culture 
which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human 
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially 
concentrated, and based on a shared language.”393 Moreover, this type of culture involves 
not just shared values or memories but also common institutions and practices. Societal 
cultures help foster the type of solidarity that is necessary for sustaining the modern 
welfare state, including a sense of common identity and membership facilitated by a 
common language and history. This sense of commonality makes it possible for 
individuals living in large modern states to feel solidarity with their fellow citizens and to 
make important sacrifices for one another in the interest of society as a whole.394 
 We can see that like Tamir, Kymlicka takes the importance of cultural belonging 
seriously. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka sets out to demonstrate that freedom of 
choice is actually dependent on social practices, cultural meanings, and a shared 
language, and that the capacity to form and revise conceptions of the good is closely tied 
to one’s membership in a societal culture. Deciding how to live one’s life is a matter of 
exploring the possibilities made available to us by our culture, and individual choice 
actually amounts to a range of options passed down to us by culture. If they are to 
provide this important cultural context for their members, minority cultures in 
multicultural and multinational states may need protection from economic and political 
interference by the majority culture. As such, Kymlicka argues that liberal thinkers ought 
to accept a wide range of group-differentiated rights for ethnic groups and national 
minorities, and that doing so will not require them to sacrifice their commitments to 
social equality and individual freedom.395  
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 According to Kymlicka, most contemporary liberal theorists have argued that a 
society motivated by the liberal principles of justice would not accord political 
significance to the cultural membership of individual citizens. He argues that this is a 
mistake and that liberal principles of justice are not only consistent with but also require 
certain forms of special status for national minorities.396 He believes that the “politics of 
difference” (also called “politics of recognition” and “identity politics”) need not be a 
threat to liberalism, and that the issues they raise can be managed peacefully and fairly 
through dialogue and compromise. Kymlicka concludes by saying that liberal theorists 
cannot pretend to simply look at people as individuals because “political life has an 
inescapably national dimension, whether it is in the drawing of boundaries and 
distributing of powers, or in the decisions about the language of schooling, courts, and 
bureaucracies, or in the choice of public holidays. Moreover, these inescapable aspects of 
political life give a profound advantage to the members of majority nations.”397As such, 
liberals must take steps to prevent the resulting injustices, steps which might include 
polyethnic representation rights to accommodate ethnic and other disadvantaged groups 
within the larger national group, and self-government rights which ensure the autonomy 
of national minorities alongside the majority nation.398 
 With his comprehensive definition of what constitutes a societal culture, 
Kymlicka offers a clearer picture of what exactly makes a culture national. Kymlicka 
explains that the debate over minority rights is not about whether it is ever acceptable to 
support “communities” or recognize “difference,” but about whether to support the 
particular sort of community and cultural difference exhibited by national minorities (as 
distinct from social movements and immigrant groups, which Kymlicka believes are not 
entitled to the same special status as national minorities).399 Nevertheless, Kymlicka’s 
distinction between immigrant communities and national minorities immediately raises a 
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potential problem with his argument. Using the example of Canada, Kymlicka states that 
French Canadians constitute a national minority within Canada, which entitles them to 
special language rights such as court proceedings and education in their mother-tongue at 
the public expense. Other minority groups, such as those whose mother-tongue might be 
Greek or Swahili, are not entitled to these same rights because they are immigrant groups 
rather than national minorities.400 Kymlicka justifies this by saying that there are 
important differences between communities established through the process of 
colonization, such as the English and French communities in Canada, and immigrant 
communities. According to Kymlicka, “there was a fundamentally different set of 
expectations accompanying colonization and immigration―the former resulted from a 
deliberate policy aimed at the systematic re-creation of an entire society in a new land; 
the latter resulted from individual and familial choices to leave their society and join 
another existing society.”401 The main point he makes is that because colonists never 
intended to integrate into another culture but rather intended to transplant their old one to 
a new land, they constitute a national minority. On the other hand, because immigrants 
chose to leave their homelands willingly, knowing that their success and the success of 
their children will likely depend on integrating into the institutions of English and/or 
French-speaking society, they cannot claim national minority status. Immigrants are thus 
expected to integrate into the larger society whereas national minorities are not, and 
Kymlicka claims that “the expectation of integration is not unjust, I believe, so long as 
immigrants had the option to stay in their original culture,” adding that “in deciding to 
uproot themselves, immigrants voluntarily relinquish some of the rights that go along 
with their original national membership.”402 So while national minorities form societal 
cultures, immigrant groups do not, and while immigrants do have some claims regarding 
the expression of their identities, they cannot claim the same special status as national 
minorities. The claims of immigrants can be met by adapting the institutions and 
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practices of mainstream society so as to accommodate ethnic differences (Kymlicka calls 
this ‘polyethnic rights’), but they are not to be met by setting up a separate societal 
culture based on the immigrants’ mother tongue (this is reserved for national 
minorities).403  
 It seems to me that the distinction that Kymlicka makes between colonists and 
immigrants is incoherent. While his argument about immigrants willingly choosing to 
uproot themselves may apply to nations that were not created as a direct result of 
colonialism, there is no logical justification for granting special rights to descendants of 
colonists while denying them to other immigrants and their children. For one thing, 
colonists by and large also chose to uproot themselves willingly, just like immigrant 
groups (excluding refugees). For another, colonists did not merely establish their 
communities in the New World through peaceful means and on previously uninhabited 
land. On the contrary, they often committed horrid atrocities and even genocide against 
the Native American population in the process of establishing their communities, and in 
many parts of the New World the economy relied heavily on slave labour. These horrible 
violations of human rights were not isolated incidents but systemic practices that went on 
for centuries, and it is worth noting that the last federally-operated Indian Residential 
School in Canada closed in 1996 (Multicultural Citizenship was first published in 1995). 
With all of this in mind, it seems clear that there is absolutely no moral justification for 
granting any sort of special status to the descendants of colonists over immigrants and the 
children of immigrants. If anything, colonists appear to have a weaker moral claim than 
immigrants. Moreover, since Kymlicka tells us that it is the potentiality of societal 
cultures that truly matters and not their current state, and since he believes that weakened 
or oppressed societal cultures can enhance and regain their richness if given the 
appropriate conditions, there is again no logical means by which Kymlicka could argue 
that an immigrant group such as Italian Canadians cannot seek to establish a societal 
culture of their own within Canada and go on to demand the status of a national 
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minority.404 After all, Italian immigrants have lived in Canada for centuries and they 
played an important role in making Canada what it is today. One argument to the contrary 
might be the fact that Italians are not concentrated inside a clearly defined territory within 
Canada, but if they (or any other immigrant group) ever did become sufficiently 
concentrated within a particular territory, Kymlicka could not logically deny them the 
status of a national minority. Kymlicka admits as much when he tells us that although he 
himself believes that national minorities have societal cultures and immigrant groups do 
not, ”there is of course no necessity about this.”405  
 All of this leaves us in a predicament: Kymlicka makes a strong argument for the 
importance of a distinct “societal culture” in the lives of all citizens, and this leads him to 
defend the right of national minorities to preserve their unique societal cultures from 
encroachment by the majority culture. But in so doing, Kymlicka leaves the door open for 
every immigrant community (at least in states established as a direct result of 
colonialism) to form their own societal cultures and demand the special status of national 
minorities. Since a societal culture plays such an important role in our lives (individual 
choice itself depends on the presence of a societal culture), and since there is no moral 
justification for granting special status to the descendants of colonists and not to 
immigrants and their children, there is no moral argument for preventing dozens of 
immigrant communities in a country such as Canada from seeking to establish their own 
distinct societal cultures. Such a turn of events would have a major impact on the 
integrity of modern nation-states, and republican nationalists would be deeply concerned 
about the implications of Kymlicka’s arguments for citizenship and solidarity within 
contemporary political communities. I have already considered the differences between 
Tamir’s understanding of liberal nationalism and republican nationalism; in the sections 
that follow, I identify the major differences between Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism and 
republican nationalism.  
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6.5 National Identity and National Minorities 
The first important distinction between Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism and the 
nationalism of someone like David Miller is their understanding of what constitutes the 
national identity. Miller believes that we need to actively promote an encompassing 
national identity that is shared by all citizens and transcends sectional interests and 
identities. This means that minority ethnic, cultural, and territorial identities along with 
other sectional identities such as gender and race would continue to exist and would not 
be oppressed by the majority, but all citizens would also be expected to embrace a 
common national identity and culture on top of their diverse sectional identities. 
Kymlicka believes that imposing common citizenship on minorities which see themselves 
as distinct peoples or nations may actually increase conflict in a multinational state, but 
Miller argues that we can deliberately modify the national consciousness in order to 
remove a minority’s desire to form a distinct national society within an existing nation. 
Kymlicka summarizes Miller’s own view as follows: 
We should not ‘regard cultural identities as given, or at least as created externally 
to the political system’, but rather should have ‘a stronger sense of the 
malleability of such identities, that is, the extent to which they can be created or 
modified consciously.’ Since ‘subcultures threaten to undermine the overarching 
sense of identity’ needed for a generous welfare state, the state should promote ‘a 
common identity as citizens that is stronger than their separate identities as 
members of ethnic or other sectional groups.’”406  
Kymlicka disagrees with this, arguing instead that “it is no longer possible (if it ever was) 
to eliminate the sense of distinct identity which underlies these groups’ desire to form 
their own national societies. If anything, attempts to subordinate these separate identities 
to a common identity have backfired, since they are perceived by minorities as threats to 
their very existence, and so have resulted in even greater indifference or resentment.”407 
But as noted earlier, in a country like Canada this same argument can be applied to all 
sizable immigrant communities (all of whom have a distinct national identity that is 
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presumably important to them) because there is no moral justification for granting special 
status to descendants of colonists and not to immigrant groups. Miller’s encompassing 
national identity is an attempt to provide a solution to the problem of all sizable 
minorities and immigrant groups demanding their own distinct societal culture and 
national minority status. Miller concedes that if more than one distinct nation exists 
within a state and those nations have no hope of ever developing a single national identity 
that they can share in common, then secession and the establishment of multiple nation-
states is a viable option. As such, Miller is the first to admit that the ideal environment for 
republican citizenship and deliberative democracy is a relatively unified and stable 
nation-state.  
 Miller argues that there are strong ethical reasons for making the bounds of 
nationality and the bounds of the state coincide, stating: 
Where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to implement a scheme of 
social justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; and its members are to 
a greater or lesser extent able collectively to  determine its common destiny. 
Where the citizens of a state are also compatriots, the mutual trust that this 
engenders makes it more likely that they will be able to solve collective action 
problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice forms of 
deliberative democracy. Together these make a powerful case for holding that the 
boundaries of nations and states should as far as possible coincide.408 
It is an encompassing national identity that creates the kind of solidarity required for 
democratic politics. This shared national identity is not set in stone because all national 
identities are ‘imagined’ identities, and the content of this imagination changes over time. 
As noted in Chapter 4, even Rousseau acknowledged that all societies change and that the 
chief task of the political order is to allow the expression of these changes and to adapt to 
them. Even though at any given moment there will be something substantial that we call 
our national identity, and even though we will have customs and institutions that 
correspond to it, the nature of this identity is not beyond critical assessment.409 This 
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means that the national identity can in fact encompass minority groups, including ethnic, 
cultural, and territorial minorities (defined as ethno-cultural minorities concentrated 
inside a specific territory within a larger nation-state), without granting the status of 
national minority to all such groups.  
 If we consider Kymlicka’s native Canada, we see that even though its size and 
colonial history make it a less than ideal model for the kind of nation-state that Miller has 
in mind, it can still serve as an example of what Miller is trying to say about an 
encompassing national identity. Kymlicka notes that Canada is made up of First Nations 
peoples (original inhabitants), English and French Canadians (colonists), and a multitude 
of diverse immigrant groups. In Multicultural Citizenship, he discusses the various ways 
in which minority groups have been accommodated in Canada, including representation 
rights (political rights for disadvantaged groups, such as visible minorities), polyethnic 
rights (cultural rights for immigrant groups), and self-government rights (political self-
rule for national minorities). Kymlicka differentiates self-government rights (accorded in 
varying degrees to First Nation peoples and the Province of Quebec in Canada) from 
other types of rights, explaining: 
The basic claim underlying self-government rights is not simply that some groups 
are disadvantaged within the political community (representation rights), or that 
the political community is culturally diverse  (polyethnic rights). Instead, the claim 
is that there is more than one political community, and that the authority of the 
larger state cannot be assumed to take precedence over the authority of the 
constituent national communities. If democracy is the rule of the people, national 
minorities claim that there is more than one people, each with the right to rule 
themselves.410 
Kymlicka acknowledges that creating overlapping political communities within a single 
nation-state gives rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potential conflicts about which 
political communities citizens should primarily identify with. According to Kymlicka, 
“self-government rights, therefore, are the most complete case of differentiated 
citizenship, since they divide the people into separate ‘peoples’, each with its own 
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historical rights, territories, and powers of self-government; and each, therefore with its 
own political community. They may view their own political community as primary and 
authority of the larger federation as derivative.”411 Kymlicka tells us that it might be 
tempting to insist that citizenship ought to be a common identity shared by all 
individuals, but he nonetheless claims that refusing demands for self-government will 
aggravate alienation among national minorities and increase the desire for secession.412 
Thus, Quebec is accorded a significant amount of self-government at the provincial level, 
but it still remains a part of the Canadian federation. Separatists in Quebec held two 
independence referendums (1980, 1995) in an attempt to secede from Canada, but both 
attempts failed, and Kymlicka would argue that granting Quebeckers the special status of 
a national minority convinced most inside Quebec that there was no need for outright 
independence. In 2006 then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated: “Do the 
Québécois form a nation within Canada? The answer is yes.”413 Harper’s argument was 
that Quebeckers form a nation within a nation, and that they should continue to do so 
within a united Canada. Harper’s words in this case seem to be in line with Kymlicka’s 
belief that national minorities such as Quebeckers can have dual citizenship and dual 
loyalties as members of both the Québécois nation and the Canadian state. Kymlicka 
notes that attempts to impose an artificial overarching national identity on existing 
national identities often fail miserably, as in the case of Yugoslavia, and so he argues that 
the only practical solution must be to make our peace with the existence of multiple 
societal cultures and multiple nations within a single state.  
 But is this how things really work in practice, even in Canada? Kymlicka tells us 
that members of a national community may view their own political community as 
primary and the authority of the larger federation as derivative, and certainly there are 
Quebeckers who feel this way. But does the Canadian state really treat Quebec as a 
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distinct nation? The Canadian state is known as “Canada” and not the “Federation of 
Canada and Quebec,” official documents list everyone’s citizenship as “Canadian,” and 
federal policies such as Canada’s Broadcasting Act (which promotes the development of 
Canadian content in programming and production) clearly state that their aim is to “build 
and support our Canadian identity.”414 To continue with the Broadcasting Act example, 
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is 
concerned with “equal rights of Canadian men, women, and children,” with “Canadian 
attitudes, opinions, ideas, values, and artistic creativity,” and with “a Canadian point of 
view.”415 The Broadcasting Act acknowledges “the linguistic duality and multicultural 
and multiracial nature of Canadian society” and recognizes “the special place of 
aboriginal peoples within our society,” but it makes no mention of Quebeckers as a 
separate nation within Canada or to Canada as a multi-national state.416 In fact, while it is 
true that English and French are both official languages in Canada, and while it is also 
true that French-speakers have a right to receive government services in their mother 
tongue across the country, federal government documents and communiqués hardly ever 
refer to Quebeckers as a distinct nation; rather, the two largest groups in the country are 
divided into English and French Canadians. Upholding cultural diversity is purported to 
be one of the key goals of Canada’s Broadcasting Act, but in this case “cultural diversity 
refers to how different groups – like ethno-cultural minorities, Aboriginal peoples and 
persons with disabilities – are represented in broadcasting.”417 There is again no mention 
of Quebeckers as a distinct nation or of Canada as a multinational state; instead, Canada 
is described as a state with two official languages, consisting of various ethnocultural 
minorities (not national minorities), and recognizing the special place of Aboriginal 
peoples.  
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 It appears that even in Canada, a state whose vast size and colonial past make it a 
less-than-ideal candidate for Miller’s republican nation-state, there is a clear and 
deliberate policy at the federal level to create and promote a single and encompassing 
Canadian identity. This identity requires the acceptance of two official languages, the 
recognition of a special place for Aboriginal peoples on account of their unique history 
(but Aboriginal peoples are still referred to as Canadian), and a respect for a myriad of 
ethnocultural subcultures that make up Canadian society. Nonetheless, Canadian identity 
is not a dual identity and there is certainly no official attempt to acknowledge or promote 
a sense of dual or differentiated citizenship for Quebeckers. On the contrary, the 
government of Canada is committed to fostering an encompassing Canadian identity that 
includes English and French Canadians, Aboriginal peoples, and immigrant communities 
under a common Canadian umbrella. It is unlikely that Canada or any other state would 
encourage national minorities to view their own political community as separate and 
primary, and the authority of the larger federation as secondary and derivative.  
 In a 2003 paper entitled “Being Canadian” Kymlicka considers the concept of a 
wider Canadian identity. He ultimately stops well short of endorsing an encompassing 
Canadian identity and suggests that the social glue that holds a country like Canada 
together might simply be trustworthy political institutions. According to Kymlicka: 
The success of political institutions in the modern age depends heavily on the 
active and willing cooperation of citizens. Commentators have typically assumed 
that this sort of active and willing cooperation will only arise if citizens have a 
strong sense of identiﬁcation with the country. But this assumption may be 
mistaken. Perhaps citizens will cooperate whenever they view political 
institutions as  trustworthy (i.e. even-handed between individuals and groups) and 
effective (i.e., providing good services). The strength of identiﬁcation with the 
country may not be the crucial variable. Many will ﬁnd this an unsatisfactory 
account of the ‘social glue’ that enables diverse countries like Canada to function. 
It may seem too provisional or contingent. No doubt there is more to be said about 
the sources of social unity. However, whatever the answer to this question of 
social unity, it is unlikely to be distinctive to Canada.418 
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We see that Kymlicka acknowledges right away that many will find this to be an 
unsatisfactory account of the social glue that keeps a country together, and he also 
concedes that there is “more to be said” about the sources of social unity. As such, the 
answer he offers is anything but definitive, and by suggesting that a strong sense of 
identification with the country may not be a crucial variable, he seems to move closer to 
Tamir’s view that states are unnecessary and may eventually be replaced by regional or 
even global political organizations. All the potential problems with such projects 
notwithstanding, from the actual policies of the Canadian federal government it seems 
clear that their goal is not to promote a regional or global identity but an encompassing 
Canadian identity. What’s more, although Kymlicka’s point about the dangers of 
imposing an overarching identity on existing nations (as in the case of Yugoslavia) is 
valid, the idea of promoting a dual citizenship in which two distinct nations willingly 
come together to form a single state without embracing an encompassing national identity 
has not proven particularly successful either, as the examples of Czechoslovakia or 
Sweden-Norway attest. Nations that are so distinct that they cannot embrace a common 
national identity tend to go their separate ways, and Canadian government policy is 
clearly intended to promote unity by promoting an encompassing Canadian national 
identity. As Miller argues, in order to achieve long-term stability “political communities 
should as far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common 
national identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and 
group identities.”419 It still remains to be seen whether Quebec will ultimately remain a 
part of Canada or secede, but if Canada does stay united it will be through a shared 
national identity that transcends sectional identities, not through Kymlicka’s notion of a 
dual citizenship that treats national minorities as entirely separate peoples within a larger 
federal state.  
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6.6 Democratic Self-rule and Political Community/ies 
This brings us to a second major difference between Kymlicka and Miller. 
Kymlicka claims that states like Canada are made up of separate peoples with their own 
distinct societal cultures and special rights to self-government, meaning that there are 
multiple distinct political communities operating within the larger state. As such, 
Kymlicka believes that minority groups that can be said to form a distinct societal culture 
within the larger state must be granted self-government rights, even while acknowledging 
that such rights may lead to dual citizenship and dual loyalties. National minorities 
should have their own political institutions and a significant amount of political 
autonomy at the sub-state level (i.e. provincial level in the case of Quebec within 
Canada), and they should also have some form of political representation at the state or 
federal level. Kymlicka believes that embracing this type of multicultural and multi-
national citizenship is the only way to preserve stability in a pluralistic world, and he 
warns that attempts to force an overarching and unitary notion of citizenship on national 
minorities is likely to lead to conflict and secession. Kymlicka’s notion of multicultural 
citizenship is very different from the type of republican citizenship that Miller advocates. 
As I discussed at length in the previous chapter, Miller’s republican model of citizenship 
presupposes a more participatory and deliberative form of democracy than can be found 
in modern liberal democracies. Miller is adamant in his claim that the types of virtues that 
are required for republican citizenship can only be cultivated within national borders, and 
he further emphasizes that an encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens 
constitutes a necessary precondition for establishing a functional system of deliberative 
democracy.420 This is because Miller holds that democratic deliberation is most likely to 
take root within political communities whose members share a common identity that 
transcends their group-specific identities. Only an encompassing national identity that is 
shared by all citizens can create the kind of solidarity and mutual trust that makes 
deliberative democracy possible.421  
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 Republican citizenship asks citizens to adopt an inclusive and encompassing 
national identity which transcends their sectional identities as women, racial minorities, 
ethnocultural minorities, and territorial minorities.422 This is extremely important for 
Miller because he believes that deliberative democracy and politics of social justice can 
only be fully realized when the shared national culture is also expressed through politics 
(self-rule), and through politics that take place within the confines of a sovereign nation-
state. In short, the national culture must be expressed together with the general will of the 
nation, and we cannot have meaningful democratic self-rule without an encompassing 
national culture that is privileged over the many private subcultures in society. Only this 
shared national identity and its expression through politics makes it possible for citizens 
to will generally, thus allowing them to establish systems of deliberative democracy and 
social justice. In the section on Tamir’s liberal nationalism, I argued that republican 
nationalism is inherently cultural and political; political self-rule goes hand in hand with 
national self-determination, and the national culture must be expressed together with the 
general will within the confines of a sovereign nation-state. Tamir believes that cultural 
self-determination can be separated from political self-rule, which is a view that Miller 
and republican nationalists reject. Kymlicka does not make the same claim as Tamir 
because he argues that it is not enough for national minorities to be able to set their own 
cultural policies; rather, they are also entitled to substantial rights of self-government. 
However, Kymlicka believes that national minorities form separate political communities 
within the larger state, and that these political communities may at times be at odds with 
other political communities within that same state.  As such, Kymlicka’s view is just as 
unacceptable to republican nationalists as Tamir’s attempt to separate cultural self-
determination from political self-rule. Put simply, by arguing that the state is not made up 
of a single ‘people’ with a shared national identity but of multiple ‘peoples’ with distinct 
identities inhabiting separate political communities, Kymlicka splits the general will and 
removes all hope of establishing the kind of deliberative democracy that republican 
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nationalists like Rousseau and Miller are committed to. The rule of the general will is 
simply not possible in a state made up of separate political communities (which are at 
times openly antagonistic towards each other); in such states, there is no general will to 
speak of, and the political system amounts to a constant struggle between competing 
particular wills, each representing a specific faction within society.  
 With reference to Rousseau’s model of participatory democracy, Miller argues 
that democratic politics requires all the diverse perspectives within society to be 
represented in the political arena, but he firmly states that in reaching policy decisions 
citizens have to set aside their personal commitments and affiliations (be they racial, 
ethnocultural, or territorial) and assess competing proposals in terms of shared standards 
of justice and common interest. 423 In a society made up of separate political communities 
without an encompassing national identity to unite them in the face of their diverse 
sectional identities, it is extremely difficult if not outright impossible to establish 
meaningful shared standards of justice and common interest. Just as Rousseau argues that 
a community in which citizens lack a common national character could not be ruled by 
the general will, Miller maintains that a community without an encompassing national 
identity would have a much harder time establishing deliberative institutions. For 
instance, the common good of the community as a whole may require the use of taxpayer 
money for advancing shared cultural projects, but individual citizens who belong to the 
majority may have no personal interest in advancing the cultural claims of certain 
minorities (and members of a minority may have no interest in the national culture at 
large). As such, Miller argues that a society which lacks a shared national identity would 
also lack shared standards for appealing to the common good, and there would be no 
reason for radically different groups to work together. Why should members of separate 
political communities within a larger state contribute tax dollars and other goods for the 
benefit of a rival political community? For instance, why should the citizens of Quebec 
for whom ‘Quebecker’ is their primary identity agree to pay federal taxes that largely 
benefit English Canadians outside of Quebec, especially when those resources could be 
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used to address the needs of Quebeckers instead (to say nothing of the fact that many in 
Quebec view English Canadians as oppressors)? What can unite these separate political 
communities, which are at times openly hostile to one another, if not a shared national 
identity? In some cases, the answer may be “nothing at all” and the state may dissolve 
into multiple smaller states. Miller would accept this option in cases where there is no 
hope of ever establishing a shared national identity that transcends sectional interests, but 
Kymlicka seems to believe that a larger state made up of multiple nations, all of which 
form distinct political communities, can survive without a shared identity.   
 But what then is the glue that holds these separate nations together in one state? If 
Quebeckers are a distinct nation with a separate political community, and if there is no 
encompassing national identity that unites them with other Canadians, then the glue 
holding the Canadian state together at the federal level must be purely political; common 
political principles, practices, and institutions. We know that Kymlicka rejects the idea of 
a purely civic or political nationalism as unfeasible and stresses that nationality always 
involves a richer cultural component (see Chapter 1), but he seems to believe that in cases 
where states are made up of multiple nations, citizenship at the state or federal level can 
be sustained by purely political means (no encompassing national identity, no single 
national citizenship). Miller rejects this outright, stating that a purely political citizenship 
that is unsupported by a shared public culture and national identity is indeed 
unfeasible.424 For Miller, any state in which members see themselves as belonging to 
rival national communities must be regarded as a less-than-ideal scenario, and if 
establishing an encompassing national identity in the long term proves to be impossible, 
then secession may be the best solution. That said, Miller stresses that “there can be a 
shared public culture which defines the national identity (including in most cases a 
national language) alongside a plurality of private cultures (including perhaps minority 
languages).”425 What’s more, the national identity changes and evolves over time; it can 
become more inclusive and learn to accommodate new cultures, and this process of 
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change should take place as part of a collective national conversation. Miller believes that 
this deliberative approach to national identity is the future of nationality, stating: 
The main elements in the revitalization of nationality will be the same 
everywhere: an open debate about national identity and its redefinition to 
accommodate cultural and territorial minorities; the constitutional embodiment of 
the resulting principles; and the transmission of national identity through a civic 
education with a unitary core but a periphery that is flexible enough to serve the 
needs of minorities.426 
So how would Miller’s perspective deal with the specific circumstances of 
Quebec within Canada? Unlike Kymlicka, who treats Quebeckers as a distinct nation that 
forms a separate political community, Miller would promote an encompassing Canadian 
identity that treats Quebeckers as a territorial minority within Canada (i.e. an 
ethnocultural minority that has a clearly defined territory within the larger state). 
Canada’s unique historical context means that the specific content of the Canadian 
national identity has to make special accommodations for Quebeckers and First Nations 
peoples; thus, a Canadian national identity includes both English as French as official 
languages (while having a single national language would be less complicated, 
Switzerland has four official languages and remains a unified nation), and it also includes 
a special respect for First Nations peoples because of the complex historical 
circumstances under which the Canadian state was established. In short, a republican 
nationalist would view Canada as one nation with a single national identity, political 
community, and public culture. Canada may be a nation with ethnocultural and territorial 
minorities who have shaped and continue to shape the specific content of its national 
identity, but it is a nation nonetheless, not a state made up of multiple nations and 
political communities and held together by purely political bonds at the federal level. If it 
turns out that Quebeckers are truly so different from other Canadians that promoting a 
shared national identity is impossible in the long term, then secession may well occur 
sometime in the future, but in order to prevent this from happening republican 
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nationalists maintain that our best bet is not to treat Quebeckers as a separate people, but 
rather to treat them as an integral part of the larger Canadian nation. 
6.7 The Sources of Political Legitimacy 
Another major difference between republican nationalism and liberal nationalism 
can be found in their understanding of the sources of political legitimacy. Liberal 
nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka believe that cultural belonging is important only 
because it is valuable to individual citizens, and they argue that political legitimacy must 
come from the consent of the individual. Miller, on the other hand, assigns substantial 
moral and ontological significance to nationhood, arguing that national identity structures 
the moral world of the nation’s members and is constitutive of their identity. As such, the 
national culture must be assigned special value in society and be privileged over other 
forms of cultural belonging.427 Furthermore, a republican nationalist “views the issue [of 
political legitimacy] in less individualistic terms; political institutions are legitimate when 
they serve to express the will of the national community” rather than the consent of the 
individual.428 As such, political institutions are not merely concerned with the well-being 
of individuals; rather, they ought to express the collective will of the national 
community.429 In his own comparison of republican and liberal citizenship, Miller tells us 
that “liberals will seek to make the judiciary the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights 
– in effect the interpretation of liberal citizenship is entrusted to them – while the 
republican gives this role to the citizen body as a whole.”430  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, Tamir blames Rousseau for conflating the nation 
with the state by identifying the state with the subjects as a collective rather than with its 
rulers. Rousseau argues that the nation-state has a holistic character, and that the nation is 
synonymous with the people, and the people with the state. Tamir rejects the view that 
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the state should be the “institutional representation of the people’s will” and she 
distinguishes between political self-rule and national self-determination, arguing that the 
national community is not necessarily a political community.431 Kymlicka’s view differs 
from Tamir’s in that he believe that nations (including national minorities) have a right to 
both cultural self-determination and political self-rule, but he argues that multiple peoples 
and political communities can exist within a single state (e.g. Quebeckers as a separate 
people and Quebec as a separate political community within Canada). Republican 
nationalists like Miller restate Rousseau’s holistic conception of the nation-state, and they 
reject both Tamir’s and Kymlicka’s views because a community ruled by the general will 
demands that both national self-determination and political self-rule be expressed at the 
highest level of the state (at the federal level in the case of Canada, rather than provincial 
or local levels). In order for the state to have political legitimacy, the national will must 
be expressed at the highest level and the general will cannot be divided into multiple 
separate and competing wills representing smaller political communities within the state. 
The state itself must be the vehicle for furthering national self-expression; for republican 
nationalists, both the national will and the encompassing national culture must be 
expressed through politics, and through politics that take place at the highest level of the 
nation-state.  Anything less would violate the principle of democratic self-rule as 
republican nationalists understand it.  
6.8 The Public Good and Democratic Consensus 
Whereas liberal nationalists believe that decisions about substantive conceptions 
of the good (especially beyond the ideal of autonomy) should be left up to individuals, 
republican nationalists assume that political participation and an encompassing national 
identity hold both intrinsic and instrumental value, and that they are therefore essential 
aspects of the good life. Because political participation and an encompassing national 
identity constitute fundamental preconditions for establishing the community ruled by the 
general will, the decision about whether they hold intrinsic value is not left up to 
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individuals; rather, it is taken as a given in a republican nationalist community. 
Furthermore, republican nationalists believe that meaningful democratic consensus is 
possible and that the political community can privilege certain conceptions of the public 
good over others (beyond the ideal of autonomy). As Miller points out, “above all, 
[republican citizenship] involves being willing to set aside personal interests and personal 
ideals in the interests of achieving a democratic consensus.”432 Although it does not 
necessarily aim at a single objectively correct answer, the system of deliberative 
democracy that republican nationalists advocate does aim at a consensus regarding 
substantive norms and procedures. Liberal nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka reject 
this view, arguing that the fact of plurality makes it impossible to achieve meaningful 
consensus on what constitutes the good. As such, liberal societies must allow individuals 
to pursue their own conceptions of the good (within the constraints imposed by the 
demands of reasonable disagreement), and to revise them at their own discretion.433 By 
contrast, republican nationalists reject the “reasonable disagreement” limitation and hold 
that even appeals to controversial moral doctrines are acceptable in public deliberation; 
so long as the discussion itself is free, open, and civil, every citizen can have an 
opportunity to persuade their fellow citizens using the force of the better argument. If 
enough people are convinced by a particular vision of the public good and a democratic 
consensus emerges, then privileging that particular vision of the good over others is 
justified.434 
 It is important to note that the public conception of the good for republican 
nationalists is not set in stone; in fact, it is up for debate, discussion, and revision through 
the process of active participation in a system of deliberative democracy. This means that 
the good of a republican political community will be formed and revised through active 
political participation, national referenda,  and so forth, but there is still assumed to exist 
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at any given time a substantive democratic and moral consensus on what constitutes the 
public good.435 A republican nationalist begins by arguing that an encompassing national 
identity and active political participation are necessary components of the good, not only 
for individual citizens but for the community as a whole. What’s more, the actual content 
of the public good can be even more substantive in republican nationalist communities; 
those liberals who are perfectionists only go so far as to support the public promotion of 
the ideal of autonomy, but republican nationalists can promote other ideals as well, as 
long as they are supported by a democratic consensus that emerges through the process of 
deliberation.  
 For instance, a republican community may collectively decide that the public 
good requires promoting a belief in a higher power (a position which clearly violates the 
“reasonable disagreement” limitation). This does not mean that the community has to 
endorse any particular religious denomination; it may simply mean that encouraging 
belief in a higher power is considered important for society because it teaches citizens to 
look beyond their own narrow self-interests, to adopt a more far-reaching perspective, to 
act more responsibly towards their fellow citizens, and so forth. If through the process of 
deliberation the community determines that a belief in a higher power constitutes part of 
the public good, then the political community can actively encourage this belief through 
official documents and communiqués, national symbols such as the anthem and flag, the 
national system of education, state-owned media, and so on. For instance, the Canadian 
national anthem features the words “God keep our land glorious and free” and the official 
motto of the United States is “In God We Trust,” words which are also featured on US 
coins and paper currency. These are non-denominational references to a higher power, 
but they are still clear references made on official national symbols, and some have taken 
issue with them. Because reasonable people will disagree about the existence of a higher 
power, it seems that there is no way to defend these references from a liberal perspective; 
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a liberal must endorse their removal from official national symbols and documents 
because some citizens will inevitably reject the belief in a higher power. However, these 
references can be defended from a republican nationalist perspective: if through the 
process of deliberation the community decides that a belief in a higher power constitutes 
part of the public good, the state can actively promote this belief and feature references to 
a higher power on official symbols and documents. On the republican nationalist view, 
those who refuse to believe in a higher power would not be coerced into adopting the 
preferred view because every citizen is an autonomous moral agent, but the dissenters 
would also have to accept that promoting the belief in a higher power through non-
coercive means is a legitimate state policy.436  
 Dissenters may actively try to overturn this policy through the deliberative 
process, but they would have to do so by offering compelling arguments about why the 
belief in a higher power should not be considered a part of the public good. As such, 
dissenters would be expected to respect the decision of the community as long as it was 
made fairly by their fellow citizens through the process of democratic deliberation, and as 
long as they continued to have public avenues for voicing their own dissenting views. 
Dissenters in a republican community could not simply appeal to the standard of 
“reasonable disagreement” and demand that all religious symbols and judgments about 
the validity of beliefs be removed from the public sphere because reasonable people may 
disagree about them. After all, those citizens who consider their belief in a higher power 
to be an essential aspect of their identity could argue that a society which refuses to 
reference these beliefs is actively denying them the ability to publically express a 
fundamental part of themselves. Republican nationalism therefore rejects the idea of state 
neutrality towards potentially controversial doctrines and actively promotes a particular 
conception of the public good, the specific content of which is not determined or revised 
                                                 
 
436
 By “non-coercive means” I mean that the state would actively promote this good through the 
aforementioned avenues (national symbols, education, media) without unfairly punishing individual 
dissenters. The state would encourage citizens to adopt a certain view, but it would not coerce them with 
threats of physical harm if they refused. Moreover, the deliberative process would have to provide an outlet 
for dissenters to voice their concerns and to attempt to convince others of the superiority of their own 
arguments. 
182 
 
by each citizen individually but by the community collectively through the process of 
political participation and deliberation.  
 We know that while there are prominent liberals who advocate state neutrality, 
there are also liberals who believe in promoting the ‘ideal of autonomy’ as the public 
good in liberal communities. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka accepts the ideal of 
autonomy as an integral aspect of liberalism, and he criticizes Rawls’s claim that 
embracing this ideal would make liberalism sectarian. Like Mill before him, Kymlicka 
accepts the ideal of autonomy as an integral aspect of the liberal good, thereby rejecting 
state neutrality.437 The difference between Kymlicka’s liberal good and a republican 
nationalist conception of the good is not that one view embraces strict state neutrality 
while the other does not; rather, the difference is in the content of the good.438 While the 
content of the good according to a liberal nationalist like Kymlicka is the broad ideal of 
autonomy, republican nationalists can accept a more substantive understanding of the 
good, one that begins with the assumption that political participation and an 
encompassing national identity hold both intrinsic and instrumental value (and are 
therefore essential elements of the good life), but one that also holds that the content of 
the public good can extend to include ideals beyond participation and shared national 
identity (the specific content is ultimately determined by public deliberation). 
 Although all republican nationalists accept that political participation and an 
encompassing national identity are integral elements of the good life, their specific 
understanding of these ideas, as well as additional ideas about the good (such as whether 
or not to promote a belief in a higher power, for instance) will be subject to debate and 
discussion. In liberal societies ideas about the good (apart from the ideal of autonomy) 
are left up to the individual citizen, and they are formed and revised at the level of the 
individual. By contrast, in a republican society ideas about the public good will be 
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defined and revised by all citizens collectively through the deliberative process. In order 
to revise the conception of the public good, republican citizens will have to come 
together at the national level and go about revising the community’s definition of the 
public good through political participation and deliberation. Put simply, because 
republican nationalists believe that our conception of the public good reflects the general 
will of the citizens, our understanding of the public good cannot be revised by individual 
citizens at their own discretion. Instead, all citizens must come together and revise the 
conception of the public good collectively through participation and deliberation. A 
political community ruled by the general will is more than an aggregate of individuals 
with equal rights and equivalent legal status; citizens of a political community ruled by 
the general will must form a single sovereign body (Rousseau’s moi commun), and 
decisions about what constitutes the public good must be made by the whole body 
through the mechanism of democratic politics.  
 The question then becomes: why do republican nationalists want to publically 
promote a particular conception of the good, even though modern political communities 
are by and large diverse and pluralistic? Critics have argued that expecting a democratic 
consensus on questions of the good and actively promoting one conception of the public 
good over others would be impractical at best, and discriminatory at worst. Nevertheless, 
republican nationalists believe that democratic consensus is possible (the content of 
which emerges through deliberation),439 and they argue that the political community 
(through the vehicle of the state) can do far more good for its citizens by adopting a 
shared conception of the public good and actively promoting it, than by leaving the 
process of defining and revising conceptions of the good entirely up to the individual. By 
actively privileging certain conceptions of the good over others, the community teaches 
us that certain ways of life are more productive than others, that certain activities are 
more beneficial for society than others, and that certain qualities are nobler than others, 
which makes faster and more meaningful progress towards equality and social justice 
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possible. To use the example of political participation, we know that many liberals 
encourage active participation, but ultimately they feel that the decision about whether or 
not to participate in politics must be left up to the individual. As Kymlicka states, because 
there are many different conceptions of the good, “a liberal democracy must respect such 
diverse conceptions of the good life, as far as possible, and should not compel people to 
adopt a conception of the good life which privileges political participation as the source 
of meaning or satisfaction.”440 But because republican nationalists believe that 
participation has both intrinsic and instrumental value, they would argue a) that those 
individuals who do not participate in politics are unable to realize their full potential as 
citizens and be free in the most meaningful sense (FSM), and b) that the troubling decline 
in political participation in many modern liberal democracies along with the disturbing 
rise in the influence of money in politics threaten the very integrity of the democratic 
system. As such, they would stress that in order to preserve democracy we must not only 
encourage political participation as a worthy cause, but also actively promote it as an 
integral element of the good life through the vehicle of the state.  
 To reiterate, a republican nationalist would argue that political participation is an 
essential aspect of the good life because a) it allows individuals to realize themselves 
fully as citizens and be free in the most-meaningful sense (intrinsic worth), and b) it 
ensures that citizens are more engaged in the political process, which in turn ensures the 
preservation of meaningful democracy in the face of such fundamental threats as the 
growing influence of money in politics (instrumental worth). Although liberal nationalists 
believe that political participation has instrumental value for citizens, liberals do not think 
that political participation has any intrinsic value, and they mostly reject the idea that 
political activity should be a requirement of democratic citizenship. By contrast, 
republican nationalists believe that political participation has intrinsic value and they hold 
that all citizens must therefore take an active part in governing themselves. According to 
Miller, although the republican tradition holds up the active and virtuous citizen as the 
exemplar of good citizenship, one need not endorse active participation in politics as the 
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highest good to be a republican. However, a republican nationalist is required to embrace 
the more modest position that politics constitutes a necessary element of the good life.441  
 In modern liberal democracies political participation is optional and judges are 
often the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights, but the republican model of democracy 
requires more than our contemporary representative political institutions have to offer. 
Republican citizenship requires a more participatory model of democracy that makes 
political participation a requirement, which is the only way to establish a meaningful 
system of deliberative democracy. Miller believes that public discussion has a moralizing 
effect on citizens and that political participation leads to self-realization (thus, it has 
intrinsic value), and he holds that engaging in public discussion makes citizens feel as 
though they are a part of a larger whole, which makes them more likely to cooperate with 
one another. When everyone takes an active part in public discussions, citizens who 
ultimately disagree with the outcome of deliberation understand how and why the 
outcome was reached, they feel that they had the opportunity to have their voices heard, 
and they believe that they can contribute to more favorable outcomes in the future. This 
builds trust, mutual understanding, and solidarity, which leads to a stronger and more 
unified political community (hence, participation also has instrumental value). 
Republican citizens are not only encouraged but required to play an active role in both 
the formal and informal arenas of politics, even if that means sacrificing their own time 
and resources, because the goal of republican citizenship goes beyond promoting 
sectional interests and involves actively seeking consensus and compromise in the name 
of the common good.442 The belief that political participation has both intrinsic and 
instrumental value, and that it constitutes an integral element of the good life, represents a 
clear distinction between republican nationalism and the liberal nationalism of both 
Tamir and Kymlicka.  
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 A liberal would likely argue that republican nationalists want to restrict the 
freedom of individuals by not allowing each citizen to decide whether political 
participation is part of their own personal conception of the good life. However, 
republican nationalists would counter by stressing that a community in which citizens are 
not engaged in politics is itself less free because it does not offer citizens adequate 
opportunities for self-realization, and because it is dominated by special interests and 
therefore not democratic in the most meaningful sense. This is the essence of Rousseau’s 
famous statement that citizens must be “forced to be free”; by teaching citizens that 
political participation is an integral aspect of the good life instead of leaving each 
individual citizen to make that decision for himself, we are ensuring that all individuals 
have the opportunity to fully realize themselves as citizens, and that special interests will 
not take advantage of political apathy and a lack of vigilance on the part of the citizenry 
in order to gain undue influence over the political system. In short, by actively promoting 
political participation as a necessary element of the good life, we are ensuring that the 
republican community remains fully free and meaningfully democratic, and we are 
therefore preserving, not infringing upon, the freedom of citizens (including the 
dissenters themselves).  
6.9 Liberal vs. Republican Nationalism: Six Major  
Distinctions 
To sum up, the republican nationalism of someone like Rousseau and Miller 
differs from the liberal nationalism of Tamir and Kymlicka in six major ways: 1) 
republican nationalists hold that political participation has both intrinsic and instrumental 
value, and they believe that participation constitutes a necessary (though not necessarily 
the highest) aspect of the good life, whereas liberal nationalists refuse to privilege 
political participation as a source of meaning or satisfaction. 2) Republican nationalists 
believe in promoting an encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens, 
including minorities, at the level of the nation-state, while liberal nationalists claim that 
nearly all modern states will inevitably be multicultural and multinational. The 
encompassing national identity that republican nationalists endorse has both intrinsic and 
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instrumental value, and it must be privileged over sectional identities. 3) In order for the 
political community to be ruled by the general will and be fully democratic, republican 
nationalists argue that there must exist a single overarching political community at the 
level of the nation-state (rather than multiple separate political communities as argues 
Kymlicka, or a separation of national self-determination from political self-rule as argues 
Tamir). In a republican political community, both the national identity and the general 
will must be expressed through politics. 4) The source of political legitimacy for 
republican nationalists comes not from the consent of each individual but from the 
general (or national) will of the political community as a whole. 5) Republican 
nationalists argue that a shared conception of the good and a substantial democratic and 
moral consensus between citizens are possible even in a pluralistic world, and they 
maintain that the political community ought to actively promote a particular conception 
of the public good. Republican nationalists begin with the assumption that political 
participation and an encompassing national identity are integral elements of the good life, 
and that they form the fundamental preconditions for establishing the community ruled 
by the general will (the decision about whether or not this is true is not left up to 
individuals).443 Moreover, the content of the public good in the republican nationalist 
community can extend beyond participation and shared national identity. The specific 
content of the public good is up for debate and revision through the process of political 
participation and deliberation, but decisions about what constitutes the public good must 
be made by all citizens collectively.  Finally, 6) the mechanism for political decision-
making in republican nationalist communities will be different from their liberal 
counterparts because the ultimate interpreters of republican rights and obligations will be 
the people themselves rather than constitutional judges or politicians. This means that 
major political decisions, such as amendments to the constitution, will have to be 
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approved in national referenda, and if there is disagreement between the different 
branches of government on a contentious issue, the ultimate decision will not be left up to 
constitutional courts but to the general will of the people. To achieve this, political 
mechanisms will need to be put in place in order to ensure that elected representatives are 
maximally accountable to their constituents, and if decisions are made by politicians or 
judges that are widely unpopular among the general public, citizens will need to have 
avenues available to them for challenging these decisions democratically, including 
demanding a national referendum on a particular issue (for example, a referendum could 
be called if the opponents of a decision collect a set amount of valid signatures from 
fellow citizens in support of the motion). 
 With these distinctions in mind, it becomes clear that liberal and republican 
nationalism represent two different strands within nationalist theory, and that they should 
be treated as such in the literature. Distinguishing between liberal and republican 
nationalism helps to clarify and further advance the current debate within nationalist 
theory, while insisting that these two very different perspectives fall under the same 
liberal nationalist umbrella muddies the debate and renders the very concept of liberal 
nationalism meaningless. In the final chapter, I argue for treating liberal and republican 
nationalism as two separate strands of cultural nationalism, and I consider the importance 
and relevance of republican nationalism as a distinct theoretical approach in the twenty-
first century.  
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Chapter 7 
7      Moving the Debate Forward 
In the final chapter, I restate my main claims and arguments, I discuss the 
contributions that I hope my work has made to the current debates in the literature, and I 
talk about the continuing relevance of nations, nationalism, and nationalist theory in the 
twenty-first century. I have argued that by taking a closer look at the works of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who is the father of modern nationalism and an important thinker of 
the republican political tradition, we can fill in some important gaps in the vast bodies of 
literature on nationalism and republicanism. Rousseau’s ultimate project was to bring 
nationalism and republican democracy together in a way that allows citizens to become 
free in the most meaningful sense by attaining self-realization, by taking part in a shared 
national identity and culture, and by playing an active role in shaping the laws that 
govern them. This is a worthy project, and one that still has its contemporary adherents, 
most notably David Miller. As Miller states, “the guiding ideal here is that of a people 
reproducing their national identity and settling matters that are collectively important to 
them through democratic deliberation.”444 This is also a project that is deeply rooted in 
history, because, as Liah Greenfeld points out, nationalism not only defines modernity 
and the modern nation-state system, but nationalism originally developed as democracy, 
in that it embodied the modern democratic ideal that the people are the true bearers of 
political sovereignty.445 Both democracy and nationalism remain important ideas in the 
modern world, and the issues they bring up are unlikely to go away. For this reason, I 
hope that through developing the concept of republican nationalism I have managed to 
shed light on some of the gaps in the literature, and that I have succeeded in contributing 
to the important contemporary debates on republicanism, nationalism, and democracy.  
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7.1 Main Claims and Arguments 
In Chapter 1 I argued that the debate within nationalist theory has moved beyond 
the civic vs. ethnic divide, and that all theorists of nationalism are cultural nationalists to 
some degree. However, I also noted that there is a great deal of diversity within cultural 
nationalism, and that even those theorists who identify as cultural nationalists have 
endorsed very different views. Most of the debate within cultural nationalism has been 
taking place between liberal nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka on the one hand, and 
non-liberal nationalists like Roger Scruton on the other (the specific parameters of “non-
liberal” nationalism have not been clearly established, but non-liberal nationalists have 
been alternatively referred to as conservative, communitarian, or simply illiberal). I have 
suggested that another strand of cultural nationalism exists, one that is neither liberal nor 
conservative: republican nationalism is rooted in the republican principles of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and it is present in the works of David Miller. Although Miller has 
referred to himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, I argued that the brand of 
nationalism that he is advocating constitutes a distinct republican strand of nationalist 
theory and a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. 
 In Chapter 2, I looked at the development of republican political theory, and I 
tried to show that there was no single theory of republicanism to speak of. Rather, 
republicanism is a theoretical framework that has given rise to a number of diverse 
perspectives, each claiming the historical legacy of classical republican thinkers such as 
Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Harrington. The main debate within contemporary 
republican theory has taken place between instrumental republicans like Philip Pettit and 
Quentin Skinner on the one hand, and civic humanists like Hannah Arendt and Iseult 
Honohan on the other. I identified a third strand of republican theory, one which takes the 
concepts of culture and national identity seriously, and one which also traces its roots 
back to Rousseau. I emphasized that this cultural republicanism is firmly grounded in the 
wider republican tradition, and that it ought to be treated as a distinct strand of republican 
political theory.  
 In Chapter 3 I took a closer look at Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism. I 
argued that Rousseau made important contributions to republican political theory with his 
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ideas about the two social contracts and the problem of inequality, as well as his notions 
about the people as sovereign, the general will, and the moral republic. Rousseau was the 
first modern thinker to connect republican theory with a fundamentally democratic 
conception of sovereignty and with participatory democracy. In Chapter 4, I considered 
whether Rousseau’s political theory could be classified as liberal, or whether his 
perspective was in fact distinctly republican. I identified two necessary preconditions for 
establishing a political community ruled by the general will: (1) citizens who embrace 
freedom as self-mastery and are capable of rediscovering a sense of amour de soi while 
using natural compassion (directed toward the national community) to channel their 
amour-propre in more constructive ways, and (2) citizens who have a shared national 
identity and a strong love of country, which engender fraternity and solidarity. I argued 
that the importance of these preconditions for Rousseau could not be downplayed without 
losing the essence of his philosophy, and as these two preconditions appear unacceptable 
to most liberals, I concluded that Rousseau is not a liberal but a distinctly republican 
thinker―a cultural republican. I also argued that Rousseau is the founder of modern 
nationalism, and that the intrinsic connection that he makes between republicanism and 
nationalism points towards a distinct strand of nationalist theory that I call republican 
nationalism. 
 Chapter 5 delved deeper into the concept of republican nationalism through a 
comparison of Rousseau’s writings to the theories of contemporary republican thinker 
David Miller. While there are notable differences between them, Rousseau and Miller 
embark on very similar projects; in fact, I tried to show that Miller accepts the 
fundamental aspects of Rousseau’s republicanism, and that his theory amounts to a 
sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s philosophy. In Chapter 6, I juxtaposed the 
liberal nationalism of Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka to republican nationalism, and I 
argued that the two approaches are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate classifications 
within nationalist theory. I identified six major ways in which liberal nationalism differs 
from republican nationalism, including: 1) Liberal nationalists refuse to privilege political 
participation as a source of meaning or satisfaction; republican nationalists hold that 
political participation constitutes a necessary aspect of the good life. 2) Liberal 
nationalists claim that modern nation-states will inevitably be multicultural and 
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multinational; republican nationalists endorse an encompassing national identity that is 
shared by all citizens, including minorities, at the level of the nation-state. 3) The liberal 
nationalism of Kymlicka holds that multiple separate political communities will exist 
within a single nation state, while the liberal nationalism of Tamir calls for a separation 
of national self-determination from political self-rule; republican nationalists argue that if 
the political community is to be fully democratic (i.e. ruled by the general will), there 
must exist a single overarching political community at the level of the nation-state (both 
the national identity and the general will must be expressed through politics at the highest 
level). 4) The source of political legitimacy for liberal nationalists lies in the consent of 
each individual; for republican nationalists, the source of political legitimacy comes from 
the general (or national) will of the community as a whole. 5) Liberal nationalists believe 
that decisions about substantive conceptions of the good (especially beyond the ideal of 
autonomy) should be left up to individuals; republican nationalists begin with the 
assumption that political participation and an encompassing national identity are integral 
aspects of the good life, and that they form the fundamental preconditions for establishing 
the community ruled by the general will (the decision about whether or not this is true is 
not left up to individuals). Moreover, the content of the public good in the republican 
nationalist community can extend beyond participation and shared national identity; the 
specific content of the public good is up for debate and revision through the process of 
political participation and deliberation, but decisions about what constitutes the public 
good must be made by all citizens collectively. 6) Lastly, liberal nationalists hold that the 
judiciary is the supreme arbiter of constitutional rights; republican nationalists give this 
role to the citizen body as a whole. As such, the mechanism for political decision-making 
in a republican nationalist community will be distinct from its liberal counterpart: major 
political decisions, such as amendments to the constitution, will have to be approved in 
national referenda, and if there is disagreement between the different branches of 
government on a contentious issue, the ultimate decision will not be left up to 
constitutional courts but to the people as a whole. 
 When laid out in this way, one would be hard-pressed to maintain that the strand 
of thought which I refer to as republican nationalism can be subsumed under the liberal 
nationalist umbrella; the two appear very different, and they are clearly at odds with one 
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another regarding some of their most fundamental principles. Even though Miller has 
described himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, it seems incoherent to argue that 
liberal nationalists can simultaneously hold that political participation has no intrinsic 
value and yet has both intrinsic and instrumental value, that modern nation-states should 
be multinational and yet have a single encompassing national identity, that they can be 
made up of multiple separate political communities and yet constitute a single 
overarching political community, that political legitimacy comes from the consent of 
each individual and yet from the general will, that decisions about substantive 
conceptions of the good (including the view that political participation and an 
encompassing national identity hold intrinsic value) must be left up to individuals and yet 
are presupposed and actively promoted by the state, and that both the judiciary and the 
citizen body as a whole can be the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights. It is therefore 
clear that liberal and republican nationalism represent two distinct strands within 
nationalist theory, and that they should be treated as such in the literature. Insisting that 
these two perspectives fall under the same liberal nationalist umbrella muddies the debate 
and renders the very concept of liberal nationalism meaningless, while clearly 
distinguishing between liberal and republican nationalism helps to clarify and further 
advance the current debate in nationalist theory.   
7.2 Contributions to the Literature 
There are three significant gaps in the literature that I tried to address with this 
project. The first gap was in the literature on republican political theory; the two major 
strands of republicanism represented in the literature are instrumental republicanism and 
strong republicanism. Instrumental republicans like Pettit and Skinner see citizenship as a 
means of preserving individual freedom and not a relationship or activity with intrinsic 
value, while strong republicans like Hannah Arendt and Iseult Honohan stress the 
intrinsic value of participating in self-government and realizing common goods as 
citizens. Nevertheless, the main debate within contemporary republican theory has been 
taking place between instrumental republicans and those strong republicans like Honohan 
who are most often classified as civic humanists. Civic humanists accept the intrinsic 
value of participation, but they also actively dismiss what they consider to be “more 
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communitarian” versions of strong republicanism which hold that politics will inevitably 
involve extra-political elements. I argued that along with instrumental republicanism and 
civic humanism there exists a third strand of republican theory; cultural republicanism. 
Along with civic humanists, cultural republicans recognize the intrinsic value of 
participation, but unlike both instrumental republicans and civic humanists, cultural 
republicans stress the fundamental importance of a shared national identity and culture, 
including the extra-political elements that go along with them. I tried to show that 
although cultural republicanism differs from both instrumental republicanism and civic 
humanism, it remains an integral part of the wider republican tradition.  
 Grounded in the 18th century writings of Rousseau and clearly present in Miller’s 
contemporary work, cultural republicanism holds that the virtues required by republican 
citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nation, and a common national 
identity and public culture are essential for producing the kind of solidarity that is needed 
for a system of republican democracy to take shape.446 This common public culture 
should not be so all-embracing that it destroys private subcultures, but it should have 
substantial content and meaning for members of the national community.447 Cultural 
republicanism is the least prominently represented strand within republican theory; most 
contemporary contributors to the debate on republicanism (including republicans like 
Pettit and Honohan, but also liberal critics of republicanism such as Robert E. Goodin 
and Alan Patten) tend to vaguely refer to this third strand of republicanism as a “more 
communitarian” perspective that is rooted in “pre-political” culture. I tried to draw out 
cultural republicanism as a distinct strand of republican theory with a clear set of 
principles and a firm grounding in the wider republican tradition. Whereas the vast 
majority of contemporary republican literature neglects the importance of culture and 
nationality for politics, cultural republicanism sees them as inseparable elements of the 
political process. 
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 The second gap in the literature is related to the first, and it shares the same 
historical foundation in the works of Rousseau. I argued that there exists a gap in 
contemporary literature on nationalism because while the debate within nationalist theory 
has largely moved beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide and there is now a general 
understanding among nationalist thinkers that all nationalisms are to some extent cultural 
nationalisms, more work needs to be done to delineate the distinct strands of thought 
operating within the framework of cultural nationalism. The most prominent strand of 
cultural nationalism is liberal nationalism, advocated by such thinkers as Yael Tamir and 
Will Kymlicka, and much of the literature has revolved around liberal nationalists 
defending the position that liberalism and nationalism are compatible against those 
liberals like Bhikhu Parekh and Judith Lichtenberg who are more skeptical about 
nationalism. Meanwhile, alternative approaches to cultural nationalism have been broadly 
described as illiberal, communitarian, or conservative; associated with such thinkers as 
Roger Scruton, they have met with little to no sympathy from liberals and liberal 
nationalists.  With this in mind, it is no surprise that David Miller has identified as a 
liberal nationalist in the past; for a nationalist thinker, claiming to be anything other than 
a liberal nationalist is sure to be met with suspicion, or to be dismissed outright as a form 
of rightwing/conservative/communitarian extremism. I challenged this assumption by 
suggesting that Miller’s work points towards a distinct republican strand of nationalist 
theory, one that is rooted in the works of Rousseau. In order to prove my assertion, I 
sought to show the stark differences between the liberal nationalism of Tamir and 
Kymlicka on the one hand, and Miller’s republican nationalism on the other. My goal 
was to demonstrate that republican nationalism forms a distinct theoretical strand of 
nationalist theory and constitutes a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. In so 
doing, I sought to move the discussion within nationalist theory forward by arguing that 
there is still an important debate to be had between liberal and republican nationalism, 
but the first step must be to classify them as two distinct perspectives. 
 Whereas much of the literature on republicanism neglects the significance of the 
extra-political aspects of culture and nationality for politics, republican nationalism 
combines cultural republicanism and political nationalism; it recognizes the inherent 
connection between culture and politics, including the importance of an encompassing 
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national identity and culture. And while liberal nationalism recognizes the importance of 
national belonging but holds that modern states can be multinational or even transnational 
entities, republican nationalism holds that all members of the nation must share a 
common identity and culture and be active participants in the democratic process so that 
the general will, the source of political legitimacy, can be expressed at the highest level 
(the level of the nation-state). In her account of the relationship between republicanism 
and nationalism that is drawn from the current literature, Catherine Frost states the 
following: 
The difference between republicanism and nationalism, therefore, is that 
nationalism reveals that an important link runs between the political and cultural 
(or pre-political) life of a population, a link that plays a fundamental role in the 
conditions for representation in both areas. The question is whether patriotism or 
republicanism can assume the role that nationalism once played in terms of 
particularist political  attachments without also coming to terms with the 
connection between the political and cultural aspects of membership. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that this dynamic will persist regardless, but neither a 
patriotic nor a republican approach seems prepared to respond to it, preferring to 
sideline the issue while addressing more classically political matters.448 
This is precisely the challenge that republican nationalism answers: republican 
nationalism recognizes the connection between culture and politics, including the extra-
political aspects of culture, while stressing the importance of republican citizenship and 
participatory democracy. As such, republican nationalism comes to terms with the 
connection between the political and cultural aspects of membership and fills an 
important gap in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism.  
 The third significant contribution that this project makes is that it offers a fuller 
account of Rousseau’s freedom as self-mastery or FSM. In Chapter 2 I outlined the 
various competing conceptions of freedom that have been represented in the literature on 
republicanism, including freedom as non-interference, freedom as non-domination, and 
freedom as political autonomy (see table in Chapter 2). However, the idea of FSM has 
been largely unexplored in contemporary debates on republican theory, mostly because 
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modern republicans tend to dismiss FSM as a “more communitarian” and therefore 
unattractive conception of freedom.449 Rousseau’s understanding of FSM is not directly 
related to communitarianism; instead, it is a fundamentally republican and democratic 
conception of freedom that I have tried to explain more fully. I argued that Rousseau’s 
FSM presupposes three interconnected layers: (1) individual self-mastery, where the 
agent is the individual and the goal is to overcome mere appetites and narrow self-interest 
in order to achieve one’s full potential as a man and citizen, (2) political self-rule, where 
the agent is the citizen body and the goal is for all citizens to actively shape the laws that 
govern them through a system of participatory democracy, and (3) national self-
determination, where the agent is the nation-state and the goal is to preserve and promote 
the sovereignty of the state within an international system of rival powers. All three 
aforementioned layers of freedom hold intrinsic value because self-realization and 
freedom in the fullest sense depend on them.450 As Miller notes, referring to the intrinsic 
value of national self-determination and its connection to increasing the freedom of 
citizens, “self-determination for groups is valuable in much the same way as self-
determination for individuals” because “the group as a whole can achieve much more 
than I as an individual can achieve, so by belonging I have a smaller say over a bigger 
range of issues than I have as a private person.”451 This three-fold understanding of 
freedom clearly distinguishes republican nationalism from alternative approaches, 
including liberal nationalism (endorses self-determination and a less direct form of 
political self-rule but not individual self-mastery) and all forms of authoritarian 
nationalism (endorses national self-determination but not necessarily political self-rule or 
individual self-mastery).  
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 I feel that the concept of republican nationalism which I have developed 
throughout this project effectively addresses gaps in the literature regarding the 
connection between culture/nationality and politics in republican theory, the connection 
between republican citizenship/participatory democracy and nationalism in nationalist 
theory, and the general confusion about the full meaning of FSM. Much of this project 
has relied on the writings of Rousseau, and this is because his work provides the common 
thread between republicanism and nationalism. Rousseau was a major thinker of the 
republican tradition and the father of modern nationalism, and he was also one of the few 
modern thinkers to take the “ancient” conception of freedom as self-mastery seriously. 
As such, I have argued that a closer study of Rousseau’s contributions to political 
philosophy can provide valuable insights for theorizing about such important concepts as 
republicanism, nationalism, democracy, and freedom, and I hope that this project can 
serve as a step in that direction.  Moreover, I believe that the concept of republican 
nationalism as an alternative to liberal nationalism constitutes a fruitful avenue for future 
research in nationalist theory, and in the following section I consider some of the 
important questions that defenders of republican nationalism will have to grapple with in 
the future. 
7.3 Questions for the Future 
This project sought to develop republican nationalism as a distinct theoretical 
framework by arguing that it constitutes a separate strand of nationalist theory and one 
that is clearly different from liberal nationalism, that has a firm grounding in the 
republican political tradition (especially in Rousseau), and that maintains a contemporary 
relevance in the works of David Miller. I argued that republican nationalism addresses 
major gaps in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism, and I tried 
to show that there is merit in paying more attention to this approach in the future. 
Nevertheless, there is much work to be done for republican nationalism to go from a mere 
theoretical framework to the kind of serious approach to politics that liberal nationalism 
has become. There are many important questions to address about the implications of 
republican nationalism in the real world, questions whose scope extends beyond this 
project. Nevertheless, in this section I will explore three important issues that republican 
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nationalism raises and that need to be given more consideration in the future. In 
particular, I will consider whether republican nationalism upholds a sufficient degree of 
respect for individuals and for minorities, and what the actual practical policies that a 
republican nationalist might endorse would look like. 
 Regarding the question of upholding a sufficient degree of respect for individuals, 
critics of republican nationalism may claim that because political participation and a 
shared national identity are assumed to hold both intrinsic and instrumental value (and 
are thus seen as essential elements of the good life), and because decisions about what 
constitutes the public good must be made collectively through the process of deliberation 
rather than individually by each citizen for himself, republican nationalism fails to accord 
appropriate respect to each individual. On the republican nationalist view, there exists a 
substantive conception of the good that reflects the general will of the political 
community. This conception will include assigning intrinsic value to political 
participation and a shared national identity, but it may include other aspects as well. As 
such, republican nationalists argue that the public understanding of the good cannot be 
revised by individual citizens at their own discretion; instead, all citizens must come 
together and revise the public conception of the good collectively through participation 
and deliberation. This is because the citizens of a political community ruled by the 
general will must form a single sovereign body (Rousseau’s moi commun), and decisions 
about what constitutes the good must be made by the whole body through the mechanism 
of democratic politics. Individual citizens may disagree with certain aspects of what is 
considered to be the public good, but in order to revise the public conception of the good 
they will have to make their case through the deliberative process and convince their 
fellow citizens using the force of the better argument. If they fail to do so, they will be 
free to maintain their personal dissent, but they will also be obliged to accept that the 
state has the right to actively promote this particular conception of the good until such 
time as it is revised. Dissenters would be expected to respect the decision of the 
community so long as it was made fairly by their fellow citizens through the process of 
democratic deliberation, and so long as they continue to have public avenues for voicing 
their own views. 
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 Liberal critics might argue that the republican nationalist perspective restricts the 
freedom of individuals by not allowing each citizen to form his own personal conception 
of the good without interference from the state. This is an important criticism, and one 
that calls for serious consideration. In broad terms, a republican nationalist would 
respond by arguing that all laws are grounded in politics and public discussion, and that if 
the political community arrives at a democratic decision about the need to actively 
promote a particular conception of the public good, then the state can legitimately 
promote it. Republican nationalists would also argue that the political community can do 
more good for its citizens by adopting a shared conception of the public good and by 
actively promoting it than by leaving all decisions about the good up to individuals 
(especially when this means that many citizens may ultimately decide to lead lives which 
are devoid of meaning and purpose). Lastly, republican nationalists would challenge the 
claim that their perspective restricts the freedom of individuals by obliging all citizens to 
participate in politics, rather than leaving the decision up to each individual citizen. A 
republican nationalist would argue that political participation is an integral component of 
the public good because a) it allows individuals to realize themselves fully as citizens and 
be free in the most-meaningful sense (self-realization), and b) it ensures that citizens are 
more engaged in the political process, which in turn ensures the preservation of 
meaningful democracy in the face of such fundamental threats as the growing influence 
of money in politics. Republican nationalists contend that a community in which citizens 
are not actively engaged in politics will inevitably be less free because it will constrain 
each citizen’s opportunities for self-realization, and because it will be dominated by 
special interests that take advantage of the lack of citizen participation and vigilance in 
order to gain undue influence in politics.  
 A community in which the citizens are not obliged to actively participate and 
maintain constant vigilance over the political process will not be fully democratic; 
citizens in these communities may have a wide variety of choices about where to shop or 
which television programs to watch, but this is not freedom in the fullest sense (it is not 
moral freedom, as Rousseau would put it). Freedom in the most meaningful sense is not 
about the quantity of choices but about their quality; to be free, citizens must realize 
themselves in the fullest sense by becoming active members of a democratic community 
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and by taking a direct part in shaping the very laws that govern them, not merely in 
shaping their shopping practices or television viewing habits. This is what Rousseau 
meant when he made the much-debated claim that citizens must be “forced to be free”: 
by obliging citizens to participate in politics, we are ensuring that more options for self-
realization are available to them, and that special interests do not take advantage of 
political apathy and a lack of vigilance on the part of the citizenry in order to gain undue 
influence at the expense of meaningful democracy. By actively promoting political 
participation as a necessary element of the good life even though some citizens might 
disagree, we are ensuring that the republican community remains meaningfully free and 
democratic, and we are therefore preserving, not infringing upon, the freedom of all 
citizens (including the dissenters themselves). Nevertheless, this is only a brief sketch of 
a debate that has been raging for centuries, and one that has major implications for 
democratic theory and for our understanding of what it means to be free. A 
comprehensive account of the liberal criticisms of the republican nationalist 
understanding of freedom and the public good, and the potential republican responses to 
those criticisms, would require entire volumes of their own. My goal has been to bring 
this debate to the forefront and identify the major points of contention between the two 
sides, in the hopes that more work will be done on the subject in the future. 
 Another important question about republican nationalism is whether it accords a 
sufficient degree of respect for minorities. Kymlicka and other liberal nationalists take 
the issues of inclusiveness and accommodation of minority groups very seriously, and 
their goal is to develop a version of nationalism that is inclusive of racial, social, cultural, 
and national minorities. Chapter 6 includes a detailed account of the liberal nationalist 
approach to minority rights and how it compares to the republican nationalist approach 
expressed by Miller. Kymlicka distinguishes between minority groups such as social 
movements or immigrant groups, and national minorities; he believes that national 
minorities form separate political communities within the state and deserve special rights 
of representation. Kymlicka warns that imposing common citizenship and an 
encompassing national identity on minorities which see themselves as distinct peoples 
may actually increase conflict in a multinational state, but Miller argues that we can 
deliberately modify the national consciousness and promote a single encompassing 
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national identity in order to remove a minority’s desire to form a distinct national society 
within an existing nation. Republican nationalists accept Miller’s view, and while 
acknowledging that secession may be inevitable in cases where rival nations have no 
hope of ever developing a common national identity, they hold that what Kymlicka refers 
to as national minorities (ethnocultural groups with a particular homeland that form a 
separate political community within the state) should instead be referred to as territorial 
minorities (ethnocultural groups that inhabit a clearly defined territory within the larger 
state, but remain part of a shared national political community). Republican nationalists 
would argue that groups like the Bretons and Occitans in France are better classified as 
territorial rather than national minorities; they are groups with distinct ethnocultural 
characteristics and clearly defined territorial homelands that are nevertheless still part of a 
single French national community. Miller argues that such minority groups by and large 
want to be part of the national community rather than separate from it, and he makes a 
strong case for why his republican approach is better able to accommodate the claims of 
minority groups than liberal and libertarian conceptions of citizenship.452 Miller’s 
republican approach rests on the idea that meaningful democratic politics depends on a 
sense of common nationality that is threatened whenever special rights are granted for 
groups over and above what equal treatment requires, and this includes minorities.453 In 
Chapter 6 I argued in defense of Miller’s view, and I noted that even in a country like 
Canada, which is far from the ideal republican nation-state due to its vast size and 
colonial history, practical government policies seem to be geared towards promoting an 
encompassing Canadian national identity rather than a dual Canadian-Quebecois identity 
or a multinational identity.  
 The final minority-related issue that I will address is the concept of the “tyranny 
of the majority” and potential claims that republican nationalism is vulnerable to this type 
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of problem. It is true that republican nationalism includes obligations which liberalism 
does not, including the obligation to participate in the political process and in a shared 
national culture. These obligations are more demanding than those endorsed by liberal 
nationalism, and in order to guarantee meaningful political participation in the first place, 
republican nationalists must establish rights of citizenship that will ensure that all citizens 
are able to participate in both the political process and the shared national culture. These 
rights will share commonalities with liberal rights (free speech and expression, freedom 
of conscience, voting and running for office, security of the person), and they may also 
go beyond liberal rights by endorsing firm limits on economic inequality in order to 
ensure that every citizen thinks only his own thoughts, and that no citizen is wealthy 
enough to buy another or so poor as to have to sell himself.454 This is because the general 
will includes the will of every citizen, not simply the will of the majority or any other 
faction, and so all citizens, including those who may be in the minority on a given issue, 
will enjoy the same rights (and obligations) of citizenship and the protections and 
assurances that go along with them. Nevertheless, the questions that are being raised here, 
including the issue of what type of minority group accommodation is appropriate within 
modern nation-states and the question of how to ensure that all voices are being heard in 
public discussion, are far from resolved. This debate will continue, and my hope is that 
the framework of republican nationalism will offer a fresh perspective on these important 
questions; a perspective which, when pitted against the liberal nationalist approach, can 
provide new solutions that move the debate forward. 
 Some critics of nationalism in general and republican nationalism in particular 
may claim that nationalist projects such as these will inevitably become hostile to 
outsiders and seek to assert their superiority over rival nations. However, throughout this 
dissertation I have made it a point to emphasize that the type of nationalism that 
republican nationalists endorse, and the type of nationalism that Rousseau himself 
endorsed, is defensive in character and limited in scope. Republican nationalism rejects 
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all forms of military expansionism and imperialism because the larger the state becomes, 
the less democratic it becomes, and the less free its citizens will be. Furthermore, in 
recognizing the intrinsic value of culture and nationality, republican nationalists must 
agree to respect the value of all national cultures along with their own. Just as Rousseau 
states that he who wants to be free must not want to be a conqueror, so too Miller argues 
that: 
In advancing the claims of our own national community to security and self-
determination, we also recognize that other communities may make equally 
legitimate claims on their own behalf. The overall aim is a world in which 
different peoples can pursue their own national projects in a spirit of friendly 
rivalry, but in which none attempts to control, exploit, or undermine any of the 
others. Besides the barriers this erects to overt or covert imperialism, it also 
creates a general obligation to ensure that nation-states have adequate resources to 
remain economically viable.455 
 The last issue that I will address in this section is the question of what kind of 
practical policies republican nationalists might endorse, and how these may differ from 
policies preferred by liberal nationalists. The first obvious difference will revolve around 
political participation; for liberal nationalists participation is encouraged but not 
mandatory, whereas for republican nationalists taking an active part in both the informal 
and formal aspects of public life are a necessary element of the good life. What’s more, 
because republican nationalists believe that citizens cannot be fully free unless they take 
an active part in shaping the laws that govern them, a republican nationalist must endorse 
laws that make political participation mandatory. The question then becomes what these 
laws will look like, and how they will be enforced. In countries like Australia, Greece, 
Belgium, and a number of Latin American nations, participating in elections is 
compulsory; all citizens are obliged to vote, and those who fail to do so without an 
acceptable justification are most often fined, although in some countries multiple 
violations can result in losing the right to vote for a number of years or having public 
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services such as passports and other documents revoked.456  A republican nationalist 
would certainly endorse some of these measures, but which measures should be 
implemented and how severe the punishment should be for failing to participate is up for 
debate. I think that the fees for not participating would have to be substantial enough that 
they couldn’t be ignored, especially for repeat offenders, and they would likely have to be 
determined based on income (like speeding tickets in Finland) in order to ensure that 
those with money to spare cannot simply buy their way out of democracy. I am also 
inclined to endorse denying select public services, such as the ability to renew a passport, 
to those who willingly and repeatedly refuse to participate, but republican nationalists 
will likely hold different views on what types of measures should be taken to ensure 
participation. Moreover, since political participation for republican nationalists involves 
more than simply voting in elections, other civic responsibilities, such as attending public 
events or taking part in various forms of civil service, may need to become mandatory as 
well (similar to the way that jury duty is mandatory in the United States). But this again 
raises questions about which activities should be mandatory, and how compliance will be 
enforced. Other than noting that all policies should be designed to promote efficient 
political participation without placing undue or unequal burdens on individual citizens, I 
cannot yet offer definitive answers to the many questions that come with these 
propositions. More research is needed, including empirical research that aims to 
determine which public policies would be the most effective in achieving the desired 
results, and I intend to pursue this type of research in the future. 
 The fact that republican nationalism sees participation and a shared national 
identity as necessary elements of the good life means that steps will have to be taken 
beyond the political system in order to effectively promote these goods. This means 
developing a national system of education that seeks to teach citizens from a very young 
age about the intrinsic value of these goods, and it also means providing incentives for 
both public and private institutions to promote these goods within the informal spheres of 
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public life. Moreover, the republican nationalist emphasis on participation and 
deliberation requires its proponents to develop political mechanisms that are more 
participatory than those of modern liberal democracies. This is not a simple proposition, 
and there are large bodies of literature on radical and deliberative democracy that deal 
with this very question.457 The specific policies will be up for discussion, but the rapid 
advances in information technology in recent decades have made the idea of active large-
scale political participation in modern nation-states more feasible. Republican nationalists 
will want to explore these new options for participation and deliberation, but they will 
also want to promote existing mechanisms of direct democracy, such as referenda. On the 
republican nationalist view, the people as a whole must have the final say on major 
political decisions (rather than leaving these decisions up to judges or even elected 
representatives), and the referendum will be the ultimate mechanism of political decision-
making in the republican nationalist community. This is a clear difference from 
contemporary liberal constitutionalism: major political decisions, such as amendments to 
the constitution, will have to be approved in national referenda, and if there is 
disagreement between the different branches of government on a contentious issue, the 
ultimate decision will not be left up to constitutional courts but to the people as a whole. 
As such, avenues will have to be available to citizens in order to challenge democratically 
those political decisions that a significant number of them disagrees with, and this would 
include the ability to demand a national referendum on the issue (referenda would be 
called if those opposing a decision are able to collect a significant amount of valid 
signatures from fellow citizens in support of the motion). 
 Republican nationalists will also endorse more restrictions on the disparity 
between the rich and poor, they will support eliminating the influence of money in 
politics by imposing controls on campaign financing and by minimizing the impact of all 
forms of special interest lobbying, and they will demand more accountability and 
transparency from politicians. Again, the policies that are implemented to promote these 
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goals will be up for debate and discussion; some may feel that stricter laws on campaign 
financing will have the desired effect, and this view is compatible with the views of many 
liberals, while others may go as far as Rousseau and argue that all political factions 
should be eliminated completely, so that every citizen can think only his own thoughts 
and so that every elected official will be accountable directly to his constituents instead of 
the leadership of a political party. These and other questions will have to be answered 
before republican nationalism can become the kind of serious theoretical approach that 
liberal nationalism has become, and while some important work has been done on the 
subject  by Miller and other deliberative democrats, more empirical research and practical 
analysis is needed. After all, many contemporary states see themselves as liberal 
democracies, but no contemporary state identifies as a “republican democracy” or claims 
to be committed to the principles of republican nationalism. As such, the ultimate goal of 
this project has been to begin the conversation on republican nationalism and its 
distinctness from liberal nationalism rather than resolve it altogether. 
7.4 Contemporary Relevance: Nationalism in the Twenty-
first Century 
Nationalism has been a powerful political force throughout the twentieth century, 
and it has not lost much of its vigor. Despite the expanding phenomenon of globalization, 
which promises to open up borders and tear down the boundaries between peoples, 
nationalism remains a potent factor in world politics. Between separatists struggles in 
places like Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine and national rivalries which have the potential 
to escalate into serious conflicts (the tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku 
islands, or the sectarian and geo-political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia), no 
student of politics can afford to ignore the practical implications of nationalism. As long 
as nationalism remains a critical aspect of world affairs, it is necessary to give the 
academic study of nationalism, its theory and practice, the attention it deserves. The 
question of why nationalism still remains such a significant idea in a globalized world is 
a complex one, but Neil MacCormick offers a compelling answer. As MacCormick 
observes, 
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It is only through our membership of significant groupings that we can transcend 
the constraints of place and time… A “nation” (but not only a nation) can provide 
a conceptual framework that allows us to comprehend our own existence as 
belonging within a continuity in time and a community in space…. Consciousness 
of belonging to a nation is one of the things that enable us as individuals in some 
way in this earthly existence to transcend the limitations of space, time, and 
mortality, and to participate in that which had meaning before us and will 
continue to have meaning beyond us.458 
The concept of nationalism may be so potent precisely because it speaks to an inherent 
human desire to transcend mortality and participate in something that is bigger than 
ourselves. While other groupings such as the family can have a similar significance, 
national identity remains essential for the self-understanding of a great many people in 
the modern world. As Nielsen explains, 
National identity is indeed a very important identity, an identity essential for very 
many people to give meaning to their lives, vital for their secure sense of self-
respect, essential for their sense of belonging and security: all things of 
fundamental value to human beings. They are things that would be a central part 
of a good life for people in any society. Still, however important, national identity 
does not exhaust their identity and should not be their deepest loyalty.459 
  Many people believe that national identities are constitutive of the self; they feel 
that national belonging holds both intrinsic and instrumental value. As such, they would 
want to preserve their unique national identity even if all the instrumental benefits that 
come with national belonging could be secured independently.460 National belonging may 
not be the highest human good nor is it the only form of collective belonging that has 
intrinsic value (belonging to one’s family, neighborhood, and church community is also 
valuable), but national belonging is one of the important human goods that holds intrinsic 
value for many individuals around the world.461 As Miller points out: 
                                                 
 
458
 MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” 193. 
 
459
 Nielsen, “Cultural Nationalism, 120-121.  
 
460
 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 37-38.  
 
461
 Ibid, 39.  
209 
 
A national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are, 
where we have come from, what we have done. It must then involve an essentially 
historical understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a 
tradition which they then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is 
continually being rewritten; each generation revises the past as it comes to terms 
with the problem of the present. None the less, there is a sense in which the past 
always constrains the present: present identities are  built out of the materials that 
are handed down, not started from scratch.462 
National belonging is also a unique form of belonging because in a world where political 
decision-making still predominantly takes place in a system of sovereign nation-states, it 
is only through the vehicle of the nation-state that people can fully realize and preserve 
their freedom, and have their voices heard and their interests represented in a world full 
of rival states and conflicting interests. In a globalized and interdependent world, it is no 
longer possible to protect one’s interests and escape the problems of the wider world by 
relying solely on one’s family, village, or even city. National identity is the main focus of 
collective loyalty in modern nation-states because it makes individual, political, and 
national self-determination possible: “it provides the wherewithal for a common culture 
against whose background people can make more individual decisions about how to lead 
their lives; it provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued, 
particularly ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a 
‘common asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding 
and trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.”463 
 Despite claims to the contrary, nationalism does not represent a return to pre-
modern, primitive tribalism. Modern nationalism is often philosophically sophisticated, 
rational, and inclusive of immigrants, as long as they consent to participating in a 
common national culture, which includes learning the language, history, customs, and 
laws of the nation in question. As such, nationalism represents a complex and 
quintessentially modern concept that will remain a potent force in world politics for the 
foreseeable future. Because nationalism remains so important in the modern world, the 
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study of nationalist theory represents a crucial challenge for contemporary political 
philosophers. The debate surrounding nationalism has moved beyond the civic vs. ethnic 
divide as theorists of nationalism come to appreciate the essential component that culture 
plays in the life of a nation. Nonetheless, the debate within nationalist theory is far from 
over, as there are major differences between even those theorists who accept the 
theoretical framework of cultural nationalism. I have suggested that within the framework 
of cultural nationalism exists a clear distinction between liberal nationalism, which is 
established and prominent in the literature, and republican nationalism, which is still 
being developed but finds clear expression in the works of Rousseau and David Miller. 
As such, I argued that treating republican nationalism as a defensible alternative to liberal 
nationalism represents a fruitful new avenue of research within nationalist theory. 
 I end by reiterating the continuing relevance of nationalism in the modern world, 
and by stressing that although many are quick to point out the potential “downsides” of 
nationalism, it is important to also remember the very real “upsides” of national 
belonging in the twenty-first century. In the words of David Cannadine, responding to 
those who claim that nations are losing their significance in the face of globalization and 
supranational organizations such as the EU: 
The majority of people in Europe still live their lives in the context of the national 
community, and continue to view their past and future in that political framework. 
Nations may indeed be inventions. But like the wheel, or the internal combustion 
engine, they are endowed, once invented, with a real, palpable existence which is 
not just to be found in the subjective perceptions of their citizens, but is embodied 
in laws, languages, customs, institutions―and history.464 
Nations may be imagined communities, but they hold real meaning for their members and 
they wield real power on the world stage; predictions about their downfall and the 
impending end of nationalism as a major force in global politics have been wrong over 
and over again. Nations remain the most important actors on the world stage, and they 
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will continue to be for the foreseeable future. As such, the study of nations and of 
nationalism must be taken seriously by the scholars of the twenty-first century. 
 Miller makes a powerful point when he suggests that critics of nationalism may 
want to think twice before supporting the erosion of national identities in the name of 
wider regional or even global identities. Miller observes that the modern welfare state and 
programs and institutions that protect minority rights have always been national projects, 
grounded in the belief that members of a national community owe certain goods to their 
fellow citizens that they could not possibly extend to all of humanity. If national 
identities disappear, what replaces them may not be a more inclusive and compassionate 
worldview, but rather a worldview that stresses the primary importance of economic 
profits and market efficiency. As citizens lose a sense of shared national identity and 
allegiance to their particular community, they become less likely to participate in 
common projects and pursue common goods, which would make it easier for political 
and economic elites to gain undue influence over politics and eliminate the types of 
welfare programs and economic and cultural subsidies that are seen as restricting the 
efficiency of global markets.465 As Miller warns, 
If national identities are indeed being eroded, what is likely to take their place is 
not rich cultural pluralism for everyone, but the world market as the distributor of 
cultural resources. And this will be bad news for the non-elite, on two counts. 
First, they will no longer have ready access to a rich common culture of the kind 
that is still available in most European and other Western states through publicly 
funded television stations, museums, and art galleries, educational programmes, 
and the like. Second, their economic position will increasingly be determined by 
the workings of the global market, as national solidarity declines and people are 
no longer willing to allow redistributive policies to interfere with economic 
competitiveness.466  
For this reason, academics of the twenty-first century should be careful about relegating 
nations and nationalism to the dustbin of history, as Marxists and radical cosmopolitans 
have done in the past. Nations remain the primary actors on the world stage, and 
                                                 
 
465
 Miller, On Nationality, 187.  
 
466
 Ibid.  
212 
 
nationalism continues to be a powerful force that merits our time and consideration. And 
perhaps that’s a good thing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
Bibliography 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Revised Edition). London & New York: Verso, 2006. 
 
Beiner, Ronald. “Introduction.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner, 1-
26. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Bloom, Allan. “Rousseau’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism.” In The Legacy of 
Rousseau, edited by Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 144-168. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
March 5, 2012, accessed November 4, 2015. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
 
Cannadine, David. “Penguin Island Story: Planning a New History of Britain.” Times 
Literary Supplement, no. 4693. March 12, 1993. 
 
Cohen, Joshua. A Free Community of Equals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Cohen, Joshua and Archon Fung. “Radical Democracy.” Swiss Journal of Political 
Science 10(4) (2004): 23-34. 
 
Cohler, Anne M. Rousseau and Nationalism. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. 
 
“Compulsory Voting Around the World.” The Guardian, July 4, 2005, accessed January 
5, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/04/voterapathy.uk. 
 
“CRTC Approaches to Cultural Diversity.” CRTC Website, accessed October 20, 2015. 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/info_sht/b308.htm.   
 
Dent, Nicholas. Rousseau. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Doyle, William. The French Revolution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Dunn, John. “Nationalism.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner, 27-50. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. “Foundations of Liberal Equality.” In Equal Freedom (Selected 
Tanner Lectures in Human Values), edited by Stephen Darwall, 190-306. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
 
Frost, Catherine, Morality and Nationalism. London: Routledge, 2006. 
 
214 
 
Furet, François. “Rousseau and the French Revolution.” In The Legacy of Rousseau, 
edited by Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 169-183. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Gardbaum, Stephen A. “Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals after All.” 
Harvard Law Review 104(6) (1991): 1350-1371. 
 
Goodin, Robert E. “Folie Républicaine.” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 
55-76.  
 
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Honohan, Iseult. Civic Republicanism. London: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael. Blood and Belonging. London: BBC Books, 1993. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. “Misunderstanding Nationalism.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by 
Ronald Beiner, 131-140. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Lichtenberg, Judith. “How Liberal can Nationalism be?” In Theorizing Nationalism, 
edited by Ronald Beiner, 167-188. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1999. 
 
Lovett, Frank and Philip Pettit. “Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional 
Research Program.” Annual Review of Political Science, 12 (2009): 11-29. 
 
MacCallum, Gerard C. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” The Philosophical Review 
76(3) (1967): 312-334. 
 
MacCormick, Neil. “Nation and Nationalism.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by 
Ronald Beiner, 189-204. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Maloy, J.S. “The Very Order of Things: Rousseau’s Tutorial Republicanism.” Polity 
37(2) (2005): 235-261. 
 
“Mandate of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission.” 
CRTC Website, accessed October 20, 2015. 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/cancon/mandate.htm. 
 
215 
 
Miller, Dale E. J.S. Mill: Moral, Social, and Political Thought. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010. 
 
Miller, David. Citizenship and National Identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 
2000. 
 
Miller, David. National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
 
Miller, David. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.  
 
Neuhouser, Frederick. “Rousseau’s Critique of Economic Inequality.” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 41(3) (2013): 193-225. 
 
Nielsen, Kai. “Cultural Nationalism, Neither Ethnic nor Civic.” In Theorizing 
Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner, 119-130. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1999. 
 
Norman, Wayne. “Theorizing Nationalism (Normatively).” In Theorizing Nationalism, 
edited by Ronald Beiner, 51-66. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1999. 
 
Parekh, Bhikhu. “The Incoherence of Nationalism.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited 
Ronald Beiner, 295-326. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Patten, Alan. “The Republican Critique of Liberalism.” British Journal of Political 
Science 26 (1996): 25-44. 
 
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Plattner, Marc E. “Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism.” In The Legacy of 
Rousseau, edited by Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 184-200. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Pocock, J.G.A. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.   
 
“Quebecers Form a Nation Within Canada: PM.” CBC News, November 22, 2006, 
accessed October 15, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/quebecers-form-a-
nation-within-canada-pm-1.624141.   
 
Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
 
 
216 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “Considerations on the Government of Poland.” In The Plan for 
Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History 
and Politics, translated by Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush, 167-240. Hanover: 
Dartmouth College Press, 2005. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.” In The Social Contract 
and the Discourses, translated by G.D.H. Cole, 27-114. London: J.M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd., 1973. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “Discourse on Political Economy.” In The Social Contract and 
the Discourses, translated by G.D.H. Cole, 115-154. London: J.M. Dent & Sons 
Ltd., 1973. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile: or On Education, translated by Allan Bloom. New York: 
Basic Books, 1979. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre, translated by Allan 
Bloom. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On the Social Contract, edited by Donald A. Cress. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2011. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “Plan for a Constitution for Corsica.” In The Plan for Perpetual 
Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and 
Politics, translated by Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush, 123-155. Hanover: 
Dartmouth College Press, 2005. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, edited 
by V. Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “The Social Contract.” In Rousseau’s Political Writings, edited 
by A. Ritter and J.C. Bondanella. New York: Norton, 1988. 
 
Talmon, J.L. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. Britain: Secker & Warburg, 1960. 
 
Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1995. 
 
Tamir, Yael. “Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism.” In Theorizing 
Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner, 67-90. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1999. 
 
Taylor, Charles. “Nationalism and Modernity.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by 
Ronald Beiner, 219-246. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Weinstock, Daniel and David Kahane. “Introduction.” In Deliberative Democracy in 
Practice, edited by David Kahane et al., 1-20. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010. 
217 
 
 
Williams, David Lay. “Should We Care About Inequality? Let’s Ask a Philosopher.” The 
Washington Post, March 28, 2014, accessed November 25, 2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/28/should-we-
care-about-inequality-lets-ask-a-philosopher/   
 
Yack, Bernard. “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by 
Ronald Beiner, 103-118. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.  
 
  
218 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Name:   Bojan Ratković 
 
Post-secondary  Brock University 
Education and  St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada 
Degrees:   2005-2009 B.A. 
 
Brock University 
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada 
2009-2011 M.A. 
 
The University of Western Ontario 
London, Ontario, Canada 
2011-2016 Ph.D. 
 
Honours and   Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS) 
Awards:   2011-2012 
 
Social Science Graduate Alumni Award 
2013-2014 
 
Related Work  Teaching Assistant 
Experience   The University of Western Ontario 
2011-2015 
 
Teaching Assistant 
Brock University 
2009-2010 
 
Research Assistant 
Brock University 
2005-2010 
 
Publications: 
Ratković, Bojan. (2014). Rousseau and Revolution: The Influence of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Ideas on the French Revolution and Beyond. Inquiry & Insight 7(1), 1-20. 
 
Ratković, Bojan & Antonio Redfern Pucci. (2010). An Uneven Playing Field: European 
Enlargement, Inequality and Double Standards: the Case of Serbia. The Canadian Centre 
for German and European Studies Working Paper Series, 
http://euce.apps01.yorku.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/EUCE-York-Working-Paper-
Series-2010-09-B.-Ratkovic-and-A.-Redfern-Pucci- An-Uneven-Playing-Field-European-
Enlargement-and-the-Case-of-Serbia.pdf.  
